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My dissertation defends W.E.B. Du Bois’s philosophy of modern freedom, which he grounds in 
the historical reconstruction of the American civic community on the moral basis of free and equal 
citizenship. Rather than ascribe to him an elitist politics of racial ‘uplift’ and assimilation to Anglo- 
American folkways, I instead argue that he defends black moral and political autonomy for 
securing state power and civic equality. Additionally, he challenges both historical and the 
contemporary political philosophers, including John Rawls, Axel Honneth, and Philip Pettit, to 
articulate the racial dimension of the development of a social order that actualizes the moral 
meaning of free and equal citizenship. In establishing his novel philosophy of freedom, I adduce 
three critical components: 
 
(1) Contra standard interpretations of Du Bois that claim he espouses a controversial racialist 
doctrine, I argue that his racialism is best understood as conceptualizing the ethical salience of 
racial difference in the context of a democratic plurality. In the light of dominant accounts of 
plurality that do not foreground race, pace Margaret Gilbert and John Rawls, Du Bois 
deemphasizes individuals’ free choice in social group formation. In accepting the importance of 
free choice, he stresses collective historical experience as furnishing the normative salience of 
racial identity, which prefigures individuals’ free choice. A racialist model of racial difference in 
a democratic plurality exacts the civic obligation to confront the historical legacy of slavery and 
Jim Crow. 
 
(2) In advancing the moral value of citizenship, Du Bois affirms the moral obligation of the modern 
American state to represent black interests from Reconstruction onwards. Drawing on G.W.F. 
Hegel’s normative theory of the modern state, I justify Du Bois’s analysis of postbellum federal 
policies concerning black freedmen and refugees of the Civil War. Du Bois observes that the 
Freedmen’s Bureau – established with the passage of the 1865 Radical Reconstruction 
Amendments – democratically facilitated a ‘social revolution’ by promoting the integration of 
black freedmen on the moral basis of free and equal citizenship under the aegis of the federal 
government. Implicit in his analysis is a normative commitment to representational government 
that in attending to the needs of the postbellum black community incorporates black political will 
in the public adjudication of the common good – a historically unprecedented phenomenon. 
 
(3) With the rise of Jim Crow, when the U.S. federal government skirted its moral obligation to 
defend black interests, Du Bois argues that the black church and college assumed a civic function. 
Habits of citizenship flourished there, affirming the moral agency of African Americans as 
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American citizens. Inasmuch as these institutions groomed disenfranchised black citizens for the 
assumption of political power, I articulate the challenge they present to John Rawls, Axel Honneth, 
and Philip Pettit to chart the civic dimension of ‘private’ social institutions. Because they neglect 
to theorize the historical experience of racial subordination, their views of freedom omit a 
formulation of social cooperation guided by the notion of the civic within the institutional context 
of civil society. Specifically, their accounts of the interrelation between citizens, social institutions, 
and the modern state fail to capture the civic function of the black church and college during Jim 
Crow. Thus, Du Bois’s dynamic, institution-based account of freedom highlights the racial 










































 This project could not have been conceived apart from the institutional context of the City 
University of New York. If it were not for CUNY’s commitment to providing high quality 
education to the children of immigrants and the working poor of New York City, I would not have 
been able to attend college. My dissertation is a direct result of the city’s investment in its children, 
who are given the opportunity to enter formidable professions, such as academic philosophy. I 
would like to begin by thanking NYC and all of its residents, and the CUNY students and faculty 
who continue to struggle for equitable access to higher education.  
As an undergraduate student at Hunter College, I met Dr. Linda M. Alcoff and Dr. Frank 
M. Kirkland, resulting in two fateful intellectual friendships. I would like to thank Dr. Alcoff for 
writing on the back of the first paper I submitted to her as an undergraduate, “I hope you are 
considering graduate school”—a comment that Linda might not remember making. At the time, I 
was working as a live-in nanny for a child who refused to share his snacks with ‘the help,’ but 
dreamt of becoming a Professor of Philosophy. Her words shot through me like a lightning storm 
and reinforced my totally crazy ambition to pursue a Ph.D. in Philosophy. Nearly a decade later, 
her patient mentorship as my dissertation advisor helped me find my philosophical voice and feel 
at home in the discipline. From her love of philosophy and the articulate defense of a good idea, 
to her unflagging passion for justice, and her warmth, I have wrought a model for the pursuit and 
instruction of philosophy.  
I would also like to thank Dr. Frank M. Kirkland for inviting me to walk by his side through 
the world of philosophical ideas for nearly ten years. Dr. Kirkland’s steady mentorship has 
sustained my need for answers that I brought to a world that seldom responded openly or 
forthrightly, unlike Dr. Kirkland, whose office door I always found open to me, and, him, ready to 
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answer any questions a belligerent young woman with a chip on her shoulder might have. Frank, 
thank you for helping me understand. As I enter the profession, I carry with me my mentors’ 
standards of academic excellence and judicious judgment.  
I am indebted to Dr. Charles W. Mills for his generosity and unflagging support during 
each phase of the drafting of my dissertation. I am exceedingly lucky to have had him challenging 
me, particularly with respect to Africana philosophy and philosophy of race in the analytic 
tradition. I would also like to thank the committee members, Dr. Lawrie Balfour and Dr. Serene 
Khader, for their investment in, and consistent support, of the project. Dr. Sibyl Schwarzenbach’s 
introduction to the depth and complexity of John Rawls’s thought ensured that any criticism I 
make of his work is not that of a strawman argument. I am also indebted to Vasiliou Iakovos for 
arranging funding in the sixth year of my graduate studies, without which this project would not 
have come to fruition, and to the American Council on Germany and the Einstein Forum for 
providing funding and resources in the final stage of the project. And for Adele Sarli, Barbara 
Seruya, and Billy Bussell Thompson, I sing a few hosannas, loudly.  
Finally, I would like to thank my friends, Maura McGee and Lucia Stavros, who were there 
for me, listening to me complain, even encouraging it, as I drafted chapters, and celebrated with 
me each milestone that brought the project closer to completion. You have confirmed my suspicion 
what the world needs is more women with an infinite passion for the life of the mind and the arts. 
I would also like to thank my little sisters Rachel Basevich and Rosa Basevich, who while I wrote 
my dissertation supported me with the grace and maturity of a couple of world-weary rabbis, all 
the while looking up to me as their cool big sister. Thank you for still looking at me that way.  
I dedicate this project to the memory of my paternal grandmother, Nelli Basevich, a 
Russian Jew who was born in 1917 and survived WWI & II to help raise me in Brooklyn, NY, and 
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teach me kindness and the Russian alphabet. She first gave me my moral imagination, which 
kindled this project: “Tell the truth, defend the vulnerable, and love the work you do.” Thankfully, 
here, I was able to satisfy all three conditions at once. With the completion of this project, I 
consecrate my life to the realization of her vision of goodness. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge 
my parents, whose withdrawal from my life unwittingly taught me to be the master of my fate, to 
plumb the depths of my personal power, and the quiet dignity of forgiveness—lessons few learn 
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I. Introduction. Du Bois Among Us:  
A Contemporary Political Philosopher, A Voice 
from the Past 
 
 
 “Ironically, W.E.B. Du Bois may be both ‘the most contemporary figure in the twenty-
first century for us’ and one who for that very reason has been thoroughly ignored by mainstream 
scholarship.”1 Charles Mills captures my motivation for writing my dissertation. As a graduate 
student in philosophy in the City University of New York, I studied major figures of Anglo-
American and European modern philosophy who offered frameworks for conceptualizing 
freedom in a modern constitutional republic. In my first semester of graduate school, New York 
City erupted with grassroots protest that coalesced into the national, then global, Occupy Wall 
Street Movement. True to the spirit of CUNY, my instructors held seminars on Hegel and Rawls 
in Zuccotti Park. When the routine shooting of black Americans at the hands of police officers 
and vigilantes later ignited the Black Lives Matter Movement, it brought to public attention 
longstanding practices of violent, discriminatory policing, as well as the rash of white nationalist 
attacks that plagued the nation. As the movement flourished, there were two major uprisings led 
by young black Americans in Ferguson and Baltimore. Such was the political context of my 
philosophical studies—that of a young Russian-Jewish woman who looked to her discipline for 
an explanation of the failures and promise of the experiment of American democracy and what it 
means to be an American. With so much at stake in settling these questions, I wanted to make 
                                                      
1 Mills, Charles W. “W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Liberal,” in A Political Companion to W. E. B. Du Bois. (Ed.) 
Nick Bromell. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, forthcoming. p. 3; Cornel West, in Christa Buschendorf, 
“‘A Figure of Our Times’: An Interview with Cornel West on W. E. B. Du Bois,” Du Bois Review 10.1 (2013): 261-
78.  
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my study of philosophy a contribution, however small, to repairing the moral spirit of American 
democracy. 
Press coverage about the mass shooting of nine black parishioners at The Emanuel 
African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina by a white nationalist, often 
asserted the difficulty of understanding why the murders occurred and speculated about the 
mental health of the perpetrator.2 While accepting that the grounds of senseless acts of violence 
are inscrutable and that all is not well in the mind of a mass murderer, I was struck by the 
reluctance, manifest in public sentiment in the American south and nationwide, to associate the 
mass shooting to the white supremacist heritage of the Confederacy that had inspired it—a vision 
of American democracy where black and brown people, immigrants and the stateless cow before 
whites who reclaim a superiority based on the “true” meaning of the heritage of the nation and 
what it means to be a “true” American. It is instructive to recall the words of Hannah Arendt in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: “[O]nce a specific crime has appeared for the first time, its reappearance 
is more likely than its initial emergence could ever have been.”3 Not only must the American 
polity foreground the prospect of racist violence in the future, but directly confront the historical 
legacy of white supremacy from which it germinates, articulating a structural relation that 
continues to provide motivating grounds for racist violence: both ‘random’ and systematic acts 
of violence share an underlining model of world-making. That too is part of the longstanding 
conventions of American democracy and manifest in the contestation of who counts as an 
American, with civic standing warranting the full legal protections, moral respect, and social 
esteem.   
                                                      
2 Cobb, Jelani. “Inside the Trial of Dylann Roof: The Complicated Moral Calculations that Followed a Horrific 
Crime,” The New Yorker, 6 February 2017. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/06/inside-the-trial-of-
dylann-roof 
3 Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin, 2006. p. 273. 
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  In engaging modern political philosophy, I sought to present a conception of freedom 
reflecting sober confrontation of the world as it is and as it was, fraught with racial violence and 
tension about who counts as a citizen and what protections citizenship should entail. Indeed, 
what kind of moral injury constitutes being gunned down by a police officer or a white 
nationalist was subject to vehement political dispute in the public eye. In turning to modern 
political philosophy, as numerous Africana philosophers and critical race theorists have 
observed, its argumentative conventions were not adequate to explain the way racial matters 
informed the successes and failures of American democracy. If I must revise, stretch, or abandon 
the framing assumptions of the canon, I would do so for the sake of establishing a philosophy of 
freedom that assays the world as it is and proffers a vision of what it ought to be. In particular, as 
a philosopher, I wanted to sketch the moral imagination requisite for guiding the American 
public to conceiving a racially-inclusive social unity, issuing from the recognition and 
actualization of the equal moral status of racially-derogated citizens in the American civic 
community. The achievement of such a vision of social unity necessitates not only expounding 
the concepts of freedom through the lens of race, but addressing the past and present experiences 
of racial embodiment, the historical memory of racial traumas, and the legacy of moral agency 
manifest in the self-determination of oppressed peoples—what W.E.B. Du Bois calls “striving.”4 
I, then, turned to W.E.B. Du Bois to expound a vision of social unity that could repair the moral 
spirit of American democracy.  
In the dissertation, in reconstructing Du Bois’s philosophy of modern freedom, I establish 
his contribution to reimagining the moral rights of citizenship and the moral ideal of the 
American civic community, conceived as a racially-inclusive plurality. I also submit that for Du 
Bois the basic structure must actualizes the equal moral standing of all Americans, but he 
                                                      
4 Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Penguin, 1989. p. 8. 
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anchors the rationality of the social order to its ability to enfranchise former slaves and their 
descendants.5 The challenge of realizing the promise of Emancipation through the reorganization 
of the basic structure, I take, is the foundation of his philosophy of modern freedom. In 
articulating black citizens’ relation to the institutions of the basic structure—especially the state 
and civil society—I follow Du Bois by presenting social and political self-determination through 
the lens of racial and racist experiences. The imbrication of the concepts of freedom and race is 
an optimal departure point for normative theorizing of American democracy. This is precisely 
the departure point for Du Bois’s critique of Reconstruction and Jim Crow, from which I 
reconstruct his philosophy of modern freedom.  
To be sure, Du Bois shares normative resources with liberal and republican political 
philosophers, such as G.W.F. Hegel, Margaret Gilbert, John Rawls, Axel Honneth, and Philip 
Pettit. They too theorize freedom as citizens’ self-determination in a constitutional democracy 
and appeal to the justificatory force of the moral meaning of free and equal citizenship. 
Additionally, my selection of historical and contemporary figures as sufficiently pertinent to 
juxtapose with Du Bois—with the exception of Margaret Gilbert—reflects their joint stress on 
the institutional basis of self-determination. That the recognition and actualization of moral 
equality requires differentiated institutional embedding, bolstered by the state, is a common 
feature of their approaches. Yet, as the opening quote by Charles Mills underscores, Du Bois is 
“thoroughly ignored” in mainstream scholarship, albeit there is a growing interest in his 
contribution to normative political thought and in his own storied lifetime the promise of 
American democracy lay entangled in the public confrontation of racial and racist experience.6 In 
                                                      
5 Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the 
Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880. New York: The Free Press, 1998. p. 113. 
6 Gooding-Williams, Robert. In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. Appiah, Kwame Anthony. Lines of Descent: W. E. B. Du Bois and the 
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this dissertation, I build bridges between Du Bois’s critique of 19th and 20th c. American society 
and major figures in normative political philosophy, both historical and contemporary, including 
G.W.F. Hegel, Margaret Gilbert, John Rawls, Axel Honneth, and Philip Pettit. My aim is neither 
to canonize Du Bois in order to prove that he is a formidable political philosopher—this I take 
for granted—nor to chastise and chuck central figures in mainstream political philosophy for 
their neglect of racial matters and discussion of Du Bois. Though, the oversight is especially 
palpable in the writings of the contemporary political philosophers John Rawls and Axel 
Honneth, as well as their proponents, who set out to provide a theory of freedom that meets the 
challenges of our time and our world, all the while ignoring the racial tension and violence in the 
United States and continental Europe, from which they hail. Even as a voice from the past, 
philosophically, Du Bois is a contemporary among us. For the terms of his confrontation with his 
own world, that of Jim Crow America, could inform fruitfully the formulation of the terms of the 
confrontation with our own world. Following Africana philosophers and philosophers of race, I 
present Du Bois’s political philosophy as assaying normative political philosophy to help 
articulate the most compelling account of the achievements and failures of democratic politics in 
the United States, where racial tension and racist violence abound; and a nation still strive to be 
fully free.7 
Of course, in situating Du Bois within modern political philosophy, I am entering a 
vibrant debate about how best to engage his legacy in contemporary scholarship and build 
bridges responsibly between Afro-modern political thought and modern Anglo-
American/European philosophy. Notably, Africana philosophers appropriated Du Bois as a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Emergence of Identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014. Balfour, Lawrie. Democracy’s Reconstruction: 
Thinking Politically with W. E. B. Du Bois. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Mills, Charles. Black 
Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
7 See in particular Kirkland, Frank. “Modernity and Intellectual Life in Black,” Philosophical Forum 4.1-3 
(1993):136-65. 
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pragmatist, a cosmopolitan liberal, and a radical social democrat.8 Rather than claim that Du 
Bois fits into an established philosophical paradigm, my methodology for assessing his 
contribution to political philosophy begins by taking up the challenge of reconstructing the 
concept of freedom in light of major events in American history, particularly those distinguishing 
the African-American historical experience—though, Du Bois identities the latter with the 
history of America as such.9 On my view, Du Bois illustrates that “the actual historical record” 
informs the development of a philosophical concept.10 I articulate the rationally effective reasons 
that motivated political praxis and, at least in part, constituted a factual historical record.11 From 
there, I present a philosophical framework that justifies his political critique, leading me to 
reconstruct a model of freedom implicit in his writing on Reconstruction and Jim Crow – one 
that focuses on the standpoint of slaves, freedmen, and those subject to Jim Crow segregation, 
whose moral agency redrew the scope of the American civic community and spearheaded the 
public adjudication of the public good and what it means to be an American in a racially- 
                                                      
8 West, Cornel. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989. Taylor, Paul C. “What’s the Use of Calling Du Bois a Pragmatist?” Metaphilosophy 32.1-2 
 (2004): 99-114. Marable, Manning. W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat. Boston: Twayne, 1986. Reed, 
Adolph L. Jr. W.E.B. Du Bois and American Political Thought: Fabianism and the Color Line. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. Gooding-Williams, Robert. In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in 
America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.  
9 Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the 
Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880. New York: The Free Press, 1998. p. 13 & p. 29-30. 
10 Mills, Charles W. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. p. 92. 
11 In his lectures on history, Hegel distinguishes the actual historical record from “actuality” (Wirklichkeit), or the 
“will” or “principle” that impels historical praxis; the latter’s actualization takes the dual form of an empirical object 
for social scientific study and a bounded set of shared reasons for political action that a philosopher might 
reconstruct. In the same lectures, Hegel states that the struggle for the political character of the United States is just 
emerging and is – at least from his vantage point – too inchoate to judge: “America is therefore the land of the 
future.” The advantage of Hegel’s account is that one can foreground political philosophy in history, while avoiding 
a narrow focus on historical sociology. Furthermore, Du Bois’s analysis provides rich material for us to understand 
the concrete form the struggle for the political character of the U.S. took as historical fact, as well as the rationally 
effective reasons that informed political praxis. Hegel, G.W.F. Introduction to the Philosophy of History. 
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988. p. 90.  
 I should also note that in the expanded version of this project, my methodology does not presuppose a naïve 
idealism of the kind commonly attributed to Hegel and originating in Marx’s critique of the Young Hegelians in his 
German Ideology. Rather, in the spirit of a revamped Marxist critique, economic and social forces, especially as they 
pertain to the organization of labor and the political economy, are essential to my account of freedom, as they 
constitute the objective material conditions that inform political praxis.  
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inclusive manner.  
So in blood and servile war, freedom came to America. What did it mean to men? The 
paradox of democracy founded on slavery had at last been done away with. But it became 
more and more customary as time went on, to linger and to emphasize the freedom which 
emancipation brought to the masters, and later to the poor whites. On the other hand, 
strangely enough, not as much has been said of what freedom meant to the freed; of the 
sudden wave of glory that rose and burst above four million people, and of the echoing 
shout that brought that brought joy to four hundred thousand fellows of African blood in 
the North. Can we imagine this spectacular revolution? Not, of course, unless we think of 
these people as human beings like ourselves. Not unless, assuming this common 
humanity, we conceive ourselves in a position where we are chattels and real estate, and 
then suddenly in a night become ‘thenceforward and forever free.’ Unless we can do this, 
there is, of course, no point in thinking of this central figure in emancipation. But 
assuming the common humanity of these people, conceive of what happened[.]12 
 
The historical challenge Du Bois saw himself confronting was fulling the promise of former 
slaves’ social, political, and economic enfranchisement that Emancipation spelled. His main 
concern was with stipulating what the promise of freedom yielded during Reconstruction and 
later, how the demands of the segregated black community morphed during the Jim Crow era, 
without wholly foregoing the moral claim to equal standing in the American civic community, 
according to Du Bois.13 My interrogation of the development of his political critique thus 
critically corresponds to two historical periods, Reconstruction and the Jim Crow era. Although 
his analysis shifts in important ways, he consistently underscores both the importance of race in 
formulating political claims and, ideally, that black politics should achieve blacks’ inclusion in 
the modern American state on the moral basis of equal citizenship. He hopes to resolve what he 
identifies as the problem of the color-line, which perpetrates racist exclusion from the basic 
structure, within the ideals of a modern democratic constitutional regime, while also 
                                                      
12 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 121. Emphasis added.  
13 Although Neil Roberts does not focus on Du Bois’s political philosophy, the philosophical method he develops 
informs my reconstruction of the concept of freedom from Du Bois’s critique of Reconstruction and Jim Crow. 
Roberts grounds normative theorizing in the experience of slaves and freedmen, as a ‘raw’ material for re-
conceptualizing the nature of modern freedom. See his Freedom as Marronage. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2015. 
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countenancing the flourishing of racial difference in a democratic polity.  
One might question why one ought to focus on the concept of freedom grounded in the 
moral value of American citizenship rather than abandon it altogether. The noted Du Bois 
scholar Robert Gooding-Williams writes that “preoccupation […] with the possibilities of 
Emancipation” is a “genre-defining” feature of Afro-modern political thought.14 Yet, often 
accompanying the call for emancipation, Afro-modern political thought evinces suspicion toward 
the discourse of freedom, positing that major American institutions are intrinsically racist, a view 
manifest from Marcus Garvey’s Pan-Africanism to Paul Taylor’s recent claim that the very “idea 
of America” should be rejected “root and branch.”15 Du Bois, on the contrary, consistently 
underlines the legitimacy of the struggle for civic inclusion and democratic representation in 
social and political institutions – especially in the modern state – as part of the amplification of 
African Americans’ freedom and collective self-determination. This commitment of Du Bois’s is 
the lynchpin to my reconstruction of his view of modern freedom. However, while Du Bois 
offers a variegated, rich analysis—ranging from historical scholarship, to journalism, to 
ethnographies—he did not find it necessary to provide a justification for the normative basis of 
his critique, which I assail as a philosophy of modern freedom. His oeuvre had a political 
urgency that did not cross into a preoccupation with the philosophical justification of political 
claims; nor does he offer explicit arguments in favor of a model of political legitimacy that 
amplified the scope and the substance of membership in the American civic community, a 
concern that principally characterizes this project. Yet, I affirm that the philosophical 
reconstruction of the normative commitments that inform Du Bois’s views on freedom as black 
                                                      
14 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 3.  
15 Taylor, “What’s the Use of Calling Du Bois a Pragmatist?,” p. 102. See also Boxill, Bernard. “Two traditions in 
African American political philosophy,” in African-American Perspectives and Philosophical Traditions. John P 
Pittman (Ed.). New York: Routledge, 2013: pp. 119-34. 
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enfranchisement in postbellum America is an urgent task that could potentially contribute to 
untangling longstanding racial friction in the polity. 
The dissertation consists of four chapters that focus on distinct but interrelated topics 
pertinent to Du Bois’s critique of 19th and 20th c. American society: (1) Du Bois’s view on the 
normative significance racial identity and difference, entailed by his “racialism,” which I 
introduce in the context of democratic plurality and exhort us to confront the historical memory 
of slavery and Jim Crow in the public sphere; (2) his philosophy of the ethical function of the 
modern American state defends the moral status of African Americans as equal American 
citizens during Reconstruction; in the aftermath of Emancipation, the promise of freedom was 
thus linked to the moral ideal of civic enfranchisement; (3) with the failure of the state to execute 
its ethical function and actualize the full promise of freedom for former slaves and their 
descendants, I present Du Bois’s account of the civic function of the black church and schools in 
the Jim Crow era. Within these major institutions in the segregated black community, ordinary 
citizens—particularly women—were responsible for the exercise of the moral rights of 
citizenship. And, finally, (4) I address Robert Gooding-Williams’s republican-inspired critique 
of Du Bois’s political philosophy. He attributes to Du Bois an elitist politics of racial “uplift,” 
wherein black elites are responsible for counteracting white racism and for preparing the 
culturally “backward” black masses to assume the responsibilities of American modernity. 
Gooding-Williams considers Du Bois a romantic expressivist, advocating assimilation through 
self-assertion. In light of his criticism of Du Bois, I argue that Gooding-Williams unfairly severs 
the normative basis of Du Bois’s political critique from the goal of civic enfranchisement. Such a 
philosophical move dissolves what I hope to illustrate is the lynchpin of Du Bois’s political 




Chapter I.  
Du Bois’s Racialism and Two Liberal Approaches 
to Plurality 
 
From co-founding the NAACP in 1909 to joining the Communist Party in 1961, W.E.B. 
Du Bois’s political affiliations varied over the course of his long, storied career. Yet, he 
continued to uphold the basic tenets of political liberalism, at least with respect to the following 
commitments: the defense of civil and political rights in representational constitutional 
democracy.1 These commitments, however, he understood to dovetail with his racialist doctrine, 
which he introduces in the early essay “The Conservation of Races” (1897) and elaborates in The 
Souls of Black Folk (1903) and elsewhere.2 Appealing to Du Bois’s racialism in order to define 
racial difference in the context of a democratic plurality might prima facie appear 
counterproductive. Many Du Bois scholars reject his racialism as essentialist, at best, and as 
tacitly steeped in proto-fascist 20th c. pseudo-science, at worst.3 Perhaps this is why Du Bois 
scholars have not explored the doctrine in light of the idea of democratic plurality. Moreover, 
                                                           
1 Paul C. Taylor notes that in a personal letter to a friend following his persecution by the House of Un-American 
Committee, Du Bois concedes that racial justice is perhaps unachievable in the United States. Taylor, Paul C. 
“What’s the Use of Calling Du Bois a Pragmatist?” Metaphilosophy 32.1-2 (2004): 99-114. 
2 On my view, Du Bois early and later views on racialism are consistent. While they are most clearly articulated in 
his early essays, his racialist views are evident in his later works Dusk of Dawn and Black Reconstruction. Robert 
Gooding-Williams concurs. In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011. p. 167. 
3 Kwame Anthony Appiah spearheaded a debate spurred by his accusation that Du Bois’s racialism is inadvertently 
grounded in pseudo-scientific biological essentialism. For a full range of the debate, see Kwame Anthony Appiah. In 
my Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Lucia T. 
Outlaw, Jr. On Race and Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 1996. Tommy L. Lott. The Invention of Race: Black 
Culture and the Politics of Representation. Maldon: Blackwell, 1999. p. 47-66. Paul Taylor, “Appiah’s 
Uncompleted Argument: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Reality of Race,” Social Theory and Practice 26.1 (2000): 103-
28. Robert Gooding-Williams and Tommie Shelby claim that Du Bois’s doctrine of racialism is essentialist as well, 
but on account not of its tie to biology but its over-determination of black values. See Gooding-Williams, Robert. In 
the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011 and 
Shelby, Tommie. We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity. Cambridge: Harvard 




most contemporary political philosophers, who seldom cite Du Bois, refrain from focusing on 
race—to the marginalization of other categories of social differentiation and political belonging, 
such as gender, religion, and nationality—in theorizing democratic plurality.  
In this chapter, I illustrate that within the normative framework of political liberalism the 
doctrine can foreground racial matters and the historical experiences of denigrated racial groups, 
which liberalism has struggled to do.4 In an expanded version of this essay, I aim to show that 
foregrounding racial matters amplifies our understanding of how other forms of social 
differentiation and political belonging enter democratic political culture and intersect with racial 
identity.5 For the purpose of this chapter, however, I pursue the more modest aim of 
demonstrating that much of the anxiety about Du Bois’s racialism is unwarranted and that there 
is much to be gained from it, particularly for theorizing the normative significance of racial 
difference in democratic politics. In doing so, I follow a flurry of recent Du Bois scholarship that 
has emerged attempting to establish the promise of Du Bois’s racialism in light of its original 
formulation of the “social construction” of racial identity.6 Pushing further a social constructivist 
line, I argue that his racialism should foreground the interpretation of racial difference in a 
                                                           
4 There is a rich, burgeoning literature on the topic. I am particularly influenced by Charles Mills’s The Racial 
Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999; Tommie Shelby’s We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Black Solidarity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007, and Melvin Rogers’s recent work on 
race and democratic culture.  
5 To this effect, Du Bois would reject contemporary theories of ‘intersectionality’ inasmuch as he is wholly 
committed to a racialist doctrine. Race is the foundational category in relation to which gender, class, religion, and 
nationality might be cast. For an opposing view, see: Hancock, Ange-Marie. “W.E.B. Du Bois: Intellectual Father of 
Intersectionality?” SOULS: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture and Society 7 (2005): 74-84. 
Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks, “African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race,” Signs 17.2 
(1992): pp. 251-74. Du Bois’s doctrine of racialism also bears striking resemblance to Charles Mills’s recent public 
lectures on black radical liberalism. For Charles Mills’s account of Du Bois’s political philosophy, see Mills, 
Charles. “W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Liberal,” in A Political Companion to W. E. B. Du Bois. (Ed.) Nick 
Bromell. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, forthcoming. 
6 Alcoff. Linda Martín. The Future of Whiteness. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2015. Owen, David S. 
“Whiteness in Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk,” Philosophia Africana 10.2 (2007): 107-26. Taylor, Paul C. Race: 
A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2013. Kirkland, Frank M. “On Du Bois’s 
Notion of Double Consciousness,” Philosophy Compass 8.2 (2013): 137-48. Kirkland, Frank M. “Modernity and 
Intellectual Life in Black,” Philosophical Forum 24.1-3 (1993): 136-65. Jeffers, Chike. “Appiah’s 
Cosmopolitanism,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 51.4 (2013): 488-510 & “The Cultural Theory of Race: Yet 




democratic plurality, which dominant liberal accounts of plurality neglect. 
Du Bois maintains that although the meaning of racial identity is necessarily open to 
transformation, it carries unified ethical content that is non-volitional and has yet to resonate 
fully in American public political culture. Racial embodiment’s non-volitional characteristic is 
not a matter of personal choice and is delineated by the historical legacy of racializing and racist 
social and political practices.7 Racial identity is pregnant with a historically-sedimented 
normative significance that has been left incompletely articulated, amounting to a racial “ideal” 
that has yet to deliver its “message” to the world.8  African Americans’ message to the world 
carries insight into sacrifice, sorrow, and moral forbearance in the experiment of American 
democracy that began with the enslavement of their bodies.9 The Du Bois scholar Chike Jeffers 
argues that it is the “legacy of suffering from which we are supposed to learn. Learning this 
lesson – receiving the message – is not about learning how to go through slavery; it is about 
acquiring an egalitarian approach to human development.”10 Du Bois affirms that if the message 
is heard and properly understood, it would promote the moral spirit of American democracy, for 
it would press for the recognition of the universal rights of citizenship and the equal 
consideration of citizens’ claims in the distribution of power in major social and political 
institutions. Listening to the message would also educate the white citizens and the de facto 
white racial polity, founded on the institution of black chattel slavery, insofar as it would 
                                                           
7 For an illuminating contemporary discussion of why racial identity is not a matter of personal choice, see chapter 3 
of Taylor, Paul C. Race: A Philosophical Introduction. 2nd Edition. Malden: Polity, 2013. 
8 Du Bois, W.E.B. “The Conservation of Races,” in W.E.B. Du Bois: Writings. New York: The Library of America, 
1986: pp. 815-26. p. 819. 
9 My construal of the ethical significance of Du Bois’s racialism is heavily influenced by Danielle S. Allen’s book, 
Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education. Chicago and London: Chicago 
University Press, 2004. There she argues that the notion of black sacrifice must be understood in the context of 
promoting the ideals of a free American polity for the sake of democratic friendship. Following Ralph Ellison’s 
narration in Invisible Man, she observes that such sacrifice has remained largely invisible. 
10 Chike Jeffers, “Black Ideals and Modern Civilization: Cultural Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Du Bois,” p. 
23. Unpublished. (Cited with the author’s permission.).  
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facilitate the “comprehension of black people’s tragic and comic experiences.”11 For Du Bois, 
there is a moral debt that must be repaid; the demand to repay the debt issues from the moral 
meaning of citizenship, attesting to a reasonable citizens’ capacity for justice.12 Democratic 
politics is only possible if the legacy of black striving does not “fall into oblivion.”13 Or, as Toni 
Morrison puts it, we must “reremember.”14  
This racial ideal, Du Bois argues, reveals shared ethical “impulses” and “spiritual” 
inclinations that broadly converge on visibly-embodied difference, most notably skin color, 
while “infinitely transcending” it.15 We would then have to confront in the democratic polity 
what Du Bois asserts is the significance of racial identity as a racial ideal. He defines it in light of 
the problem of the color line – a reference point for apprehending black collective striving. Such 
a departure point merits conceptualizing 1) racial ideals as “ethical responses,”16 ones that are 
materially tied to 2) visible, racial embodiment, and 3) objective social location, as determined 
by a racist social hierarchy (i.e., differential access to political power and material resources).17  
In this chapter, I distinguish Du Bois’s doctrine of racialism from two dominant 
approaches for conceptualizing plurality within the framework of political liberalism, broadly 
speaking. I consider why these two paradigmatic liberal models for conceptualizing democratic 
plurality fail to accommodate racial identity adequately: 1) the republican model of social group 
11 Kirkland, “On Du Bois’s Notion of Double Consciousness,” p. 27. 
12 Helpfully, John Rawls writes: “the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty.” Political Liberalism, p. 
217. 
13 See Kirkland, Frank M. “Modernity and Intellectual Life in Black,” Philosophical Forum 24.1-3 (1993): 136-65. 
14 Morrison, Toni. Beloved. New York: Vintage, 2007. p. 43. 
15 Du Bois, “Conservation,” p. 818. 
16 Kirkland, Frank. “On Du Bois’s Notion of Double Consciousness: Some Hegelian Reflections,” p. 27. 
Unpublished. (Cited with the author’s permission.) 
17 I draw from the following critical race theorists sympathetic to Du Bois’s racialism: Alcoff, Linda Martín. Visible 
Identities: Race, Gender and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Alcoff, Linda Martín. The Future of 
Whiteness. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2015. Taylor, Paul C. Race: A Philosophical Introduction. 2nd 
Edition. Malden: Polity, 2013. Mills, Charles. Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race. Ithaca: Cornell 





formation, as illustrated by Margaret Gilbert’s view of plural subjects in jointly-committed 
groups and 2) Rawls’s idea of comprehensive doctrines. In my interrogation of these approaches, 
I aim to show that their accounts of social differentiation fail to capture the salient normative 
content of racial embodiment, which is not wholly volitional. Its normative significance is not a 
jointly-pursued goal or a view of the good a racial group assents to. On a racialist doctrine, the 
normative content of racial identity accrues historically and prefigures individual volition. The 
liberal approaches above illuminate that a strictly volitional account of the normative 
significance of black identity severs us from its historically-sedimented meaning, such that the 
memory of the past – the legacy of black slavery, sorrow, and forbearing resistance – risks 
falling into oblivion. It also risks obscuring the significance of visible embodiment and objective 
social location that centrally figures in the meaning of racial identity for Du Bois. 
 
i. A Republican View of Democratic Plurality – Gilbert’s ‘Plural’ Subjects 
Many philosophers have used a broadly republican framework to develop a political 
conception of difference that accommodates gender and racial identity in the context of a 
democratic public sphere.18 A republican model of volitional group formation and action 
attempts to account for both the emergence of racial identities and the possible political 
implications they might have. Margaret Gilbert presents a paradigmatic republican model of 
social group formation. What is distinctive about a republican approach to conceptualizing 
plurality – a feature best exemplified by Gilbert’s work – is that the free will of an individual 
                                                           
18 For further examples of republican models of social group formation, see Gooding-Williams, Robert. In the 
Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011 & 
Look, a Negro!: Philosophical Essays on Race, Culture, and Politics. New York and Milton Park: Routledge, 2005. 
Zerilli, Linda. Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005.  Honig, 
Bonnie. “Towards an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity,” in Feminist Interpretations 
of Hannah Arendt. (Ed. Bonnie Honig). University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995: pp. 135-65. Young, 




person is taken as the relevant reference point for modeling democratic plurality. An aggregate 
of individuals constitutes a social group, which she subsequently identifies as a “plural subject,” 
and it is on account of individuals’ volition as private individuals that fills out the relevant 
dimension of plurality. 
Of course, one might ask which aspect of the ‘private person’ is relevant here. Most any 
liberal framework seeks to accommodate individual autonomy. Gilbert posits that individuals’ 
pre-given, private interests motivate them to bind their will to others and to discharge the social 
obligations that subsequently arise. In A Theory of Political Obligation, she argues that a social 
group is a plural subject consisting of an aggregate of individuals – each with private ends – 
forming a joint commitment to forge and execute a common end.19 It is by virtue of the disparate 
individual ends that happen to converge in a social group that it is ‘plural’ at all. On this view, 
plurality is a measure of an aggregate of individuals with distinctive private interests and appears 
to be qualitative in character. A “plural” social group is “a set of jointly committed persons.”20  
Gilbert stipulates that group actions result from individuals’ intentions compacted in a 
joint commitment.21 This later formulation is consistent with her earlier work, where she argues 
that two individuals agreeing to go for a walk together is a paradigmatic example of social group 
formation. Two individuals, each with a distinct interest, agree to go for a walk, forming a joint 
commitment to achieve this common end, i.e., to take a walk together. In her most recent book 
Joint Commitment, she points to families as another paradigmatic example of a jointly-
committed, “plural” subject. In the family, each member of the group commits to a common 
                                                           
19 Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, p. 91. 
20 Gilbert, Margaret. “A Real Unity of Them All.” The Monist 92.2 (2009): 268-85. p. 276 
21 Gilbert’s voluntaristic view of social groups presents a problem for her political theory with respect to the 
relationship between democracy and the creation of binding political obligations. At times, reminiscent of the 
federalist papers, Gilbert appears to suggest that if a political whole is to remained bounded, political conventions 





goal, but for “private” reasons. This example has some odd results. A single-parent household 
with an infant or an autistic child is not actually a “family,” according to Gilbert.22 Individuals’ 
must register within the potential group their personal intention to join it. So, what about the 
plural subject makes it ‘plural’? “To put it somewhat formally: A and B (and . . .) (or those with 
feature F) constitute a plural subject (by definition) if and only if they are jointly committed to 
doing something as a body—in abroad sense of ‘do.’”23 
What does this definition give us? The most charitable interpretation of her view of 
plurality is that it refers to an individual’s capacity for volition – to simply have interests and 
pursue them. That bare capacity captures her notion of individual autonomy. She clarifies that 
this indeed is her view in Joint Commitment: “the condition for [the] creation [of social groups] 
are relatively easy to state and easily satisfiable – really not much less so than the making of a 
personal decision or forming of a personal intention.”24 In the family, for example, individuals’ 
“personal decision” to form a family defines it as a plural subject. And so, for the purpose of this 
paper, it is sufficient to note that, on her view, individuals’ pre-given, private interests motivate 
them to acquire membership in a social group, whose other members also commit to the group. 
These aggregated individuals and their disparate motivations define the plural subject.  
Gilbert does not mention race as a social group. At various times, she points to a “protest 
group” as a social group and makes scattered remarks about the civil rights movement in its 
connection to black Americans.25 She submits that her account of social groups might not 
accommodate racial pluralities, but dismisses the worry.26 As we’ve seen, for Gilbert, the explicit 
                                                           
22 Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, p. 94. 
23 Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, p. 144-45. 
24 Gilbert, Margaret. Joint Commitment: How We Make a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 
9. 
25 Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, p. 92. 
26 Gilbert excludes what she calls an ‘economic class’ as a social group as well. Prima facie, one might wonder what 




positing of a shared goal that group members assent to establishes it as a social group. Yet, 
philosophers of race, and especially Du Bois himself, agree that racial groups, conceived as an 
aggregate, do not share the same private interests. Paul C. Taylor sums up the point well, 
asserting that “the [racial] social units […] are not [social] groups per se; their members need not 
share we-intentions or even an awareness of their common relation to the process of racial 
formation.”27 Taylor points to the non-volitional features of racial identity, through which one 
might participate in a process of racial formation without knowing it. Furthermore, Tommie 
Shelby and Robert Gooding-Williams highlight that the internal political differences and 
disagreements, as well as the disparate personal ambitions, that members of a racial group might 
have.28  Such heterogeneity makes it difficult to define the common political aims of the black 
community.  
In his later works, Du Bois too emphasizes the “problem” of the divergence of blacks’ 
personal ambitions and political outlooks in Black Reconstruction and Dusk of Dawn. He argues 
that increasing numbers of affluent African Americans refuse to identity with more 
disenfranchised blacks.29 But, just as pressingly, even in his earlier work, Du Bois also 
emphasizes that individuals’ personal idiosyncrasy should be promoted and is an important 
element of black humanity, and of modern subjectivity more generally, especially as it pertains 
to the free development of talents, ambitions, and proclivities. Consider his observations in Souls 
about the function of higher education and the role cultural institutions have in developing “the 
sovereign human soul”: 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
economic class, especially since she believes that her view is superior precisely because of its normative payoff. 
Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, p. 166. 
27 Taylor, “What’s the Use of Calling Du Bois a Pragmatist?,” p. 109 
28 Shelby, We Who are Dark, chp. 2. 
29 Du Bois, W.E.B. Dusk of Dawn in W.E.B. Du Bois: Writings. New York: The Library of America, 1986. pp. 692-
94. Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the 




The function of the Negro college is, then clear: […] it must develop men. [There] must 
persist and evolve that higher individualism which centres of culture protect; there must 
come a loftier respect for the sovereign human soul that seeks to know itself and the 
world about it; that seeks a freedom for expansion and self-development; that will love 
and hate and labor in its own way, untrammeled by old and new.30 
 
Hence, for Du Bois, looking for black unity on the level of personal choice is inappropriate – 
disparate, freely expanding, “sovereign” individuals ought to flourish. Thus, when it comes to 
theorizing the nature of racial difference, Gilbert’s view proves vexing. The unity of racial 
difference should not be located in individuals’ ambitions and idiosyncratic interests. Even 
though Du Bois defends the flourishing of individuals’ idiosyncrasy, especially as it pertains to 
the protection of higher education, he nonetheless considers the former to complement both the 
civic function of institutions of higher education in fostering democratic literacy in the 
segregated black community and in the ‘higher’ ethical unity of black Americans, as captured in 
his doctrine of racialism. “The soul is still individual, if it is free.”31 In other words, his racialism 
is broadly compatible with negative liberty.32 
Du Bois asserts that racial identity seldom corresponds to a voluntarily constructed social 
group, as if the normative force of racial belonging is invented whole cloth – and on a whim.33 
Racial differentiation is not chosen, and its normative salience informs the expression of 
individual pursuits. Particular individuals can sometimes manipulate it, without negating it. In 
the final section of this essay, I will elaborate the tripartite features of its objective salience, 
which I introduced in my opening remarks. Briefly restated, they include: 1) a racial message as 
an ethical response to the color-line, 2) the lived experience of racial embodiment, especially as 
                                                           
30 Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Penguin, 1989. 90. 
31 Du Bois, Darkwater, p. 7. 
32 This is simply another way of saying that Du Bois’s commitment to the essential tenets of political liberalism – 
his endorsement of basic civil and political rights, as well as of democratic politics – dovetails with his racialism. In 
chapter 3, I will elaborate how exactly the black college both caters to the flourishing of black individuality, even as 
it promotes civic duty among blacks.   




it pertains to the visibility of the body, and 3) objective social location. A model of social group 
formation based on individual volition and personal choice alone ignores each element of Du 
Bois’s conception of the salience of racial identity.  
I have yet to establish the merits of each feature of Du Bois’s racialism, yet the foregoing 
discussion demonstrates that even among philosophers of race and Du Bois scholars who do not 
defend his racialism, preferring a more volitional conception of racial identity, we find that a 
view such as Gilbert’s view is nonetheless overly volitional. By way of articulating the ethical 
unity Du Bois aspires to convey in his racialist doctrine, it would be helpful to distinguish it from 
black cultural unity. Cultural plurality is a common way his racialism is presented by Du Bois 
scholars sympathetic to his approach. However, my aim in this chapter is to show why Du Bois’s 
racialism contributes to conceptualizing the nature of racial difference in a democratic plurality. 
Cultural conceptions of race abound in political liberalism. A favored model for articulating a 
cultural account of social difference—and any normative basis of social differentiation grounded 
in socially-shared reasons for action—is found in John Rawls’s conception of plurality.  
Turning next to Rawls’s view of plurality as overlapping consensus of reasonable, 
comprehensive doctrines, and showing why it fails to capture the racial difference, would 
illustrate why a strictly cultural conception of black identity in the context of democratic politics 
is not recommendable. For the normative significance of racial identity does not lie in the 
collective assent to a vision of a good life, as expounded in Rawls’s notion of a comprehensive 
doctrine. This would set the stage for cautioning against interpretations of Du Bois as a cultural 
pluralist. We must look elsewhere for a model of plurality that captures the unified ethical 
content of racial identity – we must turn towards Du Bois’s racialism head on in order to discern 
whether it countenances a sui generous model for conceptualizing racial difference in the context 
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of a democratic politics. 
ii. Rawls on Plurality: The Problem with Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrines
In his political liberalism, John Rawls devises a widely-influential idea of plurality for the 
promotion of citizens’ freedom and justice in the modern state and as a way of grounding 
competing claims that enter public political culture. Unlike Gilbert’s thesis, according to Rawls, 
he does not model the idea of plurality on individuals’ aggregated, private interests, but on their 
socially-shared comprehensive doctrines. Whereas Gilbert holds that the private interests of 
disparate individuals are delineate the plural subject in democratic politics, Rawls submits that 
the foundation of plurality is a social interest, not a private, individual one. In fact, to his credit, 
he claims that, strictly speaking, “there is no such thing as private reason.”34 His model of 
plurality is an example of socially-shared value pluralism or “reasonable” pluralism.35 Not just 
any social interests that might bind a social group should be admitted into politics, particularly if 
it fails to respect publically-accepted standards of political judgment – or “public reason.” To be 
sure, his view accommodates individuals in their pursuit of idiosyncratic interests, as affirmation 
of a comprehensive doctrine, so long as their actions are broadly consistent with a political 
conception of justice. But, he also argues that a comprehensive doctrine requires sustained 
recognition from a social group, if it is to survive under the destabilizing conditions of 
modernity.36 
Rawls asserts that disparate (but reasonable) schemes of social value is the inevitable 
34 Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. p. 220. 
35 I borrow the term from William A. Galston. Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political 
Theory and Practice.  See also Joshua Cohen’s “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus,” in The Idea of 
Democracy. David Copp and Jean Hampton (Eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
36 In light of this assertion, Rawlsians should pay closer attention to how exactly moral and philosophical doctrines 
such as Kantianism and utilitarianism constitute comprehensive doctrines, as they hardly express a socially-shared 





outcome of citizens’ participation in the basic structure of a democratic constitutional regime. 
Plurality is, therefore, an ineradicable feature of free modern societies and should not be 
mitigated. It belongs to the “background culture” inasmuch as it is the result of the “free exercise 
of free human reason under conditions of liberty.”37 In his collected lectures in Political 
Liberalism, Rawls introduces the notion of a comprehensive doctrine in his defense of an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines. He departs from the thesis that he puts forward in 
A Theory of Justice, arguing that his articulation of justice as fairness there verges on a 
“comprehensive,” rather than a strictly “political,” doctrine. He writes that a doctrine  
is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well 
as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical 
conduct (in the limit our life as a whole). There is a tendency for religious and 
philosophical conceptions to be general and fully comprehensive […] A doctrine is fully 
comprehensive when it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather 
precisely articulated scheme of thought; whereas a doctrine is only partly comprehensive 
when it comprises certain (but not all) nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather 
loosely articulated.38  
 
A comprehensive view conveys “personal” values, virtues, and character traits that guide the 
“nonpolitical conduct” of a social group and should not dominate the space of public reason.39 
He also writes that comprehensive doctrine is a rational plan of life, in reference to which an 
individual formulates her ambitions and explores the depths of her moral personality. 
Highlighting religion in particular, as a doctrine it supplies associational norms that give many 
individuals a purpose, but one cannot reasonable expect all citizens to accept the same religious 
doctrine; to do so would undermine individual autonomy to pursue a rational plan of life of their 
choosing. An individual must be free to share with a social group of her choosing a conception of 
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38 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 175.  
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introduction of comprehensive doctrines into politics is necessary for developing political values and the meaning of 
citizens’ moral equality. He says nothing further on what he means by this. See this essay in John Rawls: Collected 




the good life, or a worldview that reveals shared commitments about ultimate meaning. 
As a model for grounding political claims, an overlapping consensus departs from – 
without altogether abandoning –Kantian formulation of the justification of political judgment.40 
An overlapping consensus of comprehensive and partially comprehensive doctrines sets fair and 
reciprocal terms of social cooperation, the normative basis of which is the moral interpretation of 
free and equal citizenship. An overlapping consensus is not itself grounded in any particular 
comprehensive doctrine. The grounding of justice must be political, and its articulation “self-
standing” and “independent of [any particular] comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines.”41 When one acts from within the perspective of a comprehensive view, one still 
affirms the norms of public reason and confirms the shared ethos of one’s democratic culture, 
although the ‘ultimate’ meaning of an action will amount to different things for different people. 
For example, I might not harm another because I believe in the intrinsic dignity of our common 
humanity. Or, I might not do so because I believe human beings are made in god’s image. In 
either case, my values confirm the sanctity of human life – a norm enshrined in publically- 
accepted standards of political judgment. Because we share the moral power of citizenship to 
judge in a fashion that reflects a common sense of justice, Rawls does not believe that justice as 
fairness is a mere modus vivendi. Citizens are similarly motivated to identify with the intrinsic 
good of justice and participate in public procedures that adjudicate the common good.42  
Rawls’s conception of plurality is superior to Gilbert’s in at least two respects. First, 
comprehensive doctrines convey shared ways of life that emerge historically and bind 
individuals together in social practices. Seldom do individuals jointly and self-consciously 
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History of Political Thought: The Rousseauvian and Hegelian Heritage of Justice as Fairness. New York: 
Routledge, 2014.  
41 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 144. 




commit to founding a new religion or a way of life.43 Furthermore, he does not appeal to 
individuals’ pre-given interests. Political power is impersonal and should not be used as a mere 
means to realize private interests, whether jointly pursued or not. Second, he recognizes that no 
one legitimately owes allegiance to doctrines that reject widely accepted values expressing our 
moral equality as citizens, even if they might be meaningful for entire sections of the population. 
Yet, his account of plurality also fails to capture the normative significance of racial identity in 
general and black identity in particular. Given that, unlike Gilbert, his failure to capture black 
identity does not lie in his espousal of a strictly volitional view of social group formation, we 
must look elsewhere for the weakness in his view of plurality.  
Even in light of citizens’ different comprehensive views, citizens’ core political values 
should still converge to define the terms of their social cooperation and basic moral equality.44 
Rawls introduces the political conception of the moral person to guide the convergence of 
comprehensive views in an overlapping consensus.45 He ascribes two moral powers to 
citizenship. First, he posits the capacity to reason about a political conception of justice, which 
affirms a duty of civility for “persons engaged in social cooperation among equals.”46 Second, he 
underscores as a moral power of citizenship the capacity to pursue a rational plan of life, or a 
scheme of the good. Rawls assumes citizens’ equivalent normative status – i.e., moral equality – 
as the departure point for theorizing justice as fairness. As he puts it, public reason “assigns to 
each person the same basic political position. In giving reasons to all citizens we don’t view 
                                                           
43 Of course, there are exceptions. Consider the founding of kibbutzes or cults. Even in these cases, one can argue 
that individuals are not inventing new social values whole cloth.  
44 Rawls connects the idea of public reason with Rousseau’s conception of the general will. See Lecture V in his 
Political Liberalism, especially pages 219-20. 
45 I do not mean to suggest that the political conception of the person alone underpins an overlapping consensus. 
Rawls lists five elements that delineate the intrinsic “good” of political society, consolidating the political 
conception of justice as fairness. For my purposes in this chapter, it is enough to simply note that there are additional 
elements without further discussion. For further discussion, see his Political Liberalism, p. 176. 




persons as socially situated or otherwise rooted, that is, as being in this or that class position, or 
in this or that property and income group, or as having this or that comprehensive doctrine.”47 In 
this sense, justice as fairness is not “redress” justice.48 The political conception of the moral 
person tackles “natural” contingency (i.e., differences in innate talents, returns on strategic 
investments, and being born into ‘less favored’ social position that just happen to exist in 
society.) Unlike comprehensive doctrines, these salient features that shape a modern citizens life 
are not “elected” but are nonetheless significant issues that a theory of justice ought to address.49 
Notably, the legacy of racial injustice falls under the banner of ‘natural’ contingency, when it is 
introduced as a public issue in democratic politics.50 Stuck between the devil and the deep blue 
sea, Rawls’s political liberalism provides two avenues for realizing citizens’ moral equality: the 
pursuit of socially-elected comprehensive doctrines (inasmuch as citizens are rational) and 
mitigating natural contingency (inasmuch as citizens are reasonable).  
In light of this framework, racial identity prima facie appears as an irrelevant feature in 
the public adjudication of the principles that ought to govern society, if possessing a racial 
identity does not negatively impact a person’s life prospects. That is, if a person is white, it does 
not factor into public political culture. Yet, if we are addressing the lived experiences—historical 
or contemporaneous—of citizens of color in the United States, then racial identity mediates an 
                                                           
47 Rawls, John. “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers. Samuel Freeman (Ed.). 
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1999. p. 607. 
48 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 86. 
49 For this point, I am indebted to Elizabeth S. Anderson’s excellent essay “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 
109.2 (1999): 287-337. 
50 He makes the dubious observation: “The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons 
are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way 
that institutions deal with these facts.” A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999. p. 87. (My emphasis.) I am unsure how to interpret the modifier “natural” here, but it appears that his 
discovery of “natural facts” about the “natural distribution” of social stations reflects that justice as fairness is not 




unfortunate ‘natural’ contingency, which lowers a person’s life prospects and social standing.51 
In this case, racial identity is relevant to the extent that it illustrates obstacles to civic 
enfranchisement. The realization of freedom and equality would result in the gradual elimination 
of categories of racial belonging.52 Yet, racial identity also contributes to democratic plurality in 
a substantive, purposive fashion that positively structures individuals’ experiences of the world, 
not just of the world’s injustice and cruelty toward them.53  
Race thus enters the Rawlsian framework as a constituent of democratic plurality. 
Unfortunately, Rawls’s conception of plurality also accommodates racial identity 
unconvincingly. One cannot call race a comprehensive doctrine. Racial identity does not 
correspond to a set of values, comparable to a religious doctrine or moral outlook; sharing a 
racial identity does not entail the collective espousal of a rational plan of life. Although a 
comprehensive doctrine does not characterize racial identity well, appealing to the lived 
experience of racial embodiment in calls for racial justice often “risks” introducing an overly 
‘thick’ ideal into public political culture, which is perceived as a theory of the good. But, this 
reasoning is inconsistent: that something does not fall under an overlapping consensus does not 
                                                           
51 Shelby employs a Rawlsian framework to correct racial injustice precisely in such a fashion. See his, We Who Are 
Dark, chp. 6 and his “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” Critical Philosophy of 
Race, 1.2 (2013): 145–62. 
52 In critical race theory, this popular position is known as racial eliminativism. It holds that in a free and just society 
racial identity would be as normatively irrelevant as eye color. Notable proponents include Haslanger, Sally.  
Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012; Zack, 
Naomi. Philosophy of Science and Race, New York: Routledge, 2002; Appiah, Anthony. 1996, “Race, Culture, 
Identity: Misunderstood Connections,” in Color Conscious, Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
 Racial eliminativists tend to hold a political theory of race, that is, they define racial identity through a 
racist social hierarchy, which, once dissolved, results in the dissolution of categories of racial belonging. An 
exception to this pattern is Tommie Shelby who subscribes to a political theory of race, but includes voluntary racial 
affiliation in an ideal society. 
53 See for example Alcoff, Linda Martín. Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006. and The Future of Whiteness. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2015. 
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mean it invokes a theory of the good.54 As Charles W. Mills quite rightly points out, Rawls flags 
both the antislavery and civil rights movement as introducing comprehensive doctrines, 
undoubtedly valuable in retrospect from the point of view of justice as fairness, but nevertheless 
“comprehensive.”55  
Rawls describes racial identity as a social status one might be born into by a cosmic 
stroke of bad (or good) luck, or as a socially-affirmed comprehensive doctrine.56 In either case, 
the details of the normative significance of racial difference and its historical sedimentation in 
public political culture give way under political indifference, invisibility, and neglect. 
Tellingly, Rawls concedes that “in less good times” an imperfect ordering of norms in 
public reason warrants interpreting political values from the standpoint of comprehensive 
doctrines that could develop the moral ideal of civic equality; he cites the abolitionist movement 
as an example.57 He writes, “To resolve these more particular and detailed issues it is often more 
reasonable to go beyond the political conception and the values its principles express, and to 
invoke nonpolitical virtues that such a view does not include.”58 He fails to mention, however, 
that we have always been “in less good times” with respect to racial matters—that is a critical 
54 Consider recent attempts to in feminist ethics that bite the bullet and advance gender justice as a politically 
justifiable ‘comprehensive view’: S.A. Lloyd, “Situating a Feminist Criticism of John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 28 (1995): 1319-44; Ruth Abbey, “Back Toward a 
Comprehensive Liberalism? Justice as Fairness, Gender, and Families,” Political Theory 35.1 (2007): 5-28. 
55 Mills, Charles W. “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47.1 (2009): 161-84. p. 
167. 
56 Indeed, Rawls admits as much: “To model […] equality in the original position we say that the parties, as 
representatives of those who meet this condition, are symmetrically situated. This requirement is fair because in 
establishing the fair terms of social cooperation […] the only relevant feature of persons is their possessing the 
moral powers (to the sufficient minimum degree) and having the normal capacities to be a cooperating member of 
society over a complete life. Features relating to social position, native endowment, and historical accident, as well 
as to the content of persons’ determinate conceptions of the good, are irrelevant, political speaking, and hence 
placed behind the veil of ignorance.” Political Liberalism, p. 79. (My emphasis) 
We might do well to recall Du Bois’s sardonic picture of a white supremacist with a conscience relating to 
people of color: “My poor, un-white thing! Weep not nor rage. I know, too well, that the curse of God lies heavy 
upon you. Why? That is not for me to say, but be brave! Do your work in your lowly sphere, praying the good Lord 
that into heaven above, where all is love, one day, be born – white!” “The Souls of White Folk,” in W.E.B. Du Bois: 
Writings. Nathan Huggins (Ed.) New York: Viking Press 1986. p. 924. 
57 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 252.  




and longstanding feature of American modernity.59 Rawls is unable to anchor the development 
of the political conception of justice to racial matters; the normative framework of his liberalism 
does not allow it. Consequently, on his model of justice, it appears as if the norms of public 
reason develop haphazardly. because of its inability to confront directly and incorporate on the 
basis of mutual respect and -understanding in the United States. The contemporaneous and 
historical experiences of denigrated racial groups just seem to pop up every now and again, 
culminating in wide-scale social movements that even political liberals agree amount to 
revolutions (i.e., Radical Reconstruction and the Civil Rights movement).60  
For a democratic polity to ignore a particular social group’s historical experiences by 
chalking it up to the rather haphazard fashion political priorities are set, given reasonable 
disagreements, runs afoul of the ideals of justice. We require a conceptual apparatus that confers 
political legitimacy for giving “a particular primacy and weight” to collective experiences of 
racial embodiment, ones that carry an unavowed but unified ethical content. For, attending to 
these experience, Du Bois submits, could promote mutual respect and social cooperation in the 
concrete elaboration of the meaning of civic equality and the fair terms of social cooperation.61  
Moreover, in might of the particular nature of American modernity, which coincides with 
the founding of chattel slavery, conferring primacy to racial matters in public political culture is 
not only consistent with the underlining ideals of public political culture, but develops them. 
Onora O’Neill underscores that the norms of public political culture are always “arbitrary” 
starting points for constructing a political conception of justice and that public reasoning is never 
“complete.” Interrogating why the existent consensus in our public political culture ought to 
                                                           
59 See Mills, Charles W. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998 and Smith, Rogers M. Civic 
Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997.  
60 Danielle S. Allen. Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v. Board of Education. Chicago: 
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circumscribe our current and future political reasoning is necessary for any constructivist 
conception of political justification. She explains why that the inevitable “arbitrary” content in 
public reason will always requires further justification: “[W]hen all such ‘authorities’ are put into 
question, nobody will be told that some claim that they cannot but view as arbitrary constitutes a 
reason for them to believe or act.”62  She continues:  
In a world of differing beings, reasoning is not complete, or we may say (and Kant said) 
not completely public when it rests on appeals to properties and beliefs, attitudes and 
desires, norms and commitments, which are simply arbitrary from some points of view. In 
some contexts incompletely reasoned, hence partly arbitrary, stretches of thought are 
enough for purposes at hand – but not always. When we seek deep justification that 
reaches others who are not already like-minded, we can be satisfied only with claims 
about what to believe and what to do which (responsibly judge) can be followed by those 
others. The only strategy that can count as a reason for all is that of rejecting arbitrary 
assumptions however respectable, well-trusted, or widely accepted they or their 
proponents may be.63 
 
My intention is not to defend a Kant’s political cosmopolitanism, which O’Neill sets out to do.64 
I propose instead something far less ambitious but yet far more controversial: to insert directly 
into public political culture the unsung historical legacy and ethical content carried of racial 
embodiment manifest in the historical memory of slavery and Jim Crow. In other words, I 
propose Du Bois’s racialism as a conceptual apparatus for more “completely” weeding out 
“arbitrary points of view” from public reason.  
Du Bois’s racialism enables us to articulate the normative significance of racial identity 
and to assign weight to racial matters in a politically legitimate fashion, to which otherwise no 
priority is attached in liberal models of democratic plurality. Rawls defends moral equality, but 
                                                           
62 O’Neill, Onora. “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. (Ed.) Samuel 
Freeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp. 347–67. p. 359. 
63 O’Neill, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” p. 359. My emphasis. 
64 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. The passage is instructive: “our exercise of political power is fully proper 
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. 
This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.” O’Neill seeks to push Rawls on this point in favor of a moral 




not all equality is made the same, so to speak – some points of view warrant closer consideration, 
given a collective historical experience of injustice and trauma that has been shut out of public 
view to the stagnation of public reason. Political liberalism requires a conceptual apparatus for 
discerning the normative content not of a doctrine, but of racial identity. Moreover, racial 
matters should be central, rather than peripheral, in our moral imagination in adjudicating the 
common good, rather than as an occasional rupture impinging public political culture, when 
times are “less good.” Rawls admits that “we face great difficulties in setting priorities and 
making adjustments.”65 I submit that Du Bois’s racialism could serve as a conceptual apparatus 
for setting priorities without skirting the basic normative commitments of political liberalism. In 
failing to make racial identity and racial matters central, establishing fair terms of social 
cooperation based on mutual respect and esteem – consistent with the formal demands of moral 
equality – has proven difficult in the public confrontation of the normative significance of racial 
difference.  
Before proceeding to present Du Bois’s racialism in the context of democratic plurality, I 
would like to address dominant interpretations of Du Bois’s racialism as culturally pluralist.66 
The Du Bois scholars Manning Marable and, more recently, Chike Jeffers argue that Du Bois 
offers a cultural constructivist conception of racial identity. With respect to political conception 
of justice, he advances the moral equality of all citizens, but encourages racial affiliation in 
citizens’ “private” pursuits. To borrow a phrase from Rawls, racial difference characterizes a 
rational plan of life, but moral equality regulates the terms of public reason. Jeffers observes, 
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66 Chike Jeffers points out that cultural pluralism and black cultural nationalism ought not to be conflated. Bernard 
Boxill argues that Du Bois is a black cultural nationalist akin to Marcus Garvey because he propounds black 
separatism and rejects assimilation. I follow Jeffers and accept that cultural pluralism is the sounder interpretation of 
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“Du Bois shows a commitment to unification of African Americans into US society on terms of 
fairness and equality. He combines this, however, with an equally strong commitment to the 
preservation and cultivation of black cultural difference.”67 Similarly, Kwame Anthony Appiah 
writes that Du Bois was a “cosmopolitan nationalist,” avowing the “Negro national character and 
a Negro national destiny,” albeit one that is also “idealistic” and “ethical” in light of a 
commitment to moral equality.68  
I offer a friendly amendment to cultural pluralist interpretations of Du Bois. I am 
particularly sympathetic to Jeffers’s claim: “Du Bois demands that we pay greater attention to 
race’s cultural dimension [and that] this remains an important and fruitful demand.”69 I also 
agree that “in speaking of the impact of race on our lives, we necessarily speak of the shaping of 
our lives by our socialization into particular ways of life where being this or that race is among 
the modes of identification that influence how we think and act.”70 Racial identity is not simply a 
stigmatized social status, but carries a positive cultural significance that might warrant pride in 
group achievements and provide an existential rootedness.71  
I assert that racial forms of socialization and the cultural practices Jeffers highlights also 
carry an ethical content that should be introduced, and anchored, in American public political 
culture. This I take to be part of the distinctive black ideal or message that Du Bois argues black 
                                                           
67 Jeffers, “The Cultural Theory of Race,” p. 418-19. 
68 Appiah, Lines of Descent, p. 50, 94 & 113. 
69 Jeffers, “The Cultural Theory of Race,” p. 404. 
70 Jeffers, “The Cultural Theory of Race,” p. 420.  
71 Given the distinctive ethical injury and collective trauma of exile and cultural annihilation, as well as of the 
displacement of refugees and undocumented migrant workers, oddly few philosophical accounts exist describing the 
normative homelessness and the lived experience of existential dislocation they produce. In Political Liberalism, 
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one could interpret as one’s own. Maintaining one’s self-respect becomes exceedingly difficult. Consequently, one 




embodiment carries and whose successful delivery constitutes a “gift” to America and to the 
world. “[T]he historical memory of creating beauty in the midst of struggling to survive 
oppression can and should persist as a thing of value in black culture long after oppression has 
truly and finally been relegated to the past.”72 The historical memory of creating beauty in such 
circumstances contributes more than aesthetic value. The memory carries ethical weight that 
could promote a more egalitarian distribution of power in social and political institutions. This 
memory should not just abide in black communities as part of a cultural practice, but in 
American public political culture as part of the Bildung of a modern state. Thus, Du Bois’s 
racialism is not wholly reducible to a cultural pluralism.  
Another important reason for resisting cultural pluralist interpretations of Du Bois’s 
racialism is that it risks collapsing his view into a multiculturalist variant of the ethics of 
recognition. Multiculturalism prizes cultural diversity without hierarchy. Diverse cultural groups 
have equal negative freedom in civil society and enter the political realm as ‘abstract’ moral 
equals. Nancy Fraser observes that, on the multicultural paradigm, “[t]he goal of [racial] struggle 
is, [then,] to create multicultural public forms, which recognize a plurality of different, equally 
valuable ways of being human. In such a society, today’s dominant understanding of difference 
as deviance would give way to a positive appreciation of human diversity.”73 This move, 
however, neutralizes the distinctive contribution of the African American historical experience to 
public political culture that Du Bois has in mind. Under a multicultural view, appealing to its 
concrete elaboration runs the risk of undermining the political meaning of moral equality, where 
each group can flourish within its respective domain under a neutral state, so long as it does not 
attract too much power or attention. Such a view inadvertently empties racial matters from public 
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reason, whereas Du Bois believes that the normative significance of racial identity is bound up 
with the historical development of the meaning of civic equality in the United States.74 
Additionally, Du Bois argues that the distinctive contributions that black Americans have already 
made to the American polity have been denied, suppressed, and ignored. “America, Du Bois 
insists, is always already black.”75 Publically vindicating—or denouncing—the racial formations 
that impelled the emergence of the American republic is a contribution that his racialism 
promises, if one employs it to theorize racial difference in a democratic plurality.   
Recall that Rawls considers that social groups hold comprehensive doctrines for 
nonpublic reasons. Cultural practices, then, are pursued for ‘nonpublic’ reasons. One can choose 
to engage in culture any which way. If we accept a cultural pluralist interpretation of race, we are 
left with abstract moral equality in politics and the mere tolerance of nonpublic “difference” in 
civil society.76 In pinpointing the distinct ethical content and the historical sedimentation of the 
meaning of racial embodiment, Du Bois hopes to establish fair terms of social cooperation that 
are based on mutual respect and esteem among citizens.77 But this would transcend merely civil, 
nonpublic matters and render features of African American culture—as well as descrying the 
historical legacy of “whiteness”—a legitimate element of public political culture. The realization 
of meaningful civic equality requires that American citizens confront directly and publically the 
racist legacy we inherit, and engage the history that has made us who we are – a racialized 
plurality.  
                                                           
74 Danielle Allen notes that black American sacrifice has yet to be appreciated in the United States. I take it that Du 
Bois would include this feature under the banner of racial striving.  
75 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 126. 
76 Thus, against Robert Gooding-Williams, I reject the claim that Du Bois’s view of black ideals in American 
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iii. Du Bois’s Alternative: Racialism and Democratic Plurality 
Rather than advance a model of plurality and superimpose it on racial identity – in 
unsatisfactory ways, as we’ve seen – I propose to use Du Bois’s doctrine of racialism in order to 
model the nature of racial difference in the context of a democratic politics. In this section, I 
focus on the standpoint of the black historical experience, although I submit that the 
methodology I employ here is generalizable for theorizing the normative significance of other 
forms of racial difference. In the previous sections, I have argued that Gilbert’s and Rawls’s 
views on plurality fail to capture racial identity, which transcends individuals’ private will and 
comprehensive schemes of socially-shared reasons. According to Du Bois, racial meaning 
unfolds along the following lines: 1) an “ideal” or “message,” which he characterizes as ethical 
responses to the color-line, 2) the lived experience of visible embodiment, and 3) objective social 
location that carries differential access to basic liberties, resources, and opportunities.78 I address 
2) and 3), before proceeding to discuss 1)—that is, what the black racial ideal entails, if one 
construes it as a set of ethical responses to the color-line. I conclude by demonstrating that 
“black racial ideals” could facilitate social cooperation, as well as mutual respect and esteem, 
among citizens. I use the sorrow songs as an example of a cultural construct that carries 
historically-sedimented, ethical content that should be introduced into public political culture; its 
introduction would facilitate social cooperation and mutual understanding in a democratic 
politics, evincing a sensitivity to the normative significance of racial difference. In the final 
section, I address two objections to my presentation of Du Bois’s racialism.  
Du Bois famously writes that the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color- 
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line. The normative basis of his critique of 19th and 20th c. American democracy focuses on the 
differences of the lived experiences of racial embodiment in the Jim Crow south. His racialism 
captures the distinct normative orientation of Americans in light of the racializing power of the 
color-line. A childhood experience of exchanging visiting cards with white children first pressed 
upon him that the color of his skin set him apart from the other children. A fellow playmate, a 
young white girl, has refused his card. “Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness,” he 
writes, “that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but 
shut out from their world by a vast veil.”79 He observes that certain “physical characteristics” 
carry “the stigmata of degradation.”80 For, as Alcoff puts it, “race works through the domain of 
the visible,” creating a kind of “visual registry” that encourages judgment about “rational 
capacity, epistemic reliability, moral condition, and […] aesthetic value.”81 In Jim Crow era, 
visible markers on the body locate where one stands in light of the color-line, entangled “behind” 
or blissfully “beyond” it.  “Why did God make me an outcast and a stranger in mine own 
house?” asks Du Bois, “The shades of the prison-house closed round about us all: walls strait and 
stubborn to the whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall, and unscalable to sons of night who must 
plod darkly on in resignation, or beat unavailing palms against the stone, or steadily, half 
hopelessly, watch the streak of blue above.”82 The “shades of the prison house” are a metaphor 
for the veil that “closed” on “all,” but informed the experiences of “the whitest” and “the sons of 
night” in widely divergent fashion.    
Yet, in situating different experiences of racialized embodiment in relation to the color-
line and the veil that it hangs, Du Bois aims to capture the collective striving of racialized groups 
                                                           
79 Du Bois, Souls, p. 4.  
80 Du Bois, “On Being Ashamed of Oneself.” p. 1022. 
81 Alcoff, Linda M. Visible Identities, p. 187 & p. 192.  
82 Du Bois, Souls, p. 5. 
 35 
in light of it. That is, the formation of subjectivity in light of racial situatedness is not inert, but 
enactive and purposive. He seeks to show the patterns that the exercise of collective practical 
agency took in light of the color-line, navigating the spaces – literal and figurative – enclosed by 
it. To this end, his emphasis on visible markers on the body, notably skin color, leads him to 
conclude that the meaning of racial identity transcends the physical body, even while reflecting 
its varied lived experiences.  
But while race differences have followed mainly physical race lines, yet no mere physical 
distinctions would really define or explain the deeper differences—the cohesiveness and 
continuity of these groups. The deeper differences are spiritual, psychical, differences—
undoubtedly based on the physical, but infinitely transcending them.83 
Physical differences marked by the color-line yield “deeper” “spiritual, psychical differences,” 
which are irreducible to “the physical” and do not causally emanate from it. He thus rejects 
classical racialism modeled on biological essentialism.84 Whatever objective salience racial 
difference has, it is not based on a biological inheritance of intellectual and moral characteristics 
that track a fixed biological essence and render certain racial groups ‘metaphysically’ incapable 
of self-determination or of participation in free modern institutions.85 As Ange-Marie Hancock 
puts it, “for [Du Bois], race was tied less to blood and instead inextricably bound to the 
sociopolitical significance attached to race and the material consequences of racial norms that 
were socially defined and most importantly, socially enacted at multiple levels of political 
83 Du Bois, “Conservation,” p. 818. 
84 Kwame Anthony Appiah spearheaded a debate spurred by his accusation that Du Bois upholds a notion of race 
grounded in biology. [I will not revisit this debate; I begin my argument from the existing consensus among critical 
race theorists that Appiah’s accusation is unfair inasmuch as denying the salience of race as a social construct 
undermines democratic political culture.] See Kwame Anthony Appiah. In my Father’s House: Africa in the 
Philosophy of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr. On Race and 
Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 1996. Tommy L. Lott. The Invention of Race: Black Culture and the 
Politics of Representation. Maldon: Blackwell, 1999. p. 47-66. Paul C. Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncompleted Argument: 
W.E.B. Du Bois and the Reality of Race,” Social Theory and Practice 26.1 (2000): 103-28. 
85 Kwame Anthony Appiah argues that Du Bois’s socio-historical conception of race betrays biologistic 
commitments. I will not rehearse the debate that ensued among Du Bois scholars for the next decade. I simply take 
for granted that Appiah’s objectors prevailed. I especially like the counter-arguments and summaries of the debate 




power.”86 A critical feature of racial identity, defined in terms of the color-line, is that in the 
color-line giving rise to racialized forms of striving, the color-line identifies the objective 
structure of racist social hierarchy. But it also is a social location that is “enacted at multiple 
levels of political power.” The historical legacy of racial striving comprises a set—a pattern—of 
ethical responses to the objective structure of a social world, which historically and 
contemporaneously distributes basic liberties, wealth, and opportunities along racial lines.87 Du 
Bois’s early formulations of his racialist doctrine is consistent with his later claim that a black 
American “is a person who must ride ‘Jim Crow’ in Georgia.”88 In his racialism, he conveys the 
burden of racial ascription with the enactment of purposive striving in the face of the obstacles 
the color-line imposes.89 The color-line has been both materially determinative of the basic 
structure of modern American society and it has mediated the exercise of collective agency – 
both features constitute the normative significance of racial difference.  
In my foregoing discussion, visible, racial embodiment and objective social location 
showcases that these features of racial identity prefigure, and, for Du Bois, often stifle and 
militate against, individuals’ personal ambitions and the adoption of comprehensive schemes of 
value.90 That is, these features shed light on what it means to be ‘raced’ in the US in light of the 
obstacles that the color-line imposes. Yet, racial ideals are not “obstacles” in this sense, although 
they too arise in light of the color-line. They illustrate collective moral agency under the 
condition of racist oppression: in this sense, they are a set of ethical responses that are positive 
and contribute to norms guide the formation of subjectivity. One might then ask, however, 
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whether adding racial ideals to uncover the socio-historical construction of racial difference 
essentializes categories of racial belonging? Robert Gooding-Williams, for example, asks, short 
of curating authentic expression of black folk-life, whether Du Bois’s racialism does can provide 
a “veridical” account of racial difference, one that accommodates conflictual and heterogeneous 
voices about its significance.91 Indeed, talk of racial ideal at first blush appear to homogenize 
categories of racial belonging and the disparate individuals that fall under them. 
It is best to approach the problem by interrogating the relation between history and the 
emergence of racial ideals. Du Bois conceives of “history” as “the unfolding of values.”92 These 
“values” furnish a departure point for judgment and action, the normative basis of which is 
rationally-motivating – what we might call a “hermeneutic horizon.”93 “[P]roduced out of 
historical events,” such a horizon furnishes “a backdrop and orienting perspective from which 
individuals make sense of new events.”94 Furthermore, on Du Bois’s account, racial ideals are 
not just the historical ‘stuff’ of a habit and folkways, but an “achievement” and a “sense-making 
orientation” to which the idea of freedom is “pertinent.”95 Racial ideals are thus imbricated in the 
development—or frustration—of the political values. Du Bois situates African Americans and 
the historical legacy of black moral agency in entering public political culture at the center of 
American modernity and developing models for American democracy. 
In his essay “The Conservation of Races,” Du Bois employs his racialism to advance a 
philosophy of history that sanctions the modern idea of race as an “instrument of progress” in 
goading the nation to confront racial matters in its social and political institutions.   
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We [African Americans] are the first fruits of this new nation [US], the harbinger of that 
black tomorrow which is yet destined to soften the whiteness of the Teutonic today. We 
are that people whose subtle sense of song has given America its only American music, 
its only American fairytales, its only touch of pathos and humor amid its mad money-
getting plutocracy. As such, it is our duty to conserve our physical powers, our 
intellectual endowments, our spiritual ideals; as a race we must strive by race 
organization, by race solidarity, by race unity to the realization of that broader humanity 
which freely recognizes differences in men, but sternly deprecates inequalities in their 
opportunities of development.96 
 
One reason black and brown racial identities must be ‘conserved’ is because the full impact of 
their latent ethical content and transformative potential has yet to be appreciated in the narrative 
of American modernity. This is part of the distinctive black ideal that Du Bois argues must be 
developed and whose successful delivery constitutes a “gift” to American citizens, and even to 
the world at large.  
What form, precisely, does this gift take? In Souls, Du Bois answers, identifying the 
black historical experience with that of Native Americans, 
Your country? How come it yours? Before the Pilgrims landed we were here. Here we 
have brought our three gifts and mingled them with yours: a gift of story and song – soft, 
stirring melody in an ill-harmonized and unmelodious land; the gift of sweat and brawn 
to beat back the wilderness, conquer the soil, and lay the foundations of this vast 
economic empire two hundred years earlier than your weak hands could have done it; and 
third, a gift of the Spirit. Around us the history of the land has centered for thrice a 
hundred years; out of the nation’s heart we have called all that was best to throttle and 
subdue all that was worst; fire and blood, prayer and sacrifice, have billowed over this 
people, and have found peace only in the altars of the God of Right. Nor has our gift of 
the Spirit been merely passive. Actively we have woven ourselves with the warp and 
woof of this nation, -- we fought their battles, shared their sorrow, mingled our blood 
with theirs, and generation after generation have pleaded with a headstrong, careless 
people not Justice, Mercy, and Truth, lest the nation be smitten with a curse. Our song, 
our toil, our cheer, and warning have been given to this nation in blood-brotherhood. Are 
not these gifts worth giving? Would American have been America without her Negro 
people?97  
 
Of the three gifts identified above – story and song, labor, and spirit – allow me to focus on the 
‘gift’ of song. The sorrow songs, writes Du Bois in the concluding chapter of Souls, are “weird 
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old songs in which the soul of the slave spoke to men. [I]t stands today not simply as the sole 
American music, but as the most beautiful expression of human experience born this side of the 
seas.”98 He continues, “They are the music of an unhappy people, of the children of 
disappointment; they tell of death and suffering and unvoiced longing toward a truer world, of 
misty wanderings and hidden ways.”99 Cautioning that although many mimic and consume the 
songs, few hear their “real” melody and understand its meaning. The songs articulate black 
striving from within the color-line, focusing on the feelings of enslaved Africans in particular. 
Their message – an ethical content often not even sung in English – “two hundred years […] has 
travelled down to us and we sing it to our children, knowing as little as our fathers what its words 
mean, but knowing well the meaning of its music.”100 The ‘real’ meaning of the song conveys 
the aspiration to freedom and justice that enslaved Africans held, giving us a kernel of their own 
interpretation of what had happened to them, how they had hoped for and suffered. An 
appreciation of the achievements of black moral agency must be coupled with an understanding 
of the unfulfilled hopes and stifled aspirations that are also inextricably embedded in the African-
American historical experience.101 In his essay “Whither Now and Why,” Du Bois explicitly 
connects black identity to historical memory that must not be “degraded” by assimilation into 
white Anglo-American culture that encourages “forgetting the slave trade and slavery, and the 
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struggle for emancipation; [and] forgetting abolition[.]”102 These historical memories that outline 
the normative significance of racial difference should not be forgotten or marginalized in civil 
society, remember by the few, but should figure in public political culture, especially in 
weighing claims in the public adjudication of justice. 
The ethical content of black identity must be identified and incorporated into the political 
will, healing an injury that has lingered and distended in unexpected ways, with hardly even a 
public memorial attesting to its very existence.103 In articulating the common good and 
countering social inequality in black and brown communities, he emphasizes historical memories 
that foreground the institution of racial slavery and the genocide of Native Americans. The 
Sorrow Songs are a call to “reremember” those memories.  
One might ask, what is the political payoff of such an exercise? And why suggest the 
sedimentation of those memories is implicated in racial identities now? Shamoon Zamir has 
observed that for Du Bois there is an “indissoluble link between memory and action” that must 
not be “severed.”104 Attending to the historical memory of racial trauma would promote social 
cooperation and mutual respect, esteem, and understanding, as it would dramatically underscore 
just how longstanding the present disregard of black and brown citizens’ perspective in the 
public adjudication of the common good has been. It would facilitate a more egalitarian 
distribution of power in major social and political institutions, and render salient racial matters 
that would otherwise remain invisible. According to Chike Jeffers, Du Bois’s conception of 
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racial identity presupposes a “new egalitarian ideal” in that “true civilization channels strength 
into the struggle for universal freedom and development.”105 Jeffers argues that we can learn 
from the legacy of black suffering in order to “acquir[e] an egalitarian approach to human 
development.”106 Lawrie Balfour adds: “[Du Bois’s] meditation on the Sorrow Songs shows how 
attunement to the culture of the slaves not only affirms African Americans’ aesthetic 
contribution but also deepens readers’ understanding of the concept of freedom.”107 Listening to 
the message, we would educate moral perception of racial injustice. Such a disposition is 
encouraged by the duties of civility that Rawls outlines, for the moral meaning of citizenship 
cannot sustain the neglect of a longstanding ethical injury our fellow citizens have suffered and 
from which so many have profited. Duties of civility demand that a moral debt be repaid. 
Therefore, gaining comprehension of the black experience—learning to listen to the real melody 
of a Sorrow Song—is not elective but categorical because the demand issues from the moral 
meaning of citizenship.  
Their results in the “los[s] from the world [of] an experience of untold value.”108 The 
Sorrow Songs’ strife is still “hopeful.”109 They “breathe a hope – a faith in the ultimate justice of 
things.”110 They show us why, in light of the experience of suffering, hope is not stupid, but an 
expression of rational faith and, with the emergence of mutual trust, is potentially justifiable as 
well. That the capacity for such a faith could still be intact might educate the (white) polity (and 
even benefit them) about the moral courage necessary to actualize a modern democracy. For, the 
realization of the ideal of American modernity would mean that a formerly enslaved people are 
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still willing to participate in and develop habits of citizenship where mutual trust might still 
flourish in our democratic process, even when the Sorrow Songs are not sung and – if I may 
quote Toni Morrison again – so much “Life ha[s] rolled over dead.”111  
A wholly volitional account of black identity severs us from this historically-sedimented 
meaning of racial identity, “a kind of ‘raw material’ in our histories and lineages [that] are the 
product of mediated processes of interpretation, and yet they are not simply ours to choose or to 
interpret out of existence.”112 In failing to articulate this raw material, the gravitas of the moral 
courage necessary to refine democratic politics also slips from view. Civic duty demands that 
citizens assume a determinant disposition that publically and collectively confronts the memory 
of the past – the legacy of black slavery, sorrow, sacrifice, and forbearing resistance – so it does 
not fall into oblivion. Even as identities are open to ongoing transformation, the longstanding 
neglect of this ‘raw’ material has ossified, making our democratic politics toxic and generating 
racialized forms of distrust, discomfort, and disrespect among citizens.  
Danielle S. Allen identifies patterns of racialized distrust and domination that develop in 
light of the failure to recognize the innumerable sacrifices of African Americans in their attempts 
to participate in the American polity. Without sensitivity to the non-volitional, historically-
sedimented normative significance of racial identity – something that I believe is best captured 
by Du Bois’s racialism – these patterns will continue to remain invisible to the public, even 
while they continue to be materially determinate of the basic structure of modern life, and remain 
reflected in the lived experiences of our racialized embodiment. An ethical injury is a wound that 
does not heal with the mere passage of time.113 A radical experiment in modern democracy that 
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began with Reconstruction is the historical context of myriad black hopes, half-realized and half-
stifled, but is one that continues to frame the bounded filaments of our togetherness. New habits 
of citizenship are necessary. 
Allen writes, “emotions register the effects of loss and sacrifice on politics.”114 And so, 
“It’s gonna hurt, now […] Anything dead coming back to life hurts.”115 Racialized forms of 
sorrow and distrust, and a half-emergent triumph of democratic politics that is only actualizable 
with the settling of a moral debt that mayhap might begin to take shape by listening to two bars 
of a song:  
“There’s a little wheel a-turnin’ in-a-my heart.” 
“My soul wants something that’s new, that’s new.” 
 
iv. Objections  
One might object that I have revived Du Bois’s racialism only to make it a normatively 
toothless ethical argument advanced within the normative framework of political liberalism. My 
presentation of Du Bois’s racialism might appear to endorse the “thin” model of racial identity 
that Tommie Shelby outlines in his defense of pragmatic black nationalism. He argues that 
pragmatic black nationalism rejects “original identity” in favor of practical considerations of 
identity that could promote racial justice. He writes: 
‘[P]ractical necessity’ – self-preservation and common defense – would be the social 
bonding agent among [a] newly emerging, anti-imperialist ‘colored’ people. Most 
importantly, this multiracial ‘nation’ would be committed to social equality, democratic 
citizenship for all, self-government, and the cultivation of a vigorous citizenry.116  
 
Shelby continues: 
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[T]he thin conception of blackness that I defend as the proper basis for black solidarity 
[…] is not a mode of cultural blackness at all, at least not if we are talking about 
expressive culture – such as art, language, style, social custom, ritual, or religion – as 
opposed to political culture, the values and practices that are directly concerned with the 
legitimate use of social power, especially state power.117 
 
While Shelby’s account shares Du Bois’s emphasis on the ethical—rather than the cultural 
expressivist—value of black racial identity, against Shelby, Du Bois maintains that the shared 
experience of oppression is identity-constitutive in a substantive fashion. The normative 
resources that could inspire the “legitimate use of social power” and galvanize political solidarity 
also draw on social and cultural practices, which are associated with cultural blackness. The 
latter has wider ethical significance for reimagining social unity and civic community. Shelby, 
instead, interprets Du Bois’s racialism as advancing a “classical” nationalism about the cultural 
construction of racial identity, to which is model of “pragmatic” nationalism in democratic 
politics is averse.118  
Moreover, Du Bois does not posit that the dissolution of racial identity is desirable (or 
even feasible). He rejects both colorblindness and racial self-obliteration as goals of racial justice 
and democratic freedom. Rather, his account demonstrates the importance of understanding 
one’s historical rootedness in the world that fosters not only a positive sense of self, but, ideally, 
self-confidence and –knowledge – of the kind that white Anglo-Saxons often take for granted. 
This rootedness captures the distinctive challenge (or lack thereof) of striving to achieve one’s 
purposes, given the socio-historical location one departs from.119 A longstanding, racially 
demarcated practice of meaning-making in light of the color-line coalesces into a distinctive 
epistemic and ethical points-of-view. Because these viewpoints are also implicated in the ideals 
of American modernity, exploring their imbrication with democratic politics could chart a 
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normative orientation towards freedom.120 On this reading, we gain insight that the possession of 
a racial identity is neither oppressive nor unethical, although racist conditions often are. 
Furthermore, undoing the conditions of racial oppression requires close attunement to the 
historical experience of racial formations.121 For the historical experiences of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade and Jim Crow, as well as the concomitant social and cultural practices enclosed 
within the color-line, continue to inform the experience of racial embodiment. Du Bois “offers a 
counterhistory of the twinned development of modern democracy and racial slavery.”122 To this 
end, he asserts that racialized ideals will not suddenly dissolve even with the ongoing realization 
of racial justice. For, how can one tell when the narration of a counterhistory is complete and we 
can “retire” the concept of race?  
Alternatively, one might object that I have presented a rarified, thick, – and perhaps even 
fetishized – conception of the non-volitional ethical significance of racial identity, and black 
identity in particular. My defense of racialism in the context of democratic plurality might 
suggest that a “tragic” conception of cultural blackness delineates a unique vantage point on 
democratic politics, ignoring intraracial differences in the black counterpublic. Du Bois never 
suggests that African Americans automatically possess an ethical acumen—by virtue of their 
racial identity—that grants them special access to the nature of modern freedom. Indeed, he 
worries that African-American youth are denied knowledge of their history that carries the non-
volitional normative significance of their identity. Rather, in emphasizing the connection 
between racial ideals and the egalitarian development, he underscores that the black historical 
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experience is merely “human” – an untold story about the preservation of dignity in social 
conditions fashioned to annihilate empirically the very idea that black people are human beings. 
Instead, the historical memories of racial embodiment demonstrate an unacknowledged moral 
power in the extension of civic community to black Americans.123 Du Bois often avails himself 
of the opportunity to remind his reader that “[u]nder extraordinary provocation they [African 
Americans] had acted like decent human beings.”124 He repeats in Black Reconstruction that his 
aim is “to tell this story as though Negroes were ordinary human beings.”125 And again, in 
Philadelphia Negro, he writes: 
The battle [of the Negro problem] involves more than a mere altruistic interest in an alien 
people. It is a battle for humanity and human culture. If in the hey-dey of the world’s 
civilizations, it is possible for one people to ruthlessly steal another, drag them helplessly 
across the water, enslave them, debauch them, and then slowly murder them by social 
and economic exclusion until they disappear from the face of the earth – if the 
consummation of such a crime be possible in the twentieth century, then our civilization 
is vain and the republic is a mockery and a farce.126  
 
Du Bois maintains that the unified content of a racial ideal prevails in light of intra-racial 
disagreement and does not ‘settle’ the social and political the meaning of black identity – a 
concern that compels Tommie Shelby to ascribe to Du Bois a ‘thick’ model of racial identity, 
and as I will detail in the 4th chapter, the same worry prompts Robert Gooding-Williams to 
charge Du Bois’s cultural expressivism with ignoring intraracial political disagreement and 
heterogeneity.  
Implicit in the objection is a concern about protecting individuals’ negative liberty, 
whatever racial group they belong to. But as I have argued here, and discuss more fully in the 
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next chapter, racialism does not militate against individual autonomy. He advances the doctrine 
and defends African Americans’ negative liberty and individual idiosyncrasy. In fact, on Du 
Bois’s view, the doctrine holds the promise of the collective realization of freedom, that of social 
and political self-determination in the US. For Du Bois, attending to and engaging with—or, in 
Hegelian parlance ‘mediating’—the given, non-volitional features that inform the socio-
historical construction of the normative salience of racial identity is the keystone to modern 
freedom. Alcoff gives an instructive example of the way the historical memory of the Holocaust 
in Europe anchors difference as a social location of groups, who stand in a different relationship 
to the past, without foreclosing or narrowly demarcating subjectivity formation of a particular 
self:   
The self carries with it always this horizon as a specific location, with substantive 
content—as, for example, a specifiable relation to the Holocaust, to slavery, to the 
encuentro, and so on—but whose content only exists in interpretation and in constant 
motion. The Holocaust is one dramatic example that exists as an aspect not only of every 
contemporary Jewish person’s horizon but of every Christian European’s. But there will 
be a difference in the way that these two groups are situated vis-a`-vis this narrative: the 
one as knowing that he or she could have been the target of the Final Solution, and the 
other as knowing that this event occurred within the broad category of their culture. Each 
must react to or deal with this event in some way, but to say this does not presuppose any 
pre-given interpretation of the event or of its significance in forming a contemporary 
identity. There is even a vibrant debate over the degree of significance the Holocaust 
holds for Jewish identity today. But obviously, for some time to come, it will remain a 
central feature of the map of our collective Jewish and Gentile horizons.127 
 
Given my presentation of Du Bois’s racialism, Alcoff’s illustrative method of modeling social 
difference opens a path for appreciating how historical memory situates persons within a 
racialized hermeneutic horizon, which while conditioning the self’s practical agency, does not 
negate it or stipulate its political meaning. Du Bois thus meets the objection that his racialism 
fails to accommodate the disparate political outlooks of the individual members of a racial group. 
Although his conception of racial identity is far from ‘thin,’ one can have widely different views 
                                                           




about the meaning of the past, with the past conditioning the racialized horizon that shapes one’s 
life all the same.  
 
 
 v. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this chapter presents three features of Du Bois’s racialist doctrine: the 
ethical contribution of a racial ideals, visible embodiment, and objective social location as 
determined by a racist social hierarchy. In this chapter, I have laid out the non-volitional 
normative salience of black identity. In the following chapters, I analyze the concrete manner in 
which black historical actors have interpreted their hermeneutic horizon and actively mediated its 
content and political significance, from Reconstruction onwards. Intraracial disagreement about 
what the message of the Sorrow Songs means – making history a normative reference point of 
politics hardly determines what political claims particular historical actors would take up for the 
sake of collective emancipation. Yet, as I argue in the next chapter, for Du Bios, the modern 
democratic constitutional regime is the foundation of freedom, albeit one that is subject to 
intense political contestation. Yet, ‘internal,’ racially-demarcated practices of comportment and 
meaning-making have historically intersected with the ideals of modern democratic 
constitutional regime.  
 In advancing Du Bois’s doctrine of racialism in the context of democratic plurality, we 
see that racial matters could foreground the political adjudication of claims in representational 
government, founded on major historical events that produced racial traumas that continue to 
inform the experience of racial embodiment. The failure to heed the normative salience of racial 




freedom with respect to their objective social location (e.g., differential access to basic liberties, 
opportunities, and material resources) and lived experiences of visible embodiment (e.g., 
vulnerability of the black and brown body to random acts of violence).128 Because the doctrine 
enables the delivery of this message about racial striving and trauma, it is a motor for the 
development of modern American democracy. The legacy of slavery and Jim Crow, Du Bois 
maintains, is evident in the continuing absence of interracial contact, sympathy and mutual 
understanding. Acknowledging and appreciating the black racial ideal amounts to a “generous 
acknowledgment of a common humanity and a common destiny.”129 
 Finally, Du Bois would agree with Shelby’s key claim: 
We can think through philosophical questions […] by considering them in relation to the 
lives and experiences of black people or, better yet, by listening attentively, critically, but 
open-mindedly to black people themselves as they philosophize about these questions 
against the background of their history, practical concerns, and long-standing 
aspirations.130 
 
I present Du Bois’s racialism in the spirit of Shelby’s suggestion. Let’s now turn to the 
historical period of Reconstruction, when former slaves seized federal power and what that 
seizure meant to them, but should mean for our comprehension of the concept of freedom. 
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Chapter II.   
 
What does it mean to be an American? 




“Reason [is not] content with that cold despair which submits to the view that in 
this earthly life things are truly bad or at best only tolerable, as though they 
cannot be improved, and this is the only reflection that can keep us at peace with 
the world.”  
G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Preface §25 
 
 
“…to the Negro ‘Freedom’ was God; to the poor white ‘Freedom’ was nothing – 
he had more than he had use for; to the planter ‘Freedom’ for the poor was 
laziness and for the rich, control of the poor worker; for the Northern business 
man ‘Freedom’ was opportunity to get rich.” 
                         W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 347 
 
 
“A belief in spontaneous progress must make us blind to the role of 
government[.]” 







 In the closing of chapter 1, I articulated W.E.B. Du Bois’s racialist doctrine in terms of 
collective striving that is mediated by the color-line, a kind of striving that appeals to, and 
develops, the underlining ideals of a modern constitutional democracy. This chapter shows that 
such a reconstruction of black striving, for Du Bois, presents a distinct model of freedom, one 
that highlights basic civil and political rights, as well as representational government, particularly 
the federal government in the postbellum U.S. In underscoring citizenship as the moral basis for 
belonging to a social whole—a view consistent with contemporary political liberalism—Du Bois 
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emphasizes black moral agency under conditions of extreme duress and underscores the resultant 
historical achievements. Endorsing a model of freedom grounded in free and equal citizenship, 
he uses it to draw attention to the collective historical experience of the African American 
community in particular. By underscoring a social group’s particular perspective, he 
reformulates the ideals of American modernity and the contribution of black moral agency to 
restructuring the federal government. In this chapter, I argue that, according to Du Bois, the 
emergence of the modern centralized American state is an achievement of black collective 
striving during Reconstruction (1865-77). I thus enter a terrain seldom explored by contemporary 
political philosophers or by established Du Bois scholars. But, I believe that my unorthodox line 
of argument is crucial for appreciating the normative basis of Du Bois’s political critique of late 
19th- and early 20th American society, as it advances a conception of freedom that is grounded in 
an ethical function of the modern state and accentuates black collective striving in the realization 
of this end.  
This chapter maps a conceptual space for capturing the African-American contribution to 
the historical development of American democracy as an achievement of black moral agency 
during Reconstruction—a point about which Du Bois was adamant throughout his storied career 
and formed a linchpin of his political critique. For him, the ethical function of the U.S. federal 
state during Reconstruction not only best captures the “spiritual” aims and achievements of 
emancipated slaves, but also amounts to a “social revolution” that radically democratized the 
American social fabric and strengthened—and in some cases, brought into existence—major, 
state-sponsored social institutions in support of the common good and of the most vulnerable 
members of American society, namely former slaves.1 His political critique thus presupposes a 
normative theory of the modern American state. He argues that the historical period of 
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Reconstruction demonstrates that realizing the freedom of recently emancipated slaves 
necessitated a centralized government that could attend to their unprecedented integration into 
the American polity as free and equal citizens.2 Du Bois comments that with Emancipation black 
freedmen became “the ward” of the federal government and shortly thereafter joined legislatures 
in every existent office of public political power.3 The expansion of centralized federal power 
coincided with the democratization and increased accessibility of political office, at least for a 
brief time. 
 In line with a flurry of recent Du Bois scholarship, my approach presents Du Bois’s view 
of freedom by highlighting his debt to late modern German social theory. Kwame Anthony 
Appiah and Robert Gooding-Williams mark the influence of Gustav von Schmoller, Max Weber, 
and G.W.F Hegel on Du Bois’s political thought. “Schmoller,” writes Appiah, “thought that the 
government ‘had a moral duty to alleviate undue hardships.’” 4  The historian Axel Schäfer 
observes that Du Bois combined insights from Herder, Schmoller, and Hegel as a way of 
identifying the ethical content of racial identity, a unique refurbishing of the concept of the Volk 
that is central in modern German social thought: 
Eager to interpret the black experience in America as an ethical awakening, Du Bois 
defined black history in those terms in his scholarly work. He presented black 
institutions, morals, and manners primarily as containing the germ of the ethical self-
                                                 
2 The historian Eric Foner observes that postbellum Black political culture showed a “renewed commitment” to the 
state. Foner, Eric. “Reconstruction Revisited,” Reviews in American History 10.4 (1982): 82-100. p. 91. Foner 
elaborates: “During the Civil War and Reconstruction [emerged] a national state possessing vastly expanded 
authority and a new set of purposes, including an unprecedented commitment to the ideal of a national citizenship 
whose equal rights belonged to all Americans regardless of race. Originating in wartime exigencies, the activist state 
came to embody the reforming impulse deeply rooted in postwar politics. And Reconstruction produced enduring 
changes in the laws and Constitution that fundamentally altered federal-state relations and redefined the meaning of 
American citizenship. Yet because it threatened traditions of local ‘autonomy’ […] and was so closely associated 
with the new rights of blacks, the rise of the state inspired powerful opposition, which in turn, weakened support for 
Reconstruction.” A Short History of Reconstruction, 1863-1877. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. p. xvi. 
3 Du Bois, Souls, p. 20. Du Bois comments that freedmen’s inclusion in the local and federal state at the height of 
Reconstruction remains unparalleled in American history – and to this day.  
4 Appiah, Anthony Kwame. Lines of Descent: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Emergence of Identity. Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2014. p. 32.  
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realization of blacks that would lead to the development of a broader moral vision.5  
 
Others have underscored Du Bois’s intellectual friendship with Max Weber, which began in the 
1890s, when Du Bois was a graduate student in Berlin, continuing into their professional lives.6 
However, Hegel’s political philosophy provides the most comprehensive justification of the 
ethical function of the modern state that characterizes the purposive activities of an institution 
such as the Freedmen’s Bureau and the radical normative reorientation of the postbellum 
American state that Du Bois applauds as the contribution of black ideals to public reason. To this 
end, I introduce Hegel’s conception of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and his defense of the ethical 
function of the modern state (der moderne Rechtsstaat). This interpretative move grounds Du 
Bois’s emphasis on integrative and state-orientated black politics; and it justifies his claim that 
the Freedmen’s Bureau is a benchmark of political progress and should have been made a 
permanent institution under the aegis of the U.S. federal government. 7  The absence of a 
justification of the ethical function of the state is notable in Du Bois’s political critique. Hegel’s 
political philosophy fruitfully rectifies it. 
In taking up the challenge of demonstrating the viability of an approach that stresses 
equitable participation in the modern state, I foreground features of the African-American 
historical experience that both political philosophers and Du Bois scholars have neglected, such 
as freedmen’s efforts to establish, run, and personally fund, the Freedmen’s Bureau and 
participate in the American polity as free and equal citizens during Reconstruction, perhaps one 
                                                 
5 Schäfer, Axel R. “W.E.B. Du Bois, German Social Thought, and the Racial Divide in American Progressivism, 
1892-1909.” The Journal of American History 88.3 (2001): 925-949. p. 937. 
6  Chandler, Nahum Dimitri. “The Possible Form of an Interlocution: W. E. B. Du Bois and Max Weber in 
Correspondence, 1904-1905,” The New Centennial Review 7.1 (2007): 213-72. Lewis, D. L. W. E. B. Du Bois: 
Biography of a Race, 1868–1919. New York: H. Holt, 1993. Good-Williams, Robert. In the Shadow of Du Bois: 
Afro-Modern Political Thought in America. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
7 For further discussion of the intellectual history of Du Bois’s relation to late modern German social thought, see 
Schäfer, Axel R. “Du Bois on Race: Economic and Cultural Perspectives,” in The Cambridge Companion to W.E.B. 
Du Bois. Shamoon Zamir (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: pp. 102-16.  
 54 
of the most contested periods of American history.8 Their efforts, Du Bois submits, challenged 
what it means to be an American by showcasing the centrality of black moral agency in the 
development of American modernity. Du Bois opens Black Reconstruction, published in 1935, 
with the stirring observation: “Easily the most dramatic episode in American history was the 
sudden move to free four million Black slaves in an effort to stop a great civil war, to end [a] 
bitter controversy, and to appease the moral sense of civilization.”9 This period witnessed the 
American state’s fortification of state-sponsored social institutions nationwide, but especially in 
the South, largely on the initiative of, and those in solidarity with, the African-American 
community.10 One Southern politician at the time complained about the federal government’s 
involvement in freedmen’s affairs, “That is more than we do for white men!”11  
Furthermore, an expansive sense of civic responsibility animated postbellum democratic 
politics in the black community. Du Bois’s analysis of Reconstruction praises the efflorescence 
of black political agency that brought about a modern American state to an increasingly racially-
inclusive representational democracy, thus developing the underlining ideals of public reason 
and propelling forward American modernity. He counters the then dominant view among 
historians and in the popular imagination that propagated a degraded view of black citizenship, 
                                                 
8 The debate about the moral and political meaning of Reconstruction in American history continues. The Dunning 
School interpretation argued that the Reconstruction Amendments were a regrettable mistake that left white 
Southerners and the American nation ‘vulnerable’ to African-American exploitation and political ineptitude in 
political offices. For a streamlined discussion of the debate among historians, see the recent article: Gonchar, 
Michael. “Text to Text: ‘Why Reconstruction Matters’ and ‘Black Reconstruction in America.’” The New York 
Times. 9th December 2015. http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/text-to-text-why-reconstruction-matters-
and-black-reconstruction-in-america/?emc=eta1 
9 Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk 
Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880. New York, London, Toronto, and Sydney: 
The Free Press, 1998 [1935]. 
10 Foner describes the postbellum ramifications of black citizenship: “[P]olitics and government were the most 
integrated institutions in Southern life. Blacks and whites sat together on juries, school boards, and city councils, and 
the Republican Party provided a rare meeting ground for like-minded men of both races. Thus, […] Reconstruction 
[…] established a standard of equal citizenship and a recognition of blacks’ right to a share of state services that 
differed sharply from the heritage of slavery […] and from the state-imposed segregation that lay in the future[.]” 
Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction, p. 159.  
11 Foner, Eric. A Short History of Reconstruction, p. 134. 
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ignoring its inalienable dignity. In highlighting what Enrique Dussell calls the “underside of 
modernity,” we find an institution that many anti-racist progressive voices hesitate to include in 
an emancipatory ideal: the modern American state and black striving that gave an interpretation 
of the moral meaning of free and equal citizenship.12 But, as Lawrie Balfour observes, “much of 
Du Bois’s writing can […] be summoned in defense of American civic nationalism. Again and 
again, he returns to ‘the unifying principles of the great republic’ in order to defend the inclusion 
of nonwhite men and women within their purview.”13 
In concluding my introduction, I would like to disarm from the onset two objections to 
my approach. First, one might object that my approach is a restatement of an old interpretive 
paradigm that has dominated Du Bois scholarship: Du Bois is an assimilationist, but one who 
also hopes to accommodate black self-assertion. 14  This interpretation will not do. Short of 
appealing to notions of ‘authenticity’ and ‘expressivist’ conceptions of modern culture, the 
concepts ‘assimilation’ and ‘self-assertion’ – as they stand in the current literature – lack a clear 
articulation as to how their normative content relates to norms of modern freedom that promote 
collective self-determination within major social and political institutions.15 This chapter aims to 
                                                 
12 Dussel, Enrique. The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation. 
New Jersey: Humanities Press, 2007. Dussel concurs that exclusion from formal political institutions is an obstacle 
to emancipatory practices but stops short of ascribing to the modern state a positive and integrative ethical function 
in his philosophy of liberation:  
Liberation Philosophy will ask itself always, first, who is situated in the Exteriority of the system, and in 
the system as alienated, oppressed. Within the regimes of "formal" democracy—bourgeois, and within the 
"late" capitalism of the center—it is asked after the rights of minorities. In reality, in the nations of 
peripheral capitalism, underdeveloped and exploited, the oppressed classes, the marginal ones, the ethnic 
groups and other groups constitute the greater "social block of oppressed," the people. This "people" (as a 
political category) is excluded from the "formal" democracies (and it is the manipulated "majority" of an 
institutionalization of the State that makes do, in fact, without the popular will). p. 8. 
13 Balfour, Lawrie. Democracy’s Reconstruction: Thinking Politically with W.E.B. Du Bois. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. p 129. 
14 Good-Williams, Robert. In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America. Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2011. p. 1-18. 
15 For example, Gooding-Williams holds the view that Du Bois expected black Americans to passively ‘assimilate’ 
to the ideals of American modernity, as if the latter were merely a ‘folkway,’ one fundamentally divergent from the 
self-directed norms of black striving and the goals embedded in the exercise of their political agency.  
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establish precisely such a connection by countenancing the imbrication of postbellum African-
American political practices with the development of the U.S. federal government. In doing so, I 
sideline the longstanding debate of whether Du Bois is an assimilationist or a Black Nationalist. I 
concentrate instead on identifying the norms (of practical reason, if you will) motivating political 
action in the African-American community following the Civil War, revealing notable traces of 
both an assimilationist and a Black Nationalist outlook. The critical upshot of my approach 
uncovers that for Du Bois the ethical function of the modern state was actualized through the 
aspirations and achievements of the postbellum African-American community in particular. Or 
in Hegelian parlance, the ‘particular’ instilled substantive content into the ‘universal,’ thereby 
actualizing and developing it – although Hegel himself was blind to the racial dimension of the 
flowering of American modernity and largely omitted reference to the United States in his 
philosophical writings.16 In delineating Du Bois’s distinct contribution to Afro-modern political 
thought, we see that the ethical ideal of the modern American state, in stressing the African-
American historical experience, unyokes whiteness from Americanness, white power from 
political power.17  
Second, constructing the Hegel/Du Bois connection is still controversial in the current 
scholarship. Among critical race theorists Hegel holds a (justified) reputation for endorsing 
bigoted and imperialist views, as well as dismissing the struggle for freedom of black slaves, 
                                                 
16 In his lectures on history in 1830, Hegel states that the political character of the United States is just emerging and 
is – at least from his vantage point – too inchoate to judge: “America is therefore the land of the future.” Du Bois 
offers rich material for us to understand the concrete form that the struggle for the political character of the U.S. 
took both as historical fact and as the rationally effective reasons that impelled progressive political praxis. Hegel, 
G.W.F. Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988. p. 90. 
17 For a similar argument presented from the Latin-American perspective, see Quijano, Aníbal. “Coloniality of 
Power, Eurocentrism, and Social Classification,” Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate. 
Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui (Eds.). Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008. 
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women, and colonized people of color.18 Whereas Du Bois scholars have more recently posited a 
fecund connection to Hegel, such a link is often couched in terms of Hegel’s philosophy of 
history and the phenomenology of subjective spirit, especially as it pertains to the normative 
structure of interracial and intersubjective social relations.19 No scholar has attempted to connect 
Du Bois’s political critique (of Reconstruction in the postbellum U.S.) with Hegel’s political 
philosophy as Hegel presents it in his institutional model of objective freedom in Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, which is what this chapter sets out to do. Without dismissing Hegel’s 
chauvinism as peripheral to his philosophy, I nonetheless believe that its normative promise 
remains intact, even in light of his ignorant remarks about women, people of color, and the 
inhabitants of the Americas. Moreover, I argue that Du Bois’s understanding of the interrelation 
between group identities, social practices, and institutions of political power reflects and 
broadens a Hegelian lens – in ways that Hegel, by his own admission, could not anticipate. 
Finally, in closing my introduction, I note that an argument that expounds on the moral 
meaning of American citizenship within the modern American state in the aftermath of the Civil 
War need not suggest that over his lifetime Du Bois’s rich political views were confined to U.S. 
national borders.20 Du Bois founded the Pan-African movement and was involved in a variety of 
struggles about the imbrication of race and capitalist political economies worldwide. Neither 
does my argument deny that at different points in his career Du Bois voices a profound 
                                                 
18 Susan Buck-Morss. Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. Tibebu, 
Teshale. Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History. Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 2010. 
19 Frank M. Kirkland. “Kant on Race and ‘Transition’ & Hegel on Race and ‘Development,’” in Linda Martin 
Alcoff, Paul Taylor, and Luvell Anderson (Eds.). The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Race. 
(forthcoming). Gooding-Williams, Robert. “Philosophy of History and Social Critique in The Souls of Black Folk,” 
Sur les Sciences Sociales 26.1 (1987): 99-114. Shaw, Stephanie J. W.E.B. Du Bois and The Souls of Black Folk.  
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013. Zamir, Shamoon. Dark Voices, W. E. B. Du Bois and 
American Thought, 1888-1903. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
20 For more on this topic, see chp 6 of Balfour’s Democracy’s Reconstruction.  
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pessimism about the prospect of realizing racial justice in the U.S.21 In basing my analysis on the 
political critique he articulates primarily in his The Souls of Black Folks and Black 
Reconstruction, following Lawrie Balfour, I maintain that he continued to defend political 
virtues pertaining to civic community within U.S. national borders, which is embedded in the 
ethical view of the state that I present here. He consistently upheld the significance of black 
freedmen’s political enfranchisement from the point-of-view of the development of freedom in 
the U.S. This commitment is evident even when he defended black-run institutions in civil 
society in the Jim Crow era, Pan-Africanism, and came to espouse an explicitly Marxian political 
analysis. In fact, the latter positions are compatible with the analysis of the modern American 
state I give here. Du Bois includes it in his recommendations for the goals of social movements 
in the 20th c. – hopefully, as chapters 2 and 3 will show – with good reason. 
 
II. Hegel’s Justification of the Ethical Function of the Modern State 
In The Souls of Black Folk, published in 1903, approximately forty years after 
Emancipation, Du Bois assesses the meaning of freedom for former slaves:   
Free! The most piteous thing amid all the black ruin of war-time, amid the broken 
fortunes of the masters, the blighted hopes of mothers and maidens, and the fall of an 
empire, -- the most piteous thing amid all this was the black freedman who threw down 
his hoe because the world called him free. What did such a mockery of freedom mean? 
Not a cent of money, not an inch of land, not a mouthful of victuals, -- not even 
ownership of the rags on his back. Free!22 
 
There is a number of ways one might interpret Du Bois’s observations here. Most strikingly, his 
assessment of freedmen’s circumstances following Emancipation is that the juridical rights of 
citizenship require some kind of substantive articulation through concrete social and political 
mechanisms that afford not only “ownership” of material goods, but institutional contexts for the 
                                                 
21 Taylor, Paul C. “What’s the Use of Calling Du Bois a Pragmatist?” Metaphilosophy 32.1-2 (2004): 99-114. 
22 Du Bois, Souls, p. 119-20. 
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realization of “blighted hopes” and social standing, such as access to meaningful work that 
challenges the organization of labor modeled on the slave plantation. The juridical status of 
‘free’ and ‘equal’ amounts to very little, given a classical liberal interpretation of the moral 
meaning of citizenship that sanctions non-interference with basic rights and liberties – precisely 
the model of freedom that enjoyed popular support in the antebellum U.S. and maintains a 
foothold in the American polity.23 To be sure, securing black juridical rights that would protect 
the ballot and black bodies from state violence, for example, is still an ongoing, precarious 
process. Granting that basic rights and liberties that secure legal personhood are necessary but 
insufficient for modern freedom, the question then presents itself: what form of institutional 
recognition and support does Du Bois have in mind, one which would make freedom for former 
slaves ‘substantive’ and ‘actual,’ rather than ‘piteous’ and ‘mocking’? Does negative freedom – 
or the freedom of non-interference – necessarily promote a ‘piteous’ freedom for the worst off in 
modern society, in this case, black freedmen? Furthermore, which institution(s) should be 
principally responsible for rendering the freedom of the most vulnerable members of American 
society ‘substantive’ and ‘actual’?  
Changing conceptions of the role of the late 19th-c. American state rendered the 
inalienable dignity of black citizenship ‘substantive’ by taking federal measures to enfranchise 
former slaves in response to the nationwide political mobilization of the African-American 
community. Du Bois argues that the distinct contribution of African Americans to advancing 
democratic ideals in the U.S. attests to the ‘revolutionary’ normative restructuring of the ends of 
the American state.24 “The abolition of slavery meant not simply abolition of legal ownership of 
the slave; it meant the uplift of slaves and their eventual incorporation into the body civil, politic, 
                                                 
23 Du Bois’s racialist doctrine links the classical liberal idea of freedom and rugged individualism with the social 
construction of white racial identity.  
24 Du Bois, Souls, p. 25. 
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and social, of the United States.”25 For, “slavery was not abolished with the passing of the 13th 
Amendment. There were four million freedmen and most of them on the same plantation, doing 
the same work that they did before emancipation.”26 From being the night-watchman state of the 
Jacksonian era, when (white) yeoman farmers aspired to ‘self-sufficiency’ on scattered, isolated 
homesteads, the American state assumed a distinctly modern form in that it began to cater 
increasingly to the needs of all citizens.27 It not only supported concrete social and political 
mechanisms for actualizing black freedom, such as the Freedmen’s Bureau, a national banking 
system, hospitals, and public school systems.28  
The expanded role the American state assumed in the Reconstruction era is precisely the 
view of the modern state Hegel justifies in his formulation of modern life as ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit). But in articulating the Hegelian ideal of the modern state, an examination of his 
conception of Sittlichkeit is in order, as his view of the state is embedded within it. In his 
introduction to Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Allen W. Wood describes ethical life in a 
fashion that accents institutions for making individuals free: “Modern individuals cannot be free 
in the Hegelian sense unless social institutions provide for subjective freedom in several ways.”29 
Ethical life aims to reconcile the perspectives of subjective and objective ‘freedom.’ Each kind 
of ‘freedom’ offers a set of distinctive ends that provide legitimate action-guiding norms, which 
Hegel views as comprising a comprehensive model of practical freedoms that are appropriate for 
                                                 
25 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 189. 
26 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 188.  
27 Robert Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 198. Interestingly, Smith also notes that the historical period of Jacksonian era 
witnessed a highly active democratic citizenry. Of eligible voters – white males – the voter turnout for the 1840 
presidential election was over 80%. Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 201. As Danielle Allen observes, focusing on racial 
pluralities helps illuminate that access to political power and the political construction of the common good – as 
exemplified in social welfare policies and access to social capital – centered on white interests and excluded non-
white “strangers.” See Allen, Talking to Strangers, p. xv. 
28 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, chps. 7, 14 & 15; Du Bois, Souls, chp. 2. The issue of a just distribution of land 
was never resolved. The theft of indigenous land and the relationship to American political power has also never 
been worked out in American political discourse and self-understanding as a modern state. 
29 Wood, Allen W. “Editor’s Introduction,” Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991. p. xiv.  
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modern citizens. Subjective freedom (or reason) is protected by citizens’ juridical status as 
rights-bearers and subsumed under ‘Abstract Right.’ It promotes two distinctive freedoms or 
ends: individuals’ entitlement to a moral and a legal personality. Moral liberty empowers 
individuals to have a ‘subjective’ moral viewpoint that avows principled convictions. Hegel 
identifies moral liberty with Kantian morality, especially as it characterizes the modern 
phenomena of ‘having a conscience.’ A legal personality – protected by civil rights – allows 
individuals to pursue and set arbitrary ends in the institutional context of the free market in civil 
society. But these aspects of subjective freedom are only a part of the practical freedoms 
appropriate for modern citizens.  
The development of this kind of unity between subjective and object freedom Hegel calls 
the ‘Idea’ of freedom; it is the regulative meta-principle of the progressive development of 
ethical life. 
[T]he good lack[s] subjectivity and determination, and the determinant, i.e., subjectivity, 
lack[s] what has being in itself – they cancel themselves out [sich aufheben] and are 
therefore reduced to moments, to moments of the concept which becomes manifest as 
their unity and has attained reality through this very positing of its moments, so that it 
now exists as the Idea; this is the concept which has developed its determinations to 
reality and which is simultaneously present in their identity as their essence which has 
being in itself – That existence [Dasein] of freedom which was immediately present as 
right is determined in the reflection of self-consciousness as the good; the third stage, 
present here in its transition as the truth of this good and of subjectivity, is therefore also 
the truth of subjectivity and of right. (PR §141) 
 
As a living ‘Idea’, freedom must be valued as a social practice that unfolds within a 
determinant cultural and historical context. Hegel continues: 
Both principles […] the abstract good and the conscience, lack their opposite: the abstract 
good evaporates into complete powerlessness which I can endow with any content 
whatsoever, and subjectivity of spirit becomes no less impoverished in that it lacks any 
objective significance. (PR §141 A)   
 
Frederick Neuhouser observes that ethical life for Hegel “is characterized as a ‘realm of 
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actualized freedom.’”30 Even subjective freedom must assume ‘objective significance’ in the 
external world that accommodates its exercise. Hegel argues that one must contextualize the 
Kantian insight that subjective conscience – or the rights of moral subjectivity – within 
historically emerging patterns of shared cultural practices and institutional arrangements, which 
are then internalized as meaningful, action-guiding norms for members of society that reflect 
social practices around love and work, for example. These features capture the Dasein of 
subjective freedom – its ‘being-there’ quality in the realm of “actualized freedom.” Given its 
Dasein quality that attests to its place in the realm of actualized freedom, subjective freedom 
exists in unity with objective freedom; and taken together, subjective and objective freedom 
comprise the self-sufficient social whole of ethical life itself: “the reflection of self-
consciousness as the good” is identifiable with “the truth of subjectivity and of right.” For, “the 
unity of the subjective with the objective good which has being in and for itself is ethical life” 
(PR §141 A).31 The self-sufficient social whole of ethical life is the institution of modern state, 
taken not merely in its formal ‘political’ aspect, but as the institutional bedrock of an integrated 
social whole that is spurred by the immanent historical logic of the Idea.  
Unlike moral liberty, objective freedom is the externalization of intersubjectively-
constituted norms that guide social practices and identity formation. Hegel focuses on the family 
and civil society, as well as on the modern state. Each major social institution encourages norms 
that contribute to the development of an integrated self capable of assuming the responsibilities 
that come with living in a modern free society; they also provide meaningful social identities that 
                                                 
30 Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, p. 18. 
31 A Hegelian analysis of freedom limited to the unity of subjective and objective rationality is incomplete. Hegel 
continues: “and the reconciliation which takes place in it is in accord with the concept” (PR §141 A).  “The Idea” 
Hegel identifies with speculative freedom, or rational willing as such, which in its broadest formulation includes 
cultural practices, such as the arts, religion, and philosophy, and moves well beyond an individual’s self-conscious 
willing over and against the social world she confronts. See Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, p. 
20-1. Additionally, in the Encyclopedia, Hegel delineates the ‘logic’ of the concept as it unfolds historically and 
conceptual interrelation between social practices that foster meaningful social identities an individual possesses.  
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are intrinsically desirable from the standpoint of the “Idea” of freedom (explained below) and 
from the standpoint of individuals’ own interests that motivate such things as the desire to be a 
parent, a non-alienated laborer whose work is the object of social esteem, and a respected citizen.  
Briefly put, in the family, one is the object of unconditional love and is radically 
dependent on a caregiver for the satisfaction of one’s basic needs. These formative experiences 
give an individual self-confidence and the capacity to trust her judgment, entering relationships 
founded on bonds of trust, feeling and respect. Formative experiences in the family not only 
foster an integrated sense of self but, eventually, a moral personality that reflects a civic concern 
about the social whole. Civil society, Hegel writes, is a “system of needs,” where pursuing one’s 
needs simultaneously satisfies the needs of one’s fellow citizens through free market exchanges 
(PR §182). Adam Smith influenced Hegel’s conception of civil society, although Hegel ascribes 
myriad ethical features to it beyond the pursuit of self-interest that, taken together, inadvertently 
yield a greater good, namely the universal satisfaction of needs. Additionally, he believes that 
labor is a critical form of self-realization. It should signify social standing and identity, and be 
the object of social esteem, even as it enables one to set and pursue arbitrary ends that satisfy 
whatever needs an individual might have. Given their positive contribution to practical freedom, 
ethically salient social identities should be increasingly affirmed and valued, and a harmonious 
ethical life would recognize their distinct contributions to practical freedom.32 The family and 
civil society both prepare citizens to assume a civic identity and duties. The idea of ethical life 
contains “the unity of the subjective with the objective good,” as individuals come to self-
                                                 
32 The social identities Hegel has in mind are family membership, labor, religion, and citizenship in a nation (i.e., 
nationality). My project aims to open a space where the normative significance of gender and racial identity are 
amendable to a Hegelian framework and for any engagement with the conditions of modern freedom, especially in 
the U.S. Pelczynski, Z.A. “The Hegelian Conception of the State,” Hegel’s Political Philosophy: Problems and 
Perspectives. Z.A. Pelczynski (Ed.). Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
1971. p. 15. 
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consciously will the universal ends shaping the institutions they participate in, and ultimately of 
the social whole that they belong to – namely, the state itself. Even in accommodating subjective 
freedoms, Hegel argues that individuals “should pass over of their own accord into the interests 
of the universal, and […] knowingly and willingly acknowledge this universal interest as their 
own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as their ultimate end” (PR §260). The different 
forms rational willing takes in an increasingly free world could be endorsed and refined by its 
members as an instance of their rational self-determination, rather than being perceived as 
‘external’ constraints, or obstacles to, practical freedom. 
The common end a social institution qua social whole provides is reducible neither to any 
particular agent’s will nor to an aggregate of individual wills. The end of the social whole has 
teleological priority that shapes individuals from birth (in the institutional context of the family 
nested within the state). The ‘good’ of the social end it embodies transcends individuals’ 
particular conceptions of the good, except in the oblique fashion that increasingly free self-
determination is ‘good’ for individuals, even though particular individuals might not recognize 
the value of substantive autonomy.33 The teleological priority of social roles within ethical life 
(i.e., family member, civilian, and citizen) is meant to provide a comprehensive account of how 
participation in these institutions “educates” and “forms” moral subjectivity. Willing the 
collective ends of the social whole, Hegel believes is an indelible feature of practical judgment 
that “always involves a responsiveness to social norms,” and evinces the circumscription of 
private ends for the common good.34 Identifying with the collective ends of a social whole gives 
individuals a meaningful social identity that they desire, as well as the lived experience of 
                                                 
33 Ilting, K.-H., “Hegel on the State and Marx’s Early Critique,” The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s 
Political Philosophy. Ed. Z.A. Pełczyński. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
34  Robert B. Pippin. Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. p. 150. 
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normative integrity (i.e., the freedom to and the pleasure of being a good parent, a non-alienated 
laborer, and a respected citizen). Even the exercise of subjective freedom broaches the 
‘substantive’ theory of a rational social order insofar as the means for promoting social welfare 
and schemes of self-realization are secured through shared social ends in the concrete 
institutional contexts of ethical life. Federal political power ultimately sanctions the various ends 
social institutions advance, impelling citizens to come to explicitly identify with the underlining 
principles of the civic community as an instance of their own self-determination.  
A truly free society would give its members the experiential quality of being ‘at home’ in 
it, such that one would not be rationally compelled to reject any aspect of it in the name of 
freedom.35 Sittlichkeit is meant to ground subjective will formation in a manner that one feels to 
be one’s “own” – that is, as identity-constitutive norms “closer” than “faith or trust,” comprising 
a “relationless identity” (PR §147). As a family member, civilian, and citizen, the external world 
sheds its alienating qualities through the gradual elimination of its contingent character, which 
prevents individuals from affirming its underlining principles, as if those principles emanated 
from their own autonomous judgment. 36  A more fully rational social world would become 
increasingly responsive to individuals’ ends, desires, and idealized projections of self, as 
individuals not only willfully identity with the common ends of the social whole, but the social 
whole comes to promote their welfare and incorporate their interests in the representation of the 
common good.  
So much for my presentation of Sittlichkeit in (very) broad strokes. I’ll now turn to the 
unique role of the modern state within it. Hegel makes many dramatic claims about the state that 
                                                 
35 This is the ‘infinite’ project of spirit, one that is never complete, as there is no ‘end’ to human history besides 
freedom and any human society could always be more satisfactorily and rationally arranged, and thus ‘freer.’  
36 Neuhouser, Frederick. Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom. London and Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000. p. 22-3. 
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praise its “divine” character, signifying “the march of god in the world” (PR §258). I’ve no 
intention to defend wholesale his view of the state or his overblown remarks about it. I aim 
instead to illuminate critical details of it that reflect and broaden Du Bois’s assessment of 
American modernity, as it pertains to black political striving that engaged the U.S. federal 
government during the Reconstruction era. According to Hegel, the modern state alone allows 
citizens to self-consciously will and identify with the shared ends of their social world and to 
actualize a ‘universal’ effectively. On this ground, it is the most powerful human-made force to 
appear on earth – hence its “divinity.” Yet, it is the culmination of centuries of self-conscious 
willing immanent in social practices that aspired to a more rational organization of the most 
elemental dimensions of human life: reproduction, production, and government by consent (PR 
§258). The social union of the family is founded on a sexual bond sustained by the “immediate 
feeling” of love (PR §158), whereas civil society facilitates the mutual satisfaction of needs 
without the explicit conceptualizing of others as an object of ethical concern. In both institutional 
contexts, the mediation of the universal (e.g., the common good, personhood, and civic standing) 
is unconscious and the educative function of these institutions is implicit: it occurs passively 
through individuals’ pursuits of feelings, pleasures, and self-interests. The legislative procedures 
within the state, however, provide the sole self-conscious vehicle for intervening in the 
normative structure of the social institutions nested within it, namely the family and civil society. 
The ethical function of the modern state is to reconcile subjective and objective willing through 
engendering a harmonious unity among citizens, the norms of the background ethical culture 
(Geist), and the various institutions, social practices and customs (Sitte) of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit).37  
                                                 
37 A higher level of rational reconciliation within Absolute Spirit that surveys the logic of the history of human self-
understanding in religion, culture and philosophy is possible. I do not consider this high form of unified self-
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Federal political power is thus the highest realization of modern freedom because “it is 
only in the political state that the form of social life becomes an object of rational human choice: 
Only there is it true that ‘the state knows what it wills, and knows it in its universality, as 
something thought’” (PR §270).38 In the Encyclopedia, Hegel writes that “it is the universal 
(State, government, right) that is the substantial middle term within which the individuals and 
their satisfaction have and preserve their full realization, mediation, and subsistence” (§198). The 
complete articulation of ethical life reveals that even an individual’s acquisition of a moral 
personality reflects an implicit “unity of the individual and the universal” (PR §156), where a 
historically bounded ethical culture, delineated by a shared history, values, and self-
understanding, is at hand in the charting of practical freedoms.39  
To be sure, such a model of individual will “unified” with a universal does not mean that 
the state ‘immediately’ subsumes subjective willing under its juridical apparatuses. This is a 
worry that Axel Honneth and other Hegel interpreters have about Hegel’s view of the state, as if 
it should legislate the will of all and provide instructions on what citizens should think and feel. 
Indeed, the objection ignores the critical Hegelian insight that the state as ethical life is not 
merely juridical. Like Rousseau and other liberal political philosophers, Hegel believes that 
modern freedom begins with citizenship. Unlike other liberal thinkers, he believes that 
actualizing the moral meaning of free and equal citizenship requires fulfilling our social roles 
and concomitant ethical standing as family members, civilians, and citizens. The state has both 
the effective power and ethical responsibility to integrate citizens into an objectively rational 
understanding in my assessment of the state.   
38 Wood, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. p. 29. 
39 In light of the above discussion, we are in a good position to assess why Hegel’s longstanding reputation for 
defending a repressive state is mistaken. The accusation ignores the dialectical relation between subjective and 
objective reason. That subjective and objective reason stand in a mutually-constitutive, dialectical relation attests to 
the mistake of ascribing a ‘repressive’ quality to his view of modern ethical life. Such an interpretation privileges the 
point-of-view of Kantian moral subjectivity, and ignores the complex origin and conditions of subjective will 
formation. 
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social order. Furthermore, via concrete social and political mechanisms, the state establishes the 
social conditions for individuals’ successful schemes of self-realization as an extension of its 
positive integrative power. Inasmuch as a civic ideal is necessarily in the offing in influencing 
citizens’ various ethical standings attached to their social identities, the state determines (for 
better or worse) their relation to their external world and to each other.  
The elimination of poverty and the positive affirmation of social identity fall within 
its ethical duties; in a civic community, there exists a legitimate political obligation to protect the 
most vulnerable members of society. The civic community must prevent the very formation 
of social locations that are inherently undignified and exploitative. Consider Hegel’s 
discussion of the ‘rabble’ (der Pöbel) – a precursor of Marx’s notion of the proletariat. Although 
he never offers a satisfactory solution, Hegel argues that the formation of the Pöbel is of critical 
civic concern. It is a systematically excluded and hyper-exploited social position that capitalist 
economic markets inevitably generate. In being disenfranchised and systematically excluded 
from the institutions of ethical life, the Pöbel is alienated from the social whole and experiences 
it to be hostile to its ends. In fact, Hegel argues that the emergence of the Pöbel skirts the norms 
of a fully free ethical culture, as it speaks to the inherently irrational tendencies of capitalist 
political economies:  
Of course every individual is in one way independent, but he is also a member of the 
civic community. Insofar as every man has the right to ask maintenance from it, it must 
also protect him against himself. It is not simply that starvation must be guarded against. 
The wider view is that there never shall arise a rabble, or mass. Since the civic 
community is obliged to support individuals, it also has the right to insist that individuals 
[citizens] should care for its subsistence. (PR §240). 
Note that for Hegel guarding against poverty is a right that laborers hold against their civic 
community; it is not a matter of personal responsibility, even in the cases of the dereliction of the 
duties of self-care (e.g., alcoholism, drug addiction, etc.). Indeed, poverty is an inevitable feature 
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of the structural inequalities of modern society based on capitalist political economies that 
subordinate labor to the accumulation of capital. The elimination of poverty is not simply a 
matter of an equitable distribution of food, but of the positive affirmation of poor folk’s identity 
as citizens that would bolster self-determining political agency.40  
The condition [of poverty] exposes [one] to the wants of the civic community, which has 
deprived him of the natural methods of acquisition (§217), and superseded the bond of 
the family stock (§181). Besides, poverty causes men to lose more or less the advantage 
of society, the opportunity to acquire skill or education, the benefit of the administration 
of justice, the care for health, even the consolation of religion. Among the poor the public 
power takes the place of the family in regard to their immediate need [.] (PR §241) 
 
Hegel’s social theory does not offer a solution to poverty. But, his discussion shows that the state 
is the only institution that influences social forces in civil society, including economic markets, 
so that a conception of the moral meaning of free and equal citizenship could legitimately 
reconstitute the normative structure of any major social institutions, or, as in the case of 
Reconstruction, bring them into existence. Moreover, it can take over their particular ethical 
functions when they fall into disrepair, “supersed[ing] their bond” such that the satisfaction of 
“immediate need” becomes an explicitly political matter. The state is the ‘end’ of all other social 
institutions that carries the historically constituted norms of – to borrow a phrase from Arendt – 
‘human togetherness’ that has become attached to norms of practical freedom (i.e., spirit) in a 
particular civic community. Its purpose is thus not to maximize individuals’ arbitrary freedom; 
that kind of freedom is appropriate in the institutional context of civil society, but even there 
only to a limited extent. Civil society must retain an implicit ethical function for educating 
subjective wills to universality, as our material neediness forces us into cooperative relationships 
with others. Hegel’s view of the state (as well as civil society) is normatively richer than liberal 
conceptions of it. It ought not merely to protect private property, provide security and enlarge 
                                                 
40 For this reason, Hegel does not support the welfare state. 
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industry (PR §270). Following the ancient Greek model of the polis, Hegel contends that civic 
engagement is the most appropriate practical activity for human beings, but accommodates 
subjective freedom.41 The subjective willing of the universal Hegel identifies as “the vocation of 
individuals,” enabling them to lead “a universal life” (PR §258). He articulates a handful of 
political mechanisms within the (Prussian) state that are charged with maintaining “universal 
life.” Its essential function is to provide an institutional context for the reconciliation of 
subjective and objective rationality, but historically emergent social practices would determine 
the concrete form that progressive federal power takes, which would facilitate citizens’ 
participation in universal life. Hegel only limns that the modern state must foster self-conscious 
rational legislation – the ultimate end and “actuality” of the “ethical Idea” (PR §257, §267 A). 
The state, Hegel writes, is therefore the historical achievement of spirit, possessing an objective, 
inherent rationality, but like any social institution emerging from the unfolding of immanently 
rational social practices it acquires historical determinacy through self-conscious, political 
praxis.  
The position of the Pöbel and black freedmen both underscore the positive integrative 
function of the modern state. With respect to the Pöbel, the inability of the modern state to find a 
satisfactory resolution to the contradiction between labor and capital illustrates the need for 
critical social theory to reimagine the nature of successful integration on the ideal of self-
determination in the universal satisfaction of needs. Given an entirely different historical context, 
for Du Bois the failure to attend to freedmen’s needs results in the ‘re-enslavement’ of former 
slaves and their descendants because slavery did not end with the passage of the 13th 
                                                 
41 Unlike the ancient Greek model of the polis, Hegel believes that the activity of production, which is limited to the 
household (eikos) in the ancient Greek model, is infused with norms of rational self-determination that are subject to 
improvement and provide the conditions for a positive social identity integral to the modern human personality. The 
ancient Greek philosophical anthropological maintained that a viable notion of the ‘human’ must not depart from 
public membership in a democratic community. 
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Amendment. The emergence of a racialized position of economic and social vulnerability 
does not arise with the same 'necessity' as the capitalist exploitation of labor. A less racist 
social order is possible even in a capitalist mode of production. The vulnerability of each social 
location – that of the Pöbel and the freedmen – is complementary but distinct; and their 
juxtaposition is an exciting avenue for philosophical exploration. For the purpose of this 
paper, it is sufficient to note that in both cases the ethical ideal of the modern state is 
integral for a positive reconciliation against the destructive and alienating forces of civil society.  
Before proceeding to a discussion of Du Bois on black political agency during 
Reconstruction, I will enumerate three critical details of Hegel’s conception of the modern state 
that identify his contribution to a substantive emancipatory ideal and justify Du Bois’s political 
prescriptions.  
1. The modern state must educate citizens toward political autonomy. In his criticism of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract theory, Hegel inverts the lexical order of the generation 
of the general will that the social contract tradition advances. The rational actuality of the state 
exists prior to a particular iteration of subjective willing. The state carries a legitimate power 
to educate citizens toward political autonomy; furthermore, it has a responsibility in the 
formation of moral subjectivity toward freer and more inclusive ends. 
In opposition to the principle of individual will, we should remember the fundamental 
concept according to which the objective will is rational in itself, i.e. in its concept, 
whether or not it is recognized by individuals [Einzelnen] and willed by them at their 
discretion. [T]he subjectivity of freedom […] embodies only one (consequently one-
sided) moment of the Idea of the rational will, which is rational solely because it has 
being in and for itself […] The state in and for itself is the ethical whole, the actualization 
of freedom, and it is the absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual. […] Any 
discussion of freedom must begin now with individuality [Einzelheit] or the individual 
self-consciousness, but only with the essence of self-consciousness; for whether human 
beings know it or not, this essence realizes itself as a self-sufficient power of which 
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single individuals [die einzelnen Individuen] are only moments. (PR §258) 
Numerous commentators have noted Hegel’s debt to the Aristotlean model. They have 
drawn attention to education (Bildung) in ethical life, in which individual self-consciousness 
might be unaware that the “essence” of self-consciousness is “a self-sufficient power” in 
the external world. Wood argues that the background ethical culture of subjective will 
formation instill ethical “virtues” as intelligent “disposition (Gesinnung), trait (hexis), or habit 
(ethos) […] to act for certain reasons, to be pleased or pained at certain things, to feel certain 
emotions.”42 Benno Zabol concurs that Hegel “opposes both theoretical atomism as well as 
an undifferentiated conception of the common good. He chooses instead the Aristotelian ethos 
of an existing order in its twofold meaning as convention, place of living or custom [Sitte] and 
life-form, as the primary point of reference for a social theory of spirit.”43 The discharge of law 
and right is not ‘coercive’ inasmuch as it reflects a particular “life-form.” “The formal character 
of the right as a duty and a law it feels as the letter, cold and dead, as a shackle. […] Hence 
law […] is par excellence the shibboleth which marks out these false friends and comrades of 
what they call the ‘people.’”44 State power need not be an external coercion, but ideally an 
individual should consider it as an end a self-reflective individual gives to herself (E §503A).
Additionally, although Hegel does not theorize public school systems, as it is beyond his 
historical purview, note that given the state’s role in educating to political autonomy, the 
establishment of a public school system for promoting citizens’ democratic literacy and 
public opinion is legitimated by his account of the ethical function of the state (PR 
§315-17).
42 Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, p. 214. 
43 Zabel, Benno. “The Institutional Turn in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Towards a Conception of Freedom beyond 
Individualism and Collectivism,” Hegel Bulletin 36.1 (2015): 80-104. p. 84. 
44 Hegel, G.W.F. Philosophy of Right. Preface. T.M. Knox (Tr.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952. p. 7. 
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2. State power is not merely repressive, but enacts a positive ideal. One might object, as
Carole Pateman does, that an ethical view of the state – and any ideal one, for that matter – 
obscures an historically accurate picture of it, revealing its consistently repressive character.45 
Pateman and critics of the modern state fail to acknowledge, however, that even a repressive 
state is necessarily integrative in light of some vision of the flourishing of the social whole, 
though perhaps not a vision citizens could rationally endorse as an instance of their free self-
determination. Nonetheless, one could always reconstruct the underlining principle for the state’s 
exercise of power and judge the principle’s reasonableness: who is included and who is 
excluded, who enjoys full civic standing and who does not. These details are not ‘accidental’ 
features of modern life, but express purposive institutional praxis. Robert Gooding-Williams 
observes that even the institution of slavery in the American South existed as a self-contained 
social whole, embedded in and reproduced by federal power. The state retains an ineradicable 
normative core that offers a positive standard for the exercise of power, even when modeled on 
racialized forms of systematic exclusion, exploitation, and denigration. State power is thus not 
merely negative but productive of ideals about what it means to belong to a social whole.46 And 
these ideals could always be subject to revision and further rationalization. 
One need not deny – as Hegel never did – the violent history of state repression. Hegel 
readily concedes that a state whose praxis does not by normative design negate subjective 
autonomy is a decidedly new and hence distinctly modern phenomenon.47 Du Bois’s insight is 
that in American modernity, additional normative strictures emerge for the autonomous self-
45 See Pateman’s illuminating exchange with Charles W. Mills in chp 1 of Contract & Domination. Malden: Polity 
Press, 2007. 
46 Michele Foucault analysis of the modern state in its relation to biopolitics reflects this Hegelian insight, although 
unlike Hegel, Foucault decenters power in way that minimizes the centralized power of the state. Furthermore, 
Hegel holds the optimistic view of the capacity for rational self-determination in mediating state power 
according to principles citizens could freely endorse.  
47 A fuller account of ethical life requires incorporating Hegel’s philosophy of history that accounts for the historical 
transformation of forms of ethical life.  
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determination of a social whole: The inescapable project of fully democratically establishing the 
norms of fair social cooperation in light of the historical experience of racist dispossession and 
expropriation. This was the mission of social reform that the Freedmen’s Bureau assumed. In the 
postbellum chaos, where white supremacy struggled to maintain its foothold within the federal 
government, eventually trumping progressive forces, the Reconstruction Amendments managed 
to foreground the black freedmen’s perspective, catered to their needs and political demands, and 
democratized offices of political power. According to Du Bois, this should be recognized as a 
positive achievement of black striving – a “gift” that contributed to the expansion of the ideals of 
American modernity. It attests to the development of a freer ideal that irreversibly transformed 
the political landscape; even in its failure, it left behind a kernel about what ‘real’ freedom would 
have to be in America.   
The state is not a work of art; it exists in the world, and hence in the sphere of 
arbitrariness, contingency, and error, and bad behavior may disfigure it in many respects. 
But the ugliest man, the criminal, the invalid, or the cripple is still a human being; the 
affirmative aspect – life – survives [besteht] in spite of such deficiencies, and it is with 
this affirmative aspect that we are here concerned. (PR §258 A) 
 
In propounding an idealized ethical function of the state as the bedrock of the meaning of 
freedom in American modernity, as taken from the point-of-view of freedmen, one must 
highlight Hegel’s distinction between the ‘being-there’ of an object and its concept.48 Hegel 
admits that even in his own time “it has almost become dishonorable to continue to speak 
philosophically about the nature of the state” (PhR, Preface 17). In spite of its “affirmative 
aspect” (i.e., as the concept), that it is steeped in a particular civic community necessarily means 
it is not perfectly free and rational. In arising from a particular socio-historical context, it 
expresses “arbitrariness, contingency, and error,” but the former is also the inevitable departure 
                                                 
48 Hegel, G.W.F. The Encyclopedia Logic. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1991. §91. E 
 Elements of Rawls’s view of the basic structure of the society and of a just state resemble Hegel’s view. 
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point for mediation via political praxis.49 That the state exists as an empirical object does not 
justify all its purposive activities; it also does not merit its exclusion from the construction of 
emancipatory ideals. “Since the state is objective spirit, it is only through being a member of the 
state that an individual herself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life” (PR §258). 
For most interpreters of Hegel’s political philosophy, the affirmative aspect of the 
concept of the state is lost. As it recedes from view, the institutional context of civil society 
assumes prominence in advancing emancipatory ideals – this is most notably the case with Karl 
Marx and the Frankfurt School, including Axel Honneth. Honneth, for example, criticizes the 
“over-institutional” dimension of ethical life, where objective freedom ‘totalizes’ potential 
intersubjective networks of social recognition.50 He attempts to carve out a space for patterns of 
intersubjective recognition that are embedded neither in the state nor major social institutions. 
Similarly, Marx argues that under ideal utopian conditions the state withers away as 
emancipatory ideals arise ‘immanently’ and ‘organically’ from laborers’ social cooperation.51 
The radical potential of Hegel’s view of the state – one that is pressing in Du Bois’s analysis – is 
that the integrative normative force of the state is an inevitable feature of modern life. Whether it 
serves the ideals of capitalist profit and white supremacist patriarchy or that of an increasingly 
racially-inclusive egalitarian democracy that protects the most vulnerable, it necessarily serves 
some positive normative ideal. The ideal effectuates “substantive social bonds and shared final 
49 Hegel admits that an ineradicable element of contingency factors in here, as in the case of the drawing of national 
boundaries and adjustment to various environmental pressures. The state has a quantitative (i.e., its expanse, 
territorial unity, etc.) and a qualitative (i.e., its circumscribed ethical life) “limit” that falls far short of the 
entire globe. Hegel’s Lectures on History and The Encyclopedia Logic §A108. 
50 Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2014. p. 63-7. 
51 Even Hegel scholars share this apprehension about the positive character of the modern state. Wood and 
Neuhouser each privilege subjective will formation as the normative source for democratic legitimation of 
institutional norms. The “enjoyment” of practical freedom that affords way of being-with-oneself-in-another must 
privilege the modern state as the premier institution that has the most impact in the character, scope, and quality of 
citizens’ practical freedom. 
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ends.” 52  What is more, it inevitably molds citizens’ political autonomy towards the ideal it 
upholds. That is the essential Hegelian insight that the gain and ultimate failure of 
Reconstruction makes manifest. According to Du Bois, it is also why black American political 
agency must seize state power.  
 
3. Habits of citizenship should encourage social cooperation and civic mediation as the 
end of political praxis. For Hegel, citizens should eventually reconcile themselves to the political 
community to which they belong. This would require positive integration into the social whole, 
which encourages habits of citizenship that enable citizens to “personally adhere” to the ends of 
the political community without compromising their sense of justice or moral agency. Alfredo 
Ferrarin explains:  
The will is finally realized, for citizens understand the state as their own product; 
institutions are no longer alienated from people who, rather than being subjects suffering 
laws they sense to be oppressive and limitative of their freedom, are citizens who enact 
them and strengthen them with their personal adherence in their everyday activities.53 
 
For Du Bois, during Reconstruction the “personal adherence in [citizens’] everyday activities” to 
a rational social order transformed it, inasmuch as black political agency challenged the norms of 
fair social cooperation within the American civic community. The nationwide political 
mobilization of the black community contested habits of citizenship that failed to problematize 
systematic, racist exclusion and the background ethical culture of white supremacy, which 
mediated the expression of social forces and the perception of political legitimacy of public 
claims. Progressive postbellum forces fortified a ‘black ideal’ that pressed the ends of the polity 
                                                 
52 Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, p. 181.  
53 Alfredo Ferrarin. Hegel and Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. p. 362. 
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to reimagine schemes for the democratic distribution of power and of material resources.54 
Hegel defends a permanent body of civil servants to represent the ‘universal’ interest of 
the common good of ethical life. This class would have sufficient leisure and an impartial 
outlook for political judgment that instantiates universal life: “[T]hese individuals will not 
subordinate the universal interest to the particular interest of a community or corporation [i.e., 
union or civil society group]” (PR §309). A “universal” class of civil servants executes a public 
service based on trust that they will preserve the common good. Note that Hegel charges only a 
small fraction of the population – civil servants – with the task of explicitly engaging universal 
life in public offices. For the remainder of the citizenry, participation in ‘universal life’ is 
passive. It amounts to a patriotic outlook, comprehension of the law, and possession of an 
informed opinion about public policies. For Hegel, the mechanism for actualizing and preserving 
the civic community relies on the state and the civil servants it employs, rather than on social 
groups and social movements. Du Bois demonstrates that habits of citizenship that encouraged 
fair social cooperation as the end of political praxis was the “gift” of the postbellum black 
community to the U.S. polity, an institution hitherto derelict in its duties to all citizens, as the 
color-line demarcated the scope of civic concern. In fact, Du Bois argues that distinctly black 
ideals that were explicitly partial to the concerns of the postbellum black community were the 
only means for actualizing universal life in the U.S; and all citizens stood to gain from this 
partiality. “It can see to it that not only no action of this inner group is opposed to the real 
interests of the nation, but that it works for and in conjunction with the best interests of the 
nation.”55 Lawrie Balfour captures Du Bois’s idea here well: “In other words, Du Bois insists 
                                                 
54 The failure of the postbellum redistribution of land is a critical missed opportunity for realizing substantive 
freedom. Conceiving how to incorporate the ethical content of that call into contemporary justifications of 
reparations is a difficult but essential philosophical tasks.  
55 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 108. My emphasis. 
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that much can be learned about the prospects for all citizens by understanding the lived meaning 
of democratic principles from the vantage point of society’s most vulnerable members and 
acknowledging the general benefits that follow from policies that aim to improve the 
circumstances of particular groups.56 With considerable rhetorical flourish, Du Bois confirms 
that, “If and when universal suffrage came to enforce this point of view, an entirely different 
development of American industry and American civilization must ensure.”57 
 
III. Du Bois on the Freedmen’s Bureau: The Making of the Modern American 
State 
In transitioning to Du Bois’s account of the political and moral significance of the 
Reconstruction era, and how it helps reformulate a philosophical definition of freedom, a 
restatement of my approach to conceptualizing Hegel’s relation to Du Bois’s political critique is 
helpful. Hegel’s account of ethical life and the ideal of the modern state justify Du Bois’s 
analysis of Reconstruction, given both philosophers’ convergence on the three key positive 
contributions of a normative view of the state outlined in the previous section. His positive 
evaluation of the work of the Freedmen’s Bureau, which I present later in this section, reflects 
the Hegelian view of the ethical function of the state. However, he significantly departs from the 
Hegelian framework for conceptualizing freedom on a couple of critical fronts. Although he 
claims that the emergence of the modern American state helps secure the foundation of 
substantive freedom for all citizens, his departure from Hegel’s political philosophy is to be 
                                                 
56 Balfour, Democracy’s Reconstruction, p. 25. 
57 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 219. Due to space constraints and the already ambitions goals of this chapter, it 
excludes an essential element attesting to the promise of Du Bois’s conception of modern freedom. A normative 
analysis of non-alienated labor from the black historical perspective is necessary, especially one that builds on the 
laboring conditions of emancipated black labor that necessitated the subordination of capital to the interests of black 
(and poor white) labor. See chp. 7 of Black Reconstruction.  
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expected, given that Hegel’s political philosophy attends neither to the political morality of race 
within a particular modern polity nor to the specific historical details coeval with the emergence 
of American modernity.  
The manner that Du Bois builds on a positive normative theory of the state yields at least 
two unique philosophical insights about the nature of modern freedom. I will spend the 
remainder of the chapter examining these insights, before concluding with a brief discussion of 
his view of leadership, which I argue has been unfairly characterized as ‘elitist.’ First, Du Bois 
shows that the progressive development of the social whole, while founded on the modern state, 
cannot rely on the state alone to actualize an inclusive civic community by ‘self-generated’ 
legislative initiatives. According to Du Bois, in expressing the black historical perspective and 
the political agency of black freedmen, a social movement spearheaded by a specific social 
group contributed to the actualization of the underlining norms of public reason, thereby 
reconstituting it. Second, he highlights that the historical emergence of major social and political 
institutions such as the Freedmen’s Bureau and public school systems in the South arose from 
black political praxis, transforming the institutional structure of ethical life.  
A model of modern ethical life confronting the legacy of state-sanctioned slavery cannot 
rely on the latent normative content of the basic structure of society. It must articulate how social 
groups, in spite of the intransigence of partial and exclusionary state power, came to participate 
in ‘universal life,’ agitating for positive social change that brings about a more rational, free, and 
inclusive social order whose underlining organizing principle all civic-minded (gebildete) 
citizens can freely will as an instance of their own self-determination. Thus, Du Bois shows that 
not only is the political morality of race pressing, taken as racial ideals that the color-line 
engenders, but he also notes that the political praxis of a social group (e.g., African Americans) 
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could provide a distinct insight into the immanent logic spurring the historical development of 
the Idea of freedom, one that Hegel could not anticipate. A ‘second-sight,’ so to speak, that 
offers a distinct vantage point on the irrationality of American society.58 
 
1. Rethinking Progress.  
With respect to Du Bois’s account of progressive social change, it is critical to note that 
while he argues that a social movement spearheaded by a specific social group actualized the 
underlining norms of public reason, Du Bois accepts a positive normative theory of the state, 
which constitutes the telos of progressive social movements. He consistently stresses the 
meaning of freedom from the point-of-view of black freedmen, but nonetheless presents their 
interpretation of freedom in a manner that amplifies the bedrock values of American civic 
identity – that is, a principled commitment to freedom and equality.  
From Du Bois’s early short essays to his later tomes on historical sociology, in 
privileging the point-of-view of black freedmen just emerging from slavery, numerous basic 
questions about democratic government and the normative reconstitution of the ends of the 
American social fabric loomed:  
The true significance of slavery in the United States to the whole social development of 
America lay in the ultimate relation of slaves to democracy. What were to be the limits of 
democratic control in the United States? If all labor, black as well as white, became free – 
were given schools and the right to vote – what control could or should set the power and 
action of these laborers? Was the rule of the mass of Americans to be unlimited, and the 
right to rule extended to all men regardless of race and color, or if not, what power of 
dictatorship and control; and how would property and privilege be protected? This was 
the great and primary question which was in the minds of the men who wrote the 
Constitution […] and continued in the minds of thinkers throughout the controversy. It 
still remains with the world as the problem of democracy expands and touches all races 
and nations.59 
 
                                                 
58 Du Bois, Souls, p. 5. 
59 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 13. 
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He employs the precarious social location of black freedmen to ask basic questions about what 
sorts of political demands and public policy proposals could be legitimated through more 
inclusive democratic procedures that incorporates their ‘second sight.’ He recognizes that the 
previous social order has crumbled, requiring the redrawing of the boundaries of 
legitimate political power and civic belonging.  
He notes that the position of black slaves and free black citizens was not altogether 
unacknowledged by offices of political power prior to the ‘social revolution’ of Reconstruction. 
In fact, the potential political praxis of black Americans was a constant object of anxiety and fear 
throughout slavery and into the Reconstruction era. He demonstrates the emancipatory power of 
soberly and methodically incorporating, rather than ignoring or suppressing, black interests in the 
public formation of political will. Furthermore, the sole regulative concept for this procedure for 
reimagining the social union is the idea of freedom. In the aftermath of the civil war, Du Bois 
scrutinizes the social, economic, and political scene with an eye towards increasing the 
rationality of the social whole. He examines the modern American state’s integrative force in 
relation to freedmen – the most vulnerable members of 19th c. American society. “Suddenly, 
there was Reason,” he writes, “in all this mad orgy.” With Emancipation, “God had come to 
America.”60 From the perspective of former slaves, Emancipation was “the coming of the Lord. 
It was the fulfillment of prophesy and legend.”61 And though “their condition was appalling, […] 
they were possessed by the wildest notions of what liberty might mean.”62  
He writes that the historical experience of slavery instilled liberty as a social value that 
would continue to guide norms of social and political praxis in the postbellum black community. 
Given the historical context, we have some insight into why Du Bois believes that black 
60 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 126. 
61 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 122. 
62 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 70. 
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freedmen – refugees of the Civil War – were an impetus to the “social development of America.” 
Neither the ‘inherent’ rationality of the state nor the civil servants charged with interpreting the 
meaning of freedom nor white Americans who collectively profited from slavery offered a 
progressive vision of the flourishing of the social whole that included freedmen’s perspective.63 
“Of all that most Americans wanted, this freeing of the slave was the last.”64 For, “Nothing that 
concerned the amelioration of the Negro touched the heart of the mass of Americans.”65 But, the 
legacy of slavery and freedmen’s own position as refugees of the Civil War propelled them with 
the force of necessity to reimagine a social whole that definitively abolished all the conditions of 
racialized slavery that persisted after Emancipation – that is, to imagine what ‘real’ freedom in 
the U.S. would be, having suddenly arrived in the land of a biblical Jerusalem: “A great human 
sob shrieked in the wind, and tossed tears upon the sea, – free, free, free.”66 This political force 
that black freedmen exercised transformed the very normative structure of the American state, 
whose previous institutional form was unable to accommodate the normative force of the black 
freedmen’s call for substantive freedom. 
Consider how such an account of the ‘immanent’ social development of the U.S. departs 
from Hegel’s view. In his philosophy of history, Hegel argues that (European) people came to 
recognize freedom as the ultimate “good,” but a good “determined” by social practices that 
provide both a positive social identity and the freedom of abstract “negation” of the social 
locations they find themselves in (i.e., via the ends of subjective freedom). In light of a racist 
myopia shared by modern European philosophers, Hegel did not countenance how people of 
                                                 
63 “When Union armies entered the South they became armies of emancipation. It was the last thing they planned to 
be. The North did not propose to attack property. It did not propose to free slaves. This was a white man’s war to 
preserve the Union, and the Union must be preserved.” (Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 55) 
64 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 125. 
65 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 55. In Souls, Du Bois observes: “there was scarcely a white man in the South 
who did not honestly regard Emancipation as a crime, and its practical nullification as a duty” (p. 33). 
66 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 124. 
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color – and former slaves – engage in practices oriented toward the reconstitution of a civic 
community within the normative strictures of modernity. (That is, of spirit as such, rather than 
that of ‘natural spirit’).67 Thus, for Du Bois, the ethical function of the modern American state is 
foregrounded in the emancipatory practices of the black American community in the 
Reconstruction era. The original Hegelian formulation of ethical life lacks an analysis of the 
political morality of race in the context of the exercise of civic power. Although both 
philosophers base their social critique on the evaluative category of freedom in relation to major 
institutions, Du Bois believes that in American modernity black racial identity determined the 
development of practical freedom, contributing to the democratization – “rationalization” in 
Hegelese – of the basic structure of American society. Additionally, Du Bois contends that what 
citizens perceive as legitimately obligating in a civic community is necessarily mediated by the 
color line. (White) resistance against actualizing “universal life” transpires as an antagonistic 
reaction against the inclusion of people of color in major social and political institutions. Such an 
inclusion is often perceived as an existential threat against the integrity of white racial identity.68 
Hence, Du Bois describes the bifurcation of double consciousness as a conflict between 
blackness and Americanness. To be sure, this ‘threat’ is fortified by white reluctance to 
redistribute property and material wealth accumulated from the racist exploitation of black labor, 
free and enslaved.69 From slavery to Jim Crow, that is, for the vast stretches of American history, 
“the living together of black and white in America was unthinkable” and “democracy died save 
in the hearts of black folk.”70  
                                                 
67 Hegel argues in his philosophy of history that peoples living on the African continent ‘belong’ to natural spirit 
because they are human beings, but their normative practices are ‘natural spirit.’ For a highly original view about 
how Du Bois racialist doctrine bears on Hegel’s philosophy of history, see: Kirkland, Frank M. “On Du Bois’ 
Notion of Double Consciousness: Some Hegelian Reflections” (unpublished). 
68 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p.  
69 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 590-91. 
70 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 4. & 30. 
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To begin with, progressive change in the U.S. began with slaves enacting their own 
freedom. Because the onslaught of the Civil War ignored the institution of slavery, slaves 
undertook a massive general strike. “It was a strike on a wide basis against the conditions of 
work […] that involved directly […] a half million people. They wanted to stop the economy of 
the plantation system, and to do that they left the plantations.”71 Black refugees enacted their 
own freedom, arriving in myriads at Union army encampments and, in effect, “declared 
themselves free.”72 Even as the Union army initially attempted to enjoin their servitude, the black 
refugees instead willingly agreed to serve as soldiers. In fighting to preserve the union, they took 
up arms against their former owners and changed the course of the war, ensuring Northern 
victory and their own liberty as American citizens.73 “In proportion to the population, more 
Negroes than whites fought in the Civil War.”74 The institution of slavery ended, Du Bois writes, 
with the federal government reluctantly conferring black citizenship with the passage of the 
Reconstruction Amendments (i.e., the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendment in 1865-70). Resisting the 
prevailing juridical status that echoed the Aristotelian formulation of a slave as a voiceless tool, 
freedmen forcefully enacted a political will that felled a slavocracy and inaugurated themselves 
into the American civic community, their incorporation into which signaled a “national crisis,” 
one that had an existential dimension concerning the dramatically unsettled meaning of 
American civic identity and the political morality of whiteness.75 “And now, suddenly, violently, 
they came into a new birthright, at a time of war and passion, in the midst of the stricken and 
                                                 
71 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 67. 
72 Du Bois, Souls, p. 15. 
73 “With arms in their hands, Negroes would form a fighting force which could replace every single Northern white 
soldier fighting listlessly and against his will with a black man fighting for freedom” (Du Bois, Black 
Reconstruction, p. 80). 
74 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 716. 
75 Du Bois, Souls, p. 16; Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 131-32; Alcoff, Linda M. The Future of Whiteness. 
Malden: Polity, 2015. 
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embittered population of their former masters.”76 
Neither the U.S. government nor the majority of the citizens imagined that they would 
have to chart norms of fair social cooperation within a civic community that incorporates 
the “striving” of former slaves as moral equals. Until his death, President Lincoln, writes Du 
Bois, still hoped that a recolonialization project would rid the U.S. of its black population;77 
some Southerners called for the genocidal mass murder of free black Americans following the 
end of the Civil War;78 or else, as popular racist sciences foretold, as free, the black community 
would die out on its own accord because it was metaphysically incapable of existing as free. In 
short, the white community hardly imagined that it would need to confront the political judgment 
of former slaves or become reconciled to the black historical perspective, including 
acknowledging their treatment of communities of color since the founding of the republic. 
The postbellum black community pressed for the political mediation of racialized pluralities 
to reconstitute the norms of the American civic community, aiming to demolish the racial 
caste system along the way, as it still profoundly shaped the background ethical culture for 
the expression of political power. In order to realize substantive freedom for freedmen, black 
freedmen bifurcated whiteness and political power – their longing for freedom was strong 
enough to at least partially succeed in this formidable task.79  
Du Bois uses figurative language to describe this longing for freedom as a “song”: 
76 Du Bois, Souls, p. 20. 
77 Du Bois quotes at length Karl Marx’s letter to Lincoln on the heels of his 1864 reelection. In the letter Marx 
complains that in failing to address the needs of free black labor, the “workmen […] of the North […] allowed 
slavery to defile their own republic. […] The workingmen of Europe felt sure that as the American War of 
Independence initiated a new era of ascendency for the Middle Class, so the American Anti-Slavery war will do [the 
same] for the working classes. They consider it an earnest sign of the epoch to come to that it fell to the lot of 
Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggles 
for the rescue of the enchained race and the Reconstruction of a social world” (Black Reconstruction, p. 219; 
emphasis added).  
78 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 209. 
79 Thus, the historian Foner writes that what is noteworthy about the Reconstruction era is not its demise with the 
rise of the Southern ‘redemption’ movement and the withdrawal of federal support from freedmen’s initiatives. The 
remarkable thing is that Reconstruction happened at all. 
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A great song arose, the loveliest thing this side the seas. It was a new song. It did not 
come from Africa, though the dark throb and beat of that Ancient of Days was in it and 
through it. It did not come from white America. […] It was a new song. [It] throbbed and 
thundered on the world’s ears with a message seldom voiced by a man.  
They sneered at it – those white Southerners who heard it and never understood. They 
raped and defiled it – those white Northerners who listened without ears. Yet it lived and 
grew; always it grew and swelled and lived, and it sits today at the right hand of God, as 
America’s one real gift to beauty, as slavery’s one redemption, distilled from the dross of 
its dung.80 
There is only one “redemption” for slavery: a kind of “freedom” that completely negates the 
conditions of racialized slavery, a freedom hardly intelligible to freedmen’s fellow citizens who 
ignored their point-of-view, and indeed, feared their judgment.  
The foregoing discussion has argued that the Hegelian view of objective rationality in 
ethical life is the most compelling account of what such substantive freedom would entail, with a 
significant modification about the vehicle for progressive change. As Honneth observes, echoing 
Du Bois without knowing it:  
The motor and medium of the historical process of realizing institutionalized principles of 
freedom is not the law, at least not in the first instance, but social struggles over the 
appropriate understanding of these principles and the resulting changes in behavior. [W]e 
must instead take account of sociology and historiography, as these disciplines are 
inherently more sensitive to changes in everyday moral behavior.81 
Du Bois’s historical sociology of Reconstruction offers fertile philosophical insight for 
redefining liberty through considering the political objectives of former slaves.82 As already 
noted, Honneth like most critical theorist does not entertain the affirmative potential of the state 
in grounding the telos of social struggle. For the emancipatory ideal of carving out a social space 
for intersubjective patterns of recognition is quite a different matter from coming to wield federal 
80 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 125. 
81 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 329. 
82 In the chapter “The Propaganda of History,” Du Bois notes that states such as Florida and Alabama 
have destroyed all records from the Reconstruction era – thus proving how difficult it was to confront the black 
freedman as ‘a coworker in the kingdom of culture’ (Black Reconstruction, p. 721). 
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power directly. Consider the difference between former slaves conspiring in the fields as moral 
equals amongst themselves, but without any public recognition of their striving, to them showing 
up armed at the front steps of their former masters and demanding submission in the name of the 
new moral meaning of American civic identity. 83  Furthermore, freedmen’s efforts were the 
impetus for the rise of new social institutions that contributed to a rational social order. For 
instance, the Freedmen’s Bureau was a federally-sponsored social institution that functioned as 
as a mechanism for positive integration into the American social fabric; it attested to the 
successful seizure of federal power in realizing the moral meaning of citizenship from the black 
historical perspective with the conclusion of the Civil War. “The whole moral fabric of the 
country was changed, not simply by the blood and cruelty, hate and destruction, of war, but by 
the prospect of a golden future.”84 
 
2. Second Slavery & the Historical Emergence of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
  “This tale of the dawn of Freedom is an account of that government of men called the 
Freedmen’s Bureau,” writes Du Bois, “— one of the most singular and interesting of the 
attempts made by a great nation to grapple with the vast problems of race and social 
condition.”85 The postbellum political organizing of the black community – or “black striving,” 
Du Bois’s preferred idiom – spearheaded the historical emergence of a social institution that 
contributed to the rationalization of the basic structure of American society during 
Reconstruction. It “grappled” with “social conditions” through foregrounding racial matters. 
Exemplifying an institutional expression of progressive historical change, black political actors 
                                                 
83  Gooding-Williams favors the conspiratorial, “band-of-brothers” model of slaves’ political resistence. With 
Honneth, he shares an anti-institutional skepticism about the emancipatory potential of a normative theory of the 
modern American state.  
84 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 211. 
85 Du Bois, Souls, p. 14.  
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and white Republican Reconstruction politicians closely allied with the postbellum black 
community led the effort to run the Freedmen’s Bureau, which also oversaw the establishment of 
the first public school systems in the South. 86  Taken together, these federally-sponsored 
institutions educated vast sections of formerly excluded and systematically-disenfranchised 
citizens towards political autonomy; and these new institutions also enacted a positive ideal of 
social belonging, encouraging cooperative habits of citizenship – precisely the ethical function of 
the modern state that Hegel limns in the Philosophy of Right. For, the Reconstruction 
Amendments provided the first definition of American citizenship as equal treatment of 
everyone born within U.S. national borders, regardless of class or lineage.87 It thus marks the 
first experiment of interracial democracy in the U.S., but one that attended to the social 
conditions shaping the living conditions of racial pluralities. An institution was called for that 
could integrate black citizens into American society and the polity on free and equal terms – 
something that remains historically unprecedented in the United States because of its 
concomitant concern with social conditions that drove political discussion about the massive 
redistribution of resources (including land) and the economic exploitation of (black) labor. The 
modern American state has yet to foster an inclusive social whole that enables each and every 
citizen to lead a fully self-determining life and enjoy the myriad privileges of a respected and 
socially-esteemed citizenry, although Du Bois argues that the struggle of black freedmen have 
planted the kernel of just such a vision within it in the postbellum re-founding of the republic. 
The Sorrow Songs, Du Bois writes, – songs about what freedmen meant to enslaved Africans 
and their descendants – continue to carry the kernel of such a vision. The philosophical 
                                                 
86 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, chp. 15. The antebellum South had been virulently resistant to establishing a 
public school system; for more on this point see Smith, Civic Ideals, p. 216.  
The next chapter will focus on the political morality of race and public schools during the Jim Crow era. 
87 Women were excluded from the constitutional articulation of the meaning of equality – but Reconstruction 
provided the first legal precedent for inclusive citizenship interpreted as moral equality. 
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redemption of that vision is critical, given that the longtime neglect of the point-of-view of black 
freedmen has limited our articulation of racial justice.88 Additionally, if not wholly ignored, our 
political imagination has only recently reinterpreted the Reconstruction era as a disastrous 
mistake of the federal government, which facilitated black ‘domination’ of Southern whites who 
experienced the exercise of black citizenship as ‘oppressive,’ especially targeting the Freedmen’s 
Bureau for demolishing and public ridicule. 
In Souls, he identifies the Bureau as a “full-fledged government of men.”89 Over thirty 
years later, with the publication of Black Reconstruction (1935), Du Bois repeats verbatim that it 
was a “full-fledged government of men.”90 Rather than appealing to ethical life’s latent rational 
character, he points to the emergence of this new social institution for the promotion of the 
harmonious reconciliation of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ practical freedoms, that is, establishing 
the social conditions for individuals to pursue idiosyncratic personal and social interests. Of 
course, the Freedmen’s Bureau emerges in a specific historical context that responded to 
a cluster of distinct political, social, and economic circumstances. The purpose of 
providing a philosophical justification for it is not to renew an anachronistic call for its 
reestablishment. Rather, it is to highlight the role of the state in the herculean task of social 
reform that began with the dismantling of racialized slavery, amounting to a “social revolution 
by reasoned leadership” with the aim of equal representational governance and the establishment 
of social conditions that promote the self-determination of the citizenry, conceived as racialized 
pluralities.91 The Bureau thus highlights a critical aspect of American modernity that 
Hegel’s original formulation of 
88 Consider how the argument for reparations is often couched in terms of progressive tax schemes, rather than in 
terms of robust social policies that support public institutions. Though the two argumentative lines are broadly 
compatible, the latter suggests a vision of a certain kind of civic community and duties of race-based civility that are 
not accented in the former account. 
89 Du Bois, Souls, p. 24. 
90 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 219. 
91 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 219. 
 90 
modern (European) ethical life misses. Du Bois countenances the historical emergence of major 
social institutions under the guidance of a disenfranchised social group for ensuring the 
flourishing of American civic life.92  He regrets that after its emergence it was not made a 
permanent institution of the American state. 
To be sure, for Hegel, the modern state and its juridical apparatus emerge from social 
practices and socially-shared reasons that with time come to uphold the Kantian “rights” of 
moral subjectivity, but themselves remain embedded in a distinctive ethical community whose 
boundaries are delineated by shared history, values, and a collective self-understanding (‘Spirit’ 
or Geist). “States, peoples and individuals involved in this concern of the world spirit emerge, 
each with its own particular and determinate principle, which has its interpretation and actuality 
in a constitution.”93 In support of this prima facie counterintuitive insight, consider Hegel’s 
description of the emergence of the modern constitutional state: 
For [even] the constitution is not simply made: it is the work of centuries, the Idea and 
consciousness of the rational (insofar as that consciousness has developed in a nation). 
No constitution can therefore be created purely subjectively [von Subjekten]. […] The 
constitution of a nation must embody the nation’s feeling for its rights and [present] 
condition; otherwise it will have no meaning or value, even if it is present in an external 
sense. (PR §274)  
 
Hegel does not believe that normative principles have categorical validity that warrant imposing 
them on a social whole; rather they should emerge immanently from within it. Subjective and 
objective reason stand in a mutually-constitutive, dialectical relation with one another, as social 
norms and institutions are a historical byproduct of subjective will formation, which is formed 
and educated (gebildet) by the social institutions it partakes of. However valid they might be 
                                                 
92 Many Hegel scholars have noted that Hegel’s reluctance to affirm the progressive potential of social movements is 
based in his critical estimation of the Terror following the French Revolution. Du Bois’s analysis illustrates that a 
different historical context – that of the postbellum U.S. – warrants a more charitable assessment of the positive 
normative contributions of at the very least black political agency.  
93 Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, p. 221 & PR §344. 
91 
from a philosophical point-of-view about what the concept of freedom entails, categorical moral 
truths, grounded in subjective practical reason, cannot alone effectuate practices in the external 
world without first assuming widespread social significance. But, Du Bois shows that it was on 
the initiative of black political actors that fostered a social revolution that the U.S. federal 
government came to define citizenship in terms of the moral equality of all and at least for a brief 
period supported the emergence of a new social institution that would provide the conditions for 
substantive self-determination of all citizens. The American state was subject to ‘external’ 
pressures to actualize universal life, although such pressure erupted from within the whole of 
ethical life, as it was grounded in the black postbellum community. 
 In line with Hegel, Du Bois maintains that it is the prerogative of the modern state to 
assume primary responsibility for the most vulnerable members of society during 
Reconstruction. 94 There was no other entity black freedmen could reasonably appeal to.95 
Southern whites, both 
94 My argument proceeds by inference based on Du Bois’s remarks about the Freedmen’s Bureau in Souls; on the 
whole, Du Bois’s writings display inconsistency, which is why I present, first, a philosophical justification of the 
ethical function of the modern state before proceeding to employ it as an analytic lens for interpreting Du Bois’s 
political critique. 
After Emancipation, it was the plain duty of someone to assume this group leadership. I will not stop here 
to inquire whose duty it was, -- whether that of the white ex-master who had profited by unpaid toil, or the 
Northern philanthropist whose persistence brought on the crisis, or the National Government whose edict 
freed the bondmen; I will not stop to ask whose duty it was, but I insist that it was the duty of someone to 
see that these workingmen were not left alone and unguided, without capital, without land, without skill, 
without economic organization, without the bald protection of the law, order and decency, -- left in a great 
land, not to settle down to slow and careful internal development, but destined to be thrown almost 
immediately into relentless and sharp competition with the best of modern workingmen under an economic 
system where every participant is fighting for himself, and too often utterly regardless of the rights or 
welfare of his neighbor. (Souls, p. 137.)   
In Black Reconstruction, published roughly three decades after Souls, Du Bois explicitly calls on the national 
government’s obligation to complete and maintain the freedom of black freedmen: 
The Negroes had been freed by proclamation, law, and force, and their freedom must be maintained. They 
were freed through selfish motives, to weaken the enemy. It would be the depths of meanness to let them 
now grope their way without guidance or protection. The President, by proclamation, had pledged the 
maintenance of Negro freedom, and Congress had recognized its obligations to secure employment and 
support of Negroes on abandoned lands. Negroes were now oppressed by Southerners and Northern 
harpies. Further legislation was imperatively demanded. (Black Reconstruction, p. 220)  
95 Eric Foner writes: “The rise of the state was so closely associated with the new rights of blacks, the rise of the 
state inspired powerful opposition, which, in turn, weakened support for Reconstruction,” Reconstruction: 
America’s Unfinished Revolution, p. 25. 
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ex-masters and poor whites, were resentful of their newfound civic status. Though the free 
African-American community and various philanthropic organizations in the North that had 
supported abolition efforts aided their cause, without federal support freedmen’s civic standing 
as right-bearers remained nominal, as they were subject to unrestrained exploitative forces of a 
white supremacist civil society, including the labor market.  
It must be remembered and never forgotten that the civil war in the South which 
overthrew Reconstruction was a determined effort to reduce black labor as nearly as 
possible to a condition of unlimited exploitation and build a new class of capitalists on 
this foundation. The wage of the Negro worker, despite war amendments, was to be 
reduced to the level of bare subsistence by taxation, peonage, caste and every method of 
discrimination.96  
In order to better understand the exploitative forces of civil society that freedmen faced and the 
countervailing efforts of the Freedmen’s Bureau, consider Du Bois’s analysis of ‘second 
slavery.’ While the passing of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments ended juridical slavery and 
secured a schedule of basic rights and liberties for black freedmen as American citizens, Du Bois 
stressed that preventing “second slavery” should have become the next political priority.  
What could it mean to prevent a second slavery after one has become a ‘free’ citizen? 
Prior to Emancipation, “political power was […] confined to property holders and an aristocracy 
of birth and learning” inasmuch as “America [was] a commercial, white republic” that 
Jacksonian Democrats “defended chiefly in terms of racial superiority [and] white Christian male 
dominance.” 97  Given this historical context, Du Bois remarks on the progressive gains of 
Reconstruction: “with perplexed and laggard steps, the United States government followed in the 
footsteps of the black slave.”98 His formulation of second slavery demonstrates that “the flight 
96 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 670. 
97 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 6. 
98 Quoted from Foner, Reconstruction, p. 3. 
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from slavery as a continual process of release from bondage.”99 In order to prevent second 
slavery, the passage of the bill to create the Freedmen’s Bureau was necessary: 
The war cloud had thinned enough to allow a clearer conception of the work of 
Emancipation. The champions of the bill argued that the strengthening of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau was still a military necessity; that it was needed for the proper carrying out of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and was a work of sheer justice to the ex-slave, at a trifling cost 
to the government. The opponents of the measure declared that the war was over, and the 
necessity for war-measures past; that the Bureau, by reason of its extraordinary powers, 
was clearly unconstitutional in time of peace, and was destined to irritate the South and 
pauperize the freedmen, at a final cost of possibly hundreds of millions. These two 
arguments remained unanswered, and indeed unanswerable: the one that the 
extraordinary powers of the Bureau threatened the civil and political rights of all citizens; 
and the other that the government must have the power to do what manifestly must be 
done, and that present abandonment of the freedmen meant their practical re-
enslavement. The bill passed[.]100 
Operative from 1865-72, with the Freedmen’s Bureau “the United States government definitely 
assumed charge of the emancipated [slave] as the ward of the nation;” the Freedman’s Bureau 
was an organized apparatus for assuming this charge.101 Countering “practical re-enslavement,” 
the Freedmen’s Bureau – the “Bureau of Emancipation” 102  – served as an institutional 
mechanism creating the “social conditions” for “the improvement, protection, and employment 
of refugee freedmen,” as well as their “general welfare.”103 It was “the most extraordinary and 
far-reaching institution of social uplift that America has ever attempted.” 104  Although the 
Reconstruction Amendments targeted black freedmen, they also helped ‘uplift’ poor whites, who 
like black Americans lacked adequate access to basic resources and were excluded from 
opportunities to exercise meaningful civic power.105 The black community seized the opportunity 
99 Roberts, Freedom as Marronage, p. 56. 
100 Du Bois, Souls, p. 23. 
101 Du Bois, Souls, p 20. 
102 Du Bois, Souls, p. 18. 
103 Du Bois, Souls, p. 14 & 18. 
104 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 219. 
105  Du Bois notes that with the demolishing of Reconstruction, poor whites gave up even a more equitable 
distribution of material resources based on norms of civic reciprocity in exchange for exercising untrammeled white 
power over black citizens. 
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it, leading their own positive integration into the social whole.106 
Du Bois details the Bureau’s responsibilities: 
 [T]he new government – for a government it really was – issued its constitution; 
commissioners were to be appointed in each of the seceded States, who were to take 
charge of all ‘subjects relating to the refugees and freedmen,’ and all relief and rations 
were to be given by their consent alone. The Bureau […] declared: ‘It will be the object 
of all commissioners to introduce practicable systems of compensated labor,’ and to 
establish schools […] They were to […] make the destitute self-supporting; act as courts 
of law where there were no courts, or where Negroes were not recognized in them as 
free; establish the institution of marriage among ex-slaves, and keep records; see that 
freedmen were free to choose their employers, and help in making them fair contracts for 
them; and finally, the circular said: ‘Simple good faith, for which we hope on all hands 
for those concerned in the passing away of slavery, will especially relieve the 
commissioners in the discharge of their duties toward the freemen, as well as promote the 
general welfare.107   
 
Freedmen’s social welfare required the allocation of material resources, a procedure which 
included in the Bureau’s administrative operations: “The Bureau was empowered to distribute 
clothing, food, and fuel to destitute freedmen and oversee ‘all subjects’ relating to their condition 
in the South.”108 For the first time, as ‘civilians,’ Blacks became entitled to a wage contract. The 
Bureau catered to the satisfaction of black labor’s interests, including settling contract disputes 
between black employees and white employers, fixing fair wages, representing Blacks in court, 
and collecting taxes – just to name a few of its roles. Its operational logic evinced that the 
accumulation of capital must be subordinated to the needs of labor. 109  In identifying the 
                                                 
106 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 70. 
107 Du Bois, Souls, p. 21. 
108 Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction, p. 31. 
109 Du Bois writes in Black Reconstruction:  
At the time of the Civil War, it was perfectly clear […] that freedom in order to be free required a 
minimum of capital in addition to political rights and that this could be insured against the natural 
resentment of the planters only by some sort of dictatorship. Thus abolition-democracy was pushed towards 
the conception of a dictatorship of labor, although few of its advocates wholly grasped the fact that this 
necessarily involved dictatorship by labor over capital and industry. 
 
On the other hand, industrialists after the war expected the South to seize upon the opportunity to make 
increased profit by a more intelligent exploitation of labor than was possible under the slave system. They 
looked upon free Negro labor as a source of profit, and considered freedom, that is, legal doing away with 
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Freedmen’s Bureau as a government of men, Du Bois assents that the Bureau aimed to represent 
the common good by attending to black interests specifically, such that a conception of the 
common good is no longer “measured in relation to whites,”110 but to the extent that it “acts as a 
friend” to black freedmen.111 On his view, the Bureau temporarily protected Blacks from white 
reactionary violence, inasmuch as it militated against the dawning of Jim Crow and served as a 
buffer against the rising tide of lynching and racist brutality.112 Du Bois thus considers the 
Freedmen’s Bureau “a great landmark of political and social progress” and propounds its role of 
fulfilling the promise of emancipation.113   
Du Bois observes that there was considerable resistance to the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill. 
Note that the argument in favor of dismantling the Bureau is based on a narrow interpretation of 
the meaning of freedom: 
‘It is earnestly hoped for that, instead of wasting away, they [black freedmen] will, by 
their own efforts, establish for themselves a condition of responsibility and prosperity. It 
is certain that they can attain that condition only through their own merits and exertions.’ 
 
This was the answer of Andrew Johnson […] to the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill. Practically, 
it said that the Negroes do not need protection. They are free. Let them go to work, earn 
wages, and support their own schools. Their civil and political rights must depend 
entirely on their former masters, and the United States has no constitutional authority to 
interfere to help them. […] 
 
It was an astonishing pronouncement. It was the American Assumption, of the possibility 
of labor’s achieving wealth, applied with a vengeance to landless slaves under caste 
conditions. The very strength of its logic was the weakness of its common sense.114  
 
Southern politicians, including President Andrew Johnson (in office 1865-1869), had argued in 
favor of the “American Assumption” that the Freedmen’s Bureau was unconstitutional, 
                                                                                                                                                             
individual physical control, all that the Negroes or their friends could ask. They did not want for Negro 
labor to have any special protection or political power or capital[.] (p. 185.)  
110 Alcoff, The Future of Whiteness, p. 112. 
111 Du Bois, Souls, p. 19. 
112 For a detailed, harrowing description of the racist violence that befell the postbellum black community, see chp. 
16 of Black Reconstruction.  
113 Du Bois, Souls, p. 21. 
114 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 277.  
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unnecessary and extra-juridical because it suppressed the civil rights of “all citizens.”115 In other 
words, he perceived a social institution that secured blacks’ wage contract, property rights, and 
social welfare to simultaneously infringe upon those very same rights as held by Whites.116 
The backlash against the expansion of federal power to protect black freedmen’s (and poor 
whites’) welfare argued in favor of the free reign of market forces and of white supremacist 
doctrine. With the withdrawal of the federal government in 1877 the backlash prevailed, as the 
rights of black citizenship were left unprotected.  
 Du Bois responded by pointing out that postbellum historical conditions necessitated that 
“the [U.S.] government must have power to do what manifestly must be done.”117 This was not 
an empty pronouncement: former slaves participated in the programs the Freedmen’s Bureau 
administrated, seizing the opportunity to exercise political power via a newfound civic standing. 
Thus, apropos Hegel, “public rights [were] actualized in two ways; in the social institutions 
which administer [to] particular interests […] insofar as [individuals] see themselves represented 
in these institutions; to the extent that they are actively engaged in these institutions, they 
receive, in addition, the opportunity of ‘an occupation and activity directed on a universal 
end.’”118 Du Bois maintains that though the freedom of non-interference guaranteed by basic 
rights and liberties is an essential aspect of modern freedom, it is wholly insufficient for 
actualizing a ‘substantive’ freedom that is appropriate for modern citizens in general and for 
black freedmen in particular. For him, the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments was 
insufficient to prevent Blacks’ ‘practical’ re-enslavement. In focusing on the plight of freedmen, 
his analysis throws into stark relief the inadequacy of the freedom of non-interference at the 
115 Du Bois, Souls, p. 24. 
116 Du Bois, Souls, p 23. 
117 Du Bois, Souls, p 23. 
118 Ilting, K.-H., “Hegel on the State and Marx’s Early Critique,” The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s 
Political Philosophy. Ed. Z.A. Pełczyński. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. P. 102. 
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heart of the “American Assumption” for integrating black freedmen into the American social and 
political fabric.119 Such a view left them alone to contend with the chaotic forces of a capitalist 
economic market; and it locked them into stultifying social and laboring positions shaped by a 
racial caste system rooted in slavery, one that compelled black freedmen to once again take up a 
hoe, only this time for a pittance wage.120  
Furthermore, the argument in favor of the American Assumption ignored the background 
ethical culture that consistently undermined black will formation or “striving”: juridical right, 
social standing, ambitions, and civic identity. When agents of the Freedmen’s Bureau negotiated 
civil disputes, they had to bear in mind the racialized manner that social forces operated in the 
postbellum South. They directly confronted the South’s background ethical culture, as proffering 
a kind of political indoctrination into a racial caste system whose ends that must be expressly 
challenged. Note that unlike a liberal viewpoint, for Du Bois, ‘personal’ racist commitments 
should not be tolerated for the sake of freedom, but upbraided – for the sake of 
'actual' freedom. Such commitments are subject to legitimate public scrutiny because they 
help shape the exercise of juridical right and  social cooperation: 
Again we decry color-prejudice […], yet it remains a heavy fact. Such curious kinks of 
the human mind exist and must be reckoned with soberly. They cannot be laughed away, 
nor always successfully stormed at, nor easily abolished by act of legislature. And yet 
they must not be encouraged by being let alone. They must be recognized as facts, but 
unpleasant facts; things that stand in the way of civilization and religion and common 
decency. They can be met in but one way, -- by the breadth and broadening of human 
reason, by catholicity of taste and culture. […] [S]uch human training as will best use the 
labor of all men without enslaving or brutalizing; such training as will give us poise to 
encourage the prejudices that bulwark society, and to stamp out those that in sheer 
119 Neil Roberts defends a similar methodology for theorizing autonomy. See his Freedom as Marronage. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2015. 
120 How to understand the normative significance of a black freedmen’s first receiving a wage is seldom explored by 
political philosophers. Frederick Douglas provides a stirring phenomenological account of it, as he describes the 
exhilaration of receiving his first dollar for his work and the autonomy it afforded him. Du Bois, among other 
historians, shows that white employers deeply resented even paying a pittance wage to black citizens, while also 
illustrating the inadequacy of a conception of freedom modeled on the wage contract, given the prevailing structural 
inequalities of postbellum U.S.  
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barbarity deafen us to the wail of prisoned souls within the Veil[.]121 
A more complex, comprehensive model illustrates that political  rights are embedded within a 
social whole, where racialized forms of social power delineate civic concern, social 
conditions, and perceptions of political legitimacy. Such a model highlights the 
dialectical mediation of three key elements: 1) the exercise of political power by 
American citizens (conceptualized as a racialized plurality), 2) the background ethical 
culture122 that demarcates expressions of political power – what Du Bois refers to as the 
problem of racial caste; and, 3) major social and political institutions that systematically 
generate patterns of recognition and exclusion, confirming or contesting iterations of 1) and 
2). In outlining a substantive account of modern American freedom, Du Bois’s characterization 
of the emergence of the Bureau captures well the imbrication of these three factors. 
Du Bois models the institutional basis of modern freedom to complete 
black emancipation, as well as to avow the obstacles to fully realizing substantive, non-
piteous, and non-mocking freedom for black refugees and their descendants. An account of 
freedom that neglects the ethical role of the modern state does not ward off the threat of 
second slavery. But he adds that the emergence of a state-supported social institution contributed 
to the realization of the ethical role of the American state.123 Leaving freedmen to contend with 
the contingent forces 
121 Du Bois, Souls, p. 76. 
122 To borrow a term from Charles Mills, “white supremacist patriarchal polity” best describes the racial caste 
system that organizes the background ethical culture of the U.S. Mills, Charles W. and Pateman Carol. Contract & 
Domination. Malden: Polity Press, 2007. p. 173.  
123 Consider the historian Eric Foner’s contention: “A considerable literature was produced in the 1970s on the 
reasons for the economic retardation of the postbellum South, and the dire poverty of southerners, especially blacks. 
One school of thought, applying neoclassical economic theory to southern development, solved the problem by 
concluding that there was no problem. In a competitive market place in which rational, calculating self-interest 
determined the behavior of blacks and whites alike, the market produced the optimal possible result, given the 
economic resources of the South. By assuming what ought to be the subject of investigation – how men and women 
did [or should] in fact respond to an expanding market – these writers portrayed sharecropping as a rational choice 
serving the interests of both tenants and landlords, freely entered into by individuals from both groups, rather than 
the outcome of the changing relationships of class and social power.”  Reviews in American History Vol 10.4 
(1982): 92. Emphasis added. 
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of a white supremacist civil society led to a second slavery. His view of freedom begins with the 
premise “the advance of all depends increasingly on the advance of each;”124 and he cannot 
“endorse the doctrine of laissez-faire and accept the justice of […] market distributions.”125 
Negative freedom – the “freedom from” position that minimizes the ethical function of the 
modern state – could not accommodate black striving, which posited a positive view of the social 
whole, rather than an atomized conception of the satisfaction of individual pursuits. In line with 
Hegel, postbellum substantive freedom “is fully realized only insofar as each social member 
takes the universal ends of his institutions as his own: ‘The state…is the actuality within which 
the individual has and enjoys his freedom, but [only] by knowing, believing in, and willing the 
universal’” (Ph. §38).126  
Du Bois further elaborates that the institutional expansion of federal power was a “great 
school of prospective citizenship.” Allow me to again quote at length: 
Had political exigencies been less pressing, the opposition to government guardianship of 
Negroes less bitter, and the attachment to the slave system less strong, the social seer can 
well imagine a far better policy, -- a permanent Freedmen’s Bureau, with a national 
system of Negro schools; a carefully supervised employment and labor office; a system 
of impartial protection before the regular courts; and such institutions for social 
betterment as savings-banks, land and building associations, and social settlements. All 
this vast expenditure of money and brains might have formed a great school of 
prospective citizenship, and solved in a way we have not yet solved the most perplexing 
and persistent of the Negro problems.127 
Not only does Du Bois describe the Bureau as a school of prospective citizenship, but he also 
identifies it as an “instrument of social regeneration,”128 although it ultimately “failed to begin 
124 Du Bois, W.E.B. “The Development of a People,” in The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of the 
Twentieth Century: The Essential Early Essays. Ed. Nahum Dimitri Chandler. New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013. p. 244 
125 Freeman, Samuel. “Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is not a Liberal View,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 30.2 (2001): pp. 105-51. p. 106.  
126 Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, p. 202. 
127 Du Bois, Souls, p. 34. 
128 Du Bois, Souls, p. 25. 
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the establishment of good-will between ex-masters and freedmen.”129  
Throughout this chapter I have argued that the postbellum black community 
“spearheaded” the effort to rationalize the basic structure of modern American society. In 
closing, I will (briefly) consider Du Bois’s view of black leadership. The foregoing arguments 
have provided sufficient textual support and philosophical justification favoring the “reasoned 
emancipation” that the Bureau made possible under the aegis of a great school of prospective 
citizenship undertaken on a black political initiative. 130 In defending an inclusive ethical ideal of 
the modern American state to which the Bureau attests, articulating the normative basis of 
political leadership during the Reconstruction era throws a more charitable light on Du Bois’s 
formulation of black leadership. Without political leaders who possess a lucid understanding of 
the normative principles guiding political action and the obstacles to creating an inclusive civic 
community “new ideals will become formulated by ideologues and demagogues […] In such 
circumstances the resort to state power is the only satisfactory way to get rid of the ballast of the 
past, and to give actuality to new ethical concepts or principles.”131 
 
IV. Black Citizenship and the Normative Basis of Political Leadership 
My analysis of Du Bois’s conception of leadership challenges two interpretive lines 
current in Du Bois scholarship. First, a conception of freedom rooted in the ethical function of 
the modern state challenges his longstanding reputation as an elitist advancing a model of black 
leadership aiming to ‘uplift’ the ‘backward masses,’ a view most cogently advanced by the 
eminent Du Bois scholar Robert Gooding-Williams. In ignoring Du Bois’s emphasis on 
                                                 
129 Du Bois, Souls, p. 31. 
130 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 219. 
131  Pelczynski, Z.A. “The Hegelian Conception of the State,” Hegel’s Political Philosophy: Problems and 
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governance for the promotion of fair norms of interracial social cooperation, Gooding-Williams 
argues that Du Bois assumes the perspective of freedmen in order to galvanize their sentiments 
by way of empowering elite “race leaders” to “authentically” curate black “expressive self-
realization.”132 Second, my view of Du Boisian freedom resists portraying his account of black 
political leadership as facilitating the assimilation of the black community to Protestant, middle-
class folkways. Both depictions of Du Bois’s account of black leadership neglect to theorize a 
meaningful link between his political critique and the emancipatory ideals of American 
modernity. They also miss the distinctly black contribution to the development of the ideals of 
American modernity on the normative basis of the moral meaning of free and equal citizenship – 
a point about which Du Bois was adamant. My interpretation presents Du Bois’s view of black 
leadership in an alternative, more charitable light: Concerned not with leaders simply amassing 
power and authority for some unspecified purpose, he aims to actualize the ideals of a modern 
constitutional democracy. 
With respect to the first point, in arguing in favor of Du Bois’s commitment to the elitist 
uplift of the black masses, Gooding-Williams adds that Du Bois’s “political expressivism” is 
“neither about a modern African-American state nor about the leaders of such a state.”133 On the 
contrary, Du Bois’s analysis evinces a normative commitment to democratic politics and to 
centralized representational government that might effectuate substantive freedom for the worst 
off, namely former slaves. He is also cognizant that the changes in public policy introduced by 
the Reconstruction Amendments greatly benefited poor white yeoman farmers, as it constituted a 
                                                 
132 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 14. 
133 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 14. I provide a more detailed and thorough critique of Robert 
Gooding-Williams in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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radical restructuring of the normative orientation of the American state. 134  Pace Gooding-
Williams, Du Bois’s political critique underscores the ethical function of the modern state and 
the potential leaders of such a state, as his view of black leadership was at least in part attached 
to democratically-elected offices of representational government and advocated for equitable 
black participation in such offices, especially during Reconstruction.135 Du Bois is not a political 
‘self-expressionist,’ as much as he is an advocate of emancipatory ideals that motivated black 
democratic participation in major modern political institutions in the U.S.; a more charitable 
interpretation of Du Bois’s view of leadership focuses not on the ‘masses,’ but on African-
American citizens who saw themselves as exercising political power as American citizens. 
During Reconstruction, the American state for the first time catered to black Americans’ 
substantive interests, as free and equal citizenship assumed currency for legitimating political 
action and public policy; freedmen interpreted on their own terms the moral meaning of such a 
reformulation of the shared ends of the American polity.  
Du Bois is often accused of elitism because of his defense of the idea of the talented tenth 
in his early writings. Unquestionably, the accusation is at least in part true inasmuch as the 
notion has elements of snobbery, condescension, and the exaltation of middle-class mores. His 
recommendations about black women’s sexual purity, moral vice, and hygiene are just some 
trenchant illustrations of this. Moreover, he prefers well-educated African Americans as potential 
                                                 
134 The Black ‘spiritual’ achievement of equal representational government during Reconstruction is thrown in sharp 
relief in light of Rogers M. Smith’s observation that the antebellum Jacksonian era (1829-56) catered to the white 
“American farmer-laborer who in his heart dreamed of becoming a capitalist,” and, as Du Bois elaborates in Black 
Reconstruction, a “slaveowner,” but who in the South did not succeed to secure political power in the reigning 
slavocracy, languishing instead in poverty, illiteracy, and political inconsequentiality. Smith, Rogers. M. Civic 
Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997. p. 
198.  
135 The next chapter will examine the implicit ideals underpinning Black leadership in non-elected offices of major 
social institutions, such as schools and churches. Additionally, and rather ironically, the black political leaders 
Gooding-Williams contrasts with Du Bois as non-elitist were Reconstruction politicians: Frederick Douglas and 
Martin Delany. For Du Bois’s attempt to legitimate black leadership justifies Douglas’s and Delany’s political 
ascension.  
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race leaders inasmuch as in his initial formulation he hardly envisions poor Blacks as race 
leaders. But, he later parts with the notion of the Talented Tenth on account of its implicit 
classism. Because of the mercantile interests prevailing among the small number of upwardly-
mobile Blacks in the mid 20th century, he grew skeptical they would serve the interests of the 
civic community.136 There thus remains the valid technical question about who Du Bois imagines 
to be best qualified to occupy a position of leadership. Possessing an education was initially a 
requisite, but Du Bois later broadened his view over concern about the preservation of the civic 
community. Nevertheless, he remained insistent that black political leadership must serve the 
interests of the social whole, ideally in formal offices of political power.  
Gooding-Williams rather unconvincingly equates representational governance with an 
antidemocratic orientation. Given such a theoretical departure point, Du Bois’s model of black 
leadership appears as an elitist rule of the ‘talented tenth’ over black ‘masses’: 
Reviving the suspicion of the demos, Du Bois suggests that where demagogues rule, 
there is, strictly speaking, no rule. In his view, there is no difference between a rabble 
headed by demagogues and a ‘headless misguided rabble.’ … Du Bois yet again implies 
that genuine rule requires the rule of talented rulers distinguished by training as well as 
by ability and virtue (character).137 
 
While it is true that Du Bois’s critique aims to establish a rational social order in the ashes of 
slavery, his view of black leadership endorses a “reasoned emancipation” that prevents the rise 
of a second slavery for black refugees. Even with the dismantling of the Reconstruction Acts in 
1877, black-led reasoned emancipation “acquired enough leadership and knowledge to thwart the 
worst designs of the new slave drivers.”138 The political alternative to a “reasoned emancipation” 
model of governance, as exemplified by the administrators of the Freedmen’s Bureau, would 
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have left unchecked the chaos of white supremacist violence and the hyper-exploitative forces of 
civil society. This is precisely why he bemoans the dismantling of the Bureau as eventually 
leading to the dawn of Jim Crow, buttressed by “demagogues,” “misguided rabble,” and the 
violent chaos of white mob rule. Gooding-Williams fails to appreciate that Du Bois’s leaders’ 
“sensitivity to suffering” is not a manipulative ploy for more effectively “issuing commands or 
injunctions for the members of [African American] communities to obey.” 139  Realizing the 
underlining ideals of American modernity required rational self-determination within the basic 
institutional structure of a racially-inclusive social whole. 
With respect to the issue of assimilation, the goal of black leadership was not – or at least 
not, mainly – to promote assimilation to American 20th-century, middle-class Protestant 
folkways. Neither does it presuppose a rarefied ethos of authentic racial identity that all African 
Americans must share and that a charismatic leader – in the Weberian sense – marshals for 
unclear purposes. After all, save for bald-faced and callous self-interest, what would be the 
purpose for assuming political leadership in the first place, if not for the sake of “imagining a 
new form of citizenship”?140 Black politics during Reconstruction was about the amplification of 
freedom for former slaves in order to prevent second slavery. One can therefore soundly interpret 
black leadership as playing a critical role in resolving the social, political and economic 
problems emerging after Reconstruction that is not simply an attempt at the “administration” and 
“uplift” of “backward” sections of black life. Rather, their function was to render substantial the 
moral rights of citizenship to former slaves, thereby channeling black interests into 
conceptualization of the common good, one that begins with the point-of-view of those worst off 
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in American society.141 To this end, Du Bois writes, “[t]alented, unselfish […] men and women” 
must prepare “to fight an army of devils.” 142  Political leaders “in the political state […] 
voluntarily transcend the individualistic viewpoint which civil society fosters and achieve self-
realization as self-conscious members of the national community.”143 Black political leaders did 
not simply target poor black masses for “uplift.” They acted on principles that the latter could 
ideally affirm for themselves on their interpretation of what it means to be Black and American, 
simultaneously. 
Du Bois expected that African-American leaders focus on the following questions: What 
were the expectations of freedmen? What provisions were necessary to eliminate their 
vulnerability and exploitation? The affirmation of black citizenship illustrates that each particular 
freedman had a stake, and in the long view of political progress, must eventually become active 
participants, in the reinterpretation of the ideals of a modern democratic constitutional regime, 
which furnishes the motivation for sustained political engagement in the American polity. Du 
Bois rejects the then prevailing consensus that the failure of Reconstruction could be attributed to 
freedmen’s moral failings. He attempts to show that the failure is institutional – one of 
governance and public policy – and does not emanate from Blacks’ ignorance about practices of 
citizenship nor from a lack for the moral capacity for judicious government. Indeed, Du Bois 
expresses continuous praise for how much a systematically exploited, disenfranchised, and 
largely illiterate group of people were able to accomplish on their own in a very short period of 
time. Motivating his political philosophy is the hope that blackness and Americanness would no 
longer be warring ideals, but reconciled in a single breast and a single polity. 
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In other words, in light of the ethical function of the modern state, he shifts responsibility 
on the shoulders of the American federal government for the failure of Reconstruction, rather 
than blaming black political actors for 19th and 20th c. social ills. 
In no other civilized and modern land has so great a group of people, most of whom were 
able to read and write, been allowed so small a voice in their own government. […] In the 
former slave states […] there are no Negro state officials; no Negro members of 
legislatures; no judges on the bench; and usually no jurors. There are no colored county 
officials of any sort. In the towns and cities, there are no magistrates, no constables, and 
very seldom even a policeman. In this way, at least eight million Negroes are left without 
effective voice in government, naked to the worst elements of the community.144  
 
Du Bois continued to hope that the U.S. state would realize the full promise of black citizenship 
without leaving the Blacks “naked” to the “worst elements” of the community.  He maintained 
that, ideally, the state and its leaders ought to alleviate the burden placed on disenfranchised 
communities of former slaves, rather than have them resort to the institutions of civil society in 
order to achieve their interests, securing the necessary social conditions for their striving. The 
next chapter discusses black-run institutions in civil society, when the federal government failed 
to realize this promise during the Jim Crow era, when the black church and schools emerged as 





I have argued that Hegel’s view of the ethical function of the modern state has three 
positive contributions to theorizing ‘substantive’ freedom that justifies Du Bois’s political 
critique of Reconstruction: 1) education towards political autonomy, 2) a positive normative 
ideal enshrined within the background ethical culture (however imperfectly rational) and 3) the 
modern state as the object of political mediation on account of the moral meaning of citizenship 
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and the promotion of harmonious social integration and cooperation. Furthermore, I have argued 
that while Du Bois’s view reflects the Hegelian model of objective freedom in ethical life, he 
propounds two unique insights about the nature of modern freedom in the U.S.: 1) a social 
movement led by black political actors, rather than civil servants, promoted progressive ends that 
contributed to the creation of a rational social order enabling systematically-disenfranchised 
citizens to participate in ‘universal life,’ and 2) the Freedmen’s Bureau exemplifies the historical 
emergence of new social institutions for the effectuation of the ideal of ethical life. Du Bois 
provides a historical example that elucidates how formal, legal freedom – or the freedom of 
personhood – must be rendered ‘substantive’ through such institutions, if ‘re-enslavement’ were 
to be avoided. His defense of the Freedmen’s Bureau validates Hegel’s argument concerning the 
ethical role of the state, but he does not rely on the state’s ‘self-posited’ initiative to disrupt the 
social conditions of second slavery. Instead he marshals collective black striving to exert 
pressure on the federal judiciary. Thus, Du Bois not only employs, but also develops Hegel’s 
model of freedom as ethical life. Because he considered Reconstruction a period when racist 
background conditions of civil society were brought to light and explicitly challenged by 
political actors with access to state power, my interpretation of his view of modern freedom has 
considerable implications for his conception of black leadership. He was primarily concerned 
that the postbellum black community realizes effective civic standing, which was a legitimate 
normative principle motivating social ‘uplift.’  
The upshot of the argument I present in this chapter is that black politics that does not 
aim at federal governance, founded in a model of free and equal citizenship that galvanizes the 
re-founding of the American polity, is undesirable. Furthermore, the view of modernity relevant 
for my interpretation of Du Bois’s political philosophy does not necessitate a break with the past, 
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but an understanding of how the past – namely, the historical experience of slavery – continues 
to shape identities, as well as our social and political world. It evinces “black slaves’ efforts to 
constitute and reconstruct freedom in the American republic, signaling the virtues of learning 
from the humanity of slaves and the world the slaves made.”145 
The teleological primacy that the state maintains over social formations and participation 
in social institutions is grounded in the radical normative dislocation witnessed in the historical 
experience of American slavery, as well as in the contemporary experiences of ‘illegal’ 
migration and of global refugees. With the loss of work and family, one usually does not also 
lose access to institutional contexts for lobbying for one’s interests as a citizen. The devastating 
consequence of the loss of citizenship and a homeland, political standing, and the capacity to 
navigate a political culture in the absence of an intelligible civic standing enables the racist 
juridical exclusion that Charles Mills identifies in the racial contract. The notion that one is Un-
American – that one does not belong ‘here’ – attests to a civic death amounting to the demand 
that people just float out into outer space or disappear somehow, rather than one that 
soberly and methodically incorporates folks into the social whole on the moral basis of freedom 
and equality. That way, one need not broach the topic of how to rethink norms of social 
cooperation within a civic community. In Souls, Du Bois punctuates this point in the common 
view that Blacks and descendants of African slaves are not Americans; this existential 
bifurcation of civic and racial identity impels the experience of alienation from one’s own 
standing as a rights-bearer in the U.S. that he describes as double consciousness.  
The Du Bois scholar Chike Jeffers surmises that “a new egalitarian ideal” is in the offing 
in Du Bois’s political critique. Defending a racially-inclusive state requires undertaking the 
unprecedented effort of engaging in “compassionate solidarity” with former slaves and 
145 Roberts, Freedom as Marronage, p. 44. 
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adjudicating political interests from a the point-of-view of the worst off, revised conception of 
citizenship that includes the black historical experience.146 Such an effort would actualize the 
ideal function of the modern state, serving its “best interests”: “It can see to it that not only no 
action of this inner group is opposed to the real interests of the nation, but that it works for and in 
conjunction with the best interests of the nation.”147 The onset of black civic power began even 
before the passage of the 13th Amendment, when slaves held a general strike, stopped working, 
and simply walked off plantations in the thousands to join the occupying Union forces, thereby 
changing the course of American history and initiating the radical normative restructuring of the 
basic structure of 19th c. American society. Yet, “the work of freeing the former slaves and their 
descendants remain[s] unfinished.”148  
                                                 
146 Kirkland, Frank. M. “Modernity and Intellectual Life in Black,” Philosophical Forum 24.1-3 (1993): 159. 
147 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 712. My emphasis. 
148 Balfour, Democracy’s Reconstruction, p. 17. 
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CHAPTER 3.       
Du Bois, Rawls, and Honneth:  
On the Civic Function of Black Church and School 
in the Jim Crow Era 
 
 
“As I have said elsewhere: ‘Most men are colored. A belief in humanity is a belief in 
colored men.’ If you cannot get on with colored men in America you cannot get on with 
the modern world; and if you cannot work with the humanity of this world, how shall 
your souls every tune with the myriad sided souls of the worlds to come?” 
 




In the previous chapter, I argued that Du Bois’s critique of Reconstruction presupposes a 
Hegelian conception of the ethical function of the modern state. The end of Reconstruction 
coincides with the U.S. federal government skirting its ethical obligation to integrate freedmen 
on the normative basis of free and equal citizenship. The dismantling of Reconstruction policies 
coincides with the emergence of Jim Crow.2 In the 1896 Supreme Court ruling in the case of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, the court upheld the doctrine of “separate but equal” as the law of the land. It 
argued that race-based institutional segregation does not violate the 14th Amendment, which 
                                                 
1 Du Bois, W.E.B., “Religion in the South,” in Du Bois on Religion. (Ed.) Phil Zuckerman. New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000. pp. 69-89. p. 89. 
2 In a short essay prepared for the National Lawyers Guild in 1946, Du Bois explains the transition:  
 
“The counter revolution came in 1876, and from 1875 to 1883 we have a new era. Delaware in 1873 and Tennessee in 
1875 tried to take away most civil rights, and all Southern States practically nullified enfranchisement by lawlessness 
and intimidation. Here arose the new problem of lynching. Mob murders reached their climax in 1892 and the 
helplessness of the federal government under law and decision was clear. Between 1883 and the early part of the 
twentieth century, the Civil Rights Bills passed by the Reconstruction Administrations in the South become inoperative 
or were repealed. The 14th Amendment was emasculated in 1872. The federal Civil Rights Bill of 1875 was declared 
unconstitutional in 1883.” 
 
Du Bois, W.E.B. “Civil Rights Legislation Before and After the Passage of the 14th Amendment,” Lawyer's Guild 
Review 6.6 (1946):640-42. 
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protects the rights and privileges of American citizenship. In effect, it declared that the formal 
principle of legal equality legitimates racial segregation in civil society and major institutions of 
political power. State enforcement of the separation of citizens according to racial categories – 
namely, whites and non-whites – was interpreted to be consistent with formal legal equality, to 
which all citizens are morally entitled. 
The ruling crippled the moral spirit of American democracy. It formalized a new racial 
caste system, positing that the white polity nominally “respects” a person of color as a legal 
equal, while categorically refusing to engage with non-whites in establishing fair terms of social 
cooperation as fellow citizens.3 The ruling thus formalized white supremacist doctrine – that is, 
systematic race-based social domination 4  – in all major governmental institutions by 
circumscribing the American civic community as a white racial polity. It also threw light on the 
moral hollowness of formal legal ‘equality’ in the context of the derogation of citizens as moral 
equals in a civic community. Realizing the latter necessitates the ongoing, racially-inclusive, and 
public adjudication of the fair terms of social cooperation. A condition of meaningful legal 
equality is engagement with the first-person perspective of citizens as moral equals in a civic 
community.5   
In the absence of a background ethical culture characterized by good will, reciprocity, 
and mutual respect in the inclusive public adjudication of the terms of social cooperation, one’s 
                                                 
3  The author of the majority opinion, Justice Henry Billings Brown, states that while the intent of the 14th 
Amendment was to establish absolute equality, “in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the 
two races unsatisfactory to either.” “Plessy v. Ferguson.” Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/163us537. 
Accessed 12 Apr. 2017. Emphasis added. 
4 See Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. See chp. 1 for a comprehensive 
definition of white supremacy. There Mills writes: it “is itself a political system, a particular power structure of 
formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and 
opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties.” (7). 
5 As part of his abstract conception of moral personhood, citizens have an original relation to the values of public 
political culture; these values carry justificatory moral force that circumscribes legitimate interpretations of what 
legal equality and respect for basic rights amounts to by embedding citizens in a moral community as civic equals. 
Rawls thus hopes to morally discredit rulings such as Plessy v. Ferguson.   
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standing as a citizen with equal moral value is neither recognized by the state, major social and 
political institutions, nor one’s fellow citizens interpersonally. Basic civil and political rights are 
not secure and persons of color are not recognized as sources of moral value and moral 
interpretation in the American civic community. Du Bois develops potent imagery to describe 
segregation: it cast a “veil” over black American life, as America withdraws its recognition of 
the moral standing of African American citizens as “co-worker[s] in the kingdom of culture” and 
as moral equals in a civic community, leaving black citizens struggling “to escape both death and 
isolation, to husband and use [their] best powers and latent genius.”6  Du Bois argues that 
manifest in the lived experience of black embodiment in Jim Crow is a festering doubt about 
whether black citizens are even really Americans. With the withdrawal of recognition of the 
dignity of black citizenship, the federal state formalized racist exclusion from institutions of 
social and political power. It thus flouted its ethical obligation to reinforce the moral meaning of 
free and equal citizenship for all inasmuch as it must foster a background ethical culture of 
reciprocity and mutual respect – indeed, for Du Bois, this demonstrates the revolutionary 
character of Radical Reconstruction policies.  
And yet, the dignity of black citizenship remained inviolable in its moral status and the 
major social institutions in the black community continued to labor “in conformity to the greater 
ideals of the American republic,” to which the nation must appeal to legitimate its institutional 
arrangements.7 Instead, major black social institutions appealed to the public values of freedom 
and equality, which motivated social and political praxis predicated on the inviolable dignity of 
black citizenship in the segregated black community. These institutions promulgated fair terms 
of social cooperation that were otherwise not in the offing in public political culture and 
                                                 
6 Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Penguin, 1996. p. 5. 
7 Du Bois, Souls, p. 11. 
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attempted to recognize the unacknowledged moral status of African Americans as equal citizens, 
who were not embedded in major institutions of social and political power controlled by whites 
in the white racial polity. The moral duty, which transcends positive legalistic interpretations 
of public values, to restructure relations of power among citizens and their institutions 
impelled black democratic agency. According to Du Bois, in the Jim Crow era, the black 
church and schools emerged as prominent social institutions that galvanized the exercise of the 
moral rights of citizenship and pressed for the recognition – and actualization – of the moral 
status of black citizenship. 8  These institutions thus spurred the development of American 
modernity and germinated what historians refer to as the Second Reconstruction – the 
Civil Rights Movement, compelling the state to fulfill its ethical obligation to protect the moral 
standing of all citizens.9  
The Du Bois scholar Lawrie Balfour ascribes to Du Bois’s political outlook a 
commitment to what she empirically identifies as civic nationalism.10 I instead advance 
the normative idea of the moral rights of citizenship to ground his critique, although he does 
not provide a comprehensive definition of the concept. The moral rights of citizenship, as 
John Rawls defines it, are moral duties of civility that assert “the liberal principle of 
legitimacy,” as they expand the scope and substantive meaning of civic equality for all citizens 
in the American civic community: 
And since the exercise of political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship 
imposes a moral, not a legal, duty – the duty of civility – to be able to explain to 
one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they 
advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason. This 
duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in 
deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.11 
8 I use Rawls’s definition of the “moral rights of citizenship,” which I give below.  
9 Marable, Manning. Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction and Beyond in Black America, 1945–
2006. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2007.  
10  Balfour, Lawrie. Democracy’s Reconstruction: Thinking Politically with W.E.B. Du Bois. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. p 129. 
11 Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University, 2005. p. 217. 
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Rawls elaborates that “reasonable persons” have a civic responsibility to carry “burdens of 
judgement” for establishing fair terms of social cooperation. He writes, “Reasonable persons […] 
desire for its own sake a social world in which, they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others 
on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world, so that each 
benefits along with others.” 12  The moral rights of citizenship are thus linked to the self-
conception of citizens “as self-authenticating sources of valid claims” in the ongoing public 
adjudication of terms all could reasonably accept.13  
To assert that African American citizens remained self-authenticating sources of valid 
claims requires articulating the status of those claims in a white racial polity structured to blot 
them out as sources of moral value and interpretation. Besides a “willingness to listen to others” 
and “fairmindedness,” the civic orientation of the black church and school evinced an 
uncompromising affirmation of black Americans as sources of moral value and interpretation. 
According to Du Bois, the ethical work that black-led social institutions undertook in segregated 
black communities elucidates a unique normative orientation. “[T]he Negro church today,” 
writes Du Bois in Souls, “reproduced in microcosm, all that the great world from which the 
Negro is cut off by color-prejudice and social condition.”14 In addressing the concrete needs and 
vulnerabilities of the black community, these institutions succeeded in preserving the dignity of 
black citizenship under conditions of extreme duress and racist exclusion from major institutions 
of social and political power in the white racial polity. The universal category of citizenship was 
protected through a determinant relation to the particular needs and vulnerabilities of the black 
community. 
                                                 
12 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 50. 
13 Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. (Ed.) Erin Kelly. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001. p. 23. 
14 Du Bois, Souls, p. 158l 
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The institutions’ significance, Du Bois observes, illustrates that black social institutions, 
such as the black church, were “social settlements” that provisionally functioned as 
“governments of men” in the context of the systematic derogation of black citizenship and of 
African Americans as moral agents.15 The activities of the church concretely showcase its civic 
function, including the advocacy of democratic literacy about basic rights and voter registration; 
it organized the federally-neglected public school system, to which it too imparted a civic bent 
through instruction on “the wise administration of citizenship.”16 The black church established 
orphanages and retirement homes, as well as social welfare programs for childcare and poverty 
relief, administering meal and clothing subsidies.17 Black social institutions shouldered the moral 
responsibility of enacting the privileges and protections appropriate to the moral status of 
citizenship, which was not in the offing in any major institutions of political power, given de jure 
segregation. Indeed, their operations were “governmental.” 
In this chapter, I assess Du Bois political critique of Jim Crow, focusing on the following 
questions: What sort of conceptual apparatus could help philosophers appreciate the 
accomplishments and normative significance of the black church and school in the Jim Crow 
era? Moreover, how does such a conceptual apparatus challenge models of civic belonging and 
moral development in political philosophy? As it turns out, understanding and appreciating the 
“spiritual” accomplishments of the black church and school challenges political philosophy to 
                                                 
15 Du Bois, Souls, p. 158. In part, Du Bois illustrates the black experience of the world in light of the ascription of 
‘subperson.’ The white polity attempted to neutralize the value of black life and civic standing, but from the 
standpoint of the African-American community, the ascription that was never accepted. Departing from Mills, I 
should that Du Bois articulates the enactment of black moral agency as citizens in a constitutional democracy that 
does not recognize or respect them. The category of a ‘sub-persons’ is neither fixed nor passive, even in the face of 
white supremacy. I return to the difference between Charles Mills and W.E.B. Du Bois in the conclusion of the 
monograph.   
16 Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk 
Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880. New York: Free Press, 1992. p. 666. 
17 Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks. Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black Baptist Church 1880-
1920. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. p. 2. 
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revise its account of the interaction between citizens and their social institutions in the struggle 
for freedom and equality. 18  The reconstruction of a Du Boisian model of freedom as civic 
enfranchisement requires elucidating the provisional institutional spaces that necessarily arise in 
the face of racial groups’ systematic racist disenfranchisement from the basic structure of a white 
racial polities. Specifically, in this chapter, I focus on why the liberal political philosophies of 
John Rawls and Axel Honneth fail to accommodate the Du Boisian formulation of the black 
struggle during Jim Crow, where the black church and school were loci for the social and 
political self-determination of the segregated black community. 
To be sure, there is cause for situating Du Bois’s critique within the framework of 
political liberalism. Charles Mills explains how Du Bois’s political theory engages political 
liberalism:  
[Du Bois] is placing liberalism in its actual racialized context and recognizing what has to 
be done to realize liberal ideals in a society where white liberals fail to treat their black 
co-citizens with ‘color-blind’ racial respect. Black group organizations to achieve these 
ends is not only not prohibited by a liberalism sensitized to racial realities, but (more 
strongly) it is arguably mandated by any objective apprehension of the actual racial 
dynamics of the society, one in which […] liberalism – from the Founders on – has been 
deeply racialized.19 
                                                 
18 By “spiritual,” I take Du Bois to mean normatively significant from the standpoint of advancing civic equality in a 
racial plurality. 
19 Mills, Charles. “W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Liberal,” in A Political Companion to W. E. B. Du Bois. (Ed.) 
Nick Bromell. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, forthcoming. p. 29. Mills captures the substance of Du 
Bois’s political philosophy. In the words of Du Bois:  
 
Considering this whole matter [of the meaning of equality], we are faced by several considerations: how far can a 
nation maintain a high ideal of political and social action, when the majority of persons in that nation are disinclined to 
its application in particular cases? This is primarily a matter of education and of advance in ethical standards. It calls 
for careful consideration on the part of the nation as to just how far its ideals are worthwhile. Do we want democracy in 
the United States, and if so what are we willing to pay for it? 
 
For a long time the idea was prevalent that while we wanted and were determined to have democracy, it was impossible 
that Negroes should be a part of it, because of their low level of education and, as most people thought, of ability and 
character. Therefore we could only have democracy when we got rid of the Negro population. 
 
It may be said that during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, this was a dominant thought among 
Americans who realized the contradiction in our basic philosophy. One of the greatest advocates of the migration of the 
Negroes was Abraham Lincoln and he was preceded by many great Americans back to the time when the brother of 
George Washington became first President of the American Colonization Society. […] The other consideration which 
runs parallel to this was the fact that Negroes themselves recognized that their chief and strongest demand for equality 
lay in the raising of their own status through effort to achieve education and social efficiency; and their conception of 
their duty to teach the nation the value of its own ideals. […]Beyond this is a clear call for positive federal law against 
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If liberalism – and the “greater ideals of the republic” – were true to its ideals to secure freedom 
and equality for all, then liberalism itself provides the normative resources that justify – indeed, 
“mandate” – the civic orientation of black social institutions through the enactment of the moral 
rights of citizenship. Indeed, the self-organization of the black church and school illustrates the 
concrete actualization of this mandate, as black citizens strove to actualize their civic standing by 
assenting to rationally-motivating grounds oriented to civic enfranchisement, which the 
normative framework of liberalism “mandates” and the Jim Crow South rebuked. 
Du Bois’s account of the black church and school shares normative commitments with a 
liberal view that broadly tracks with John Rawls and Axel Honneth’s political philosophies, such 
as their defense of basic civil and political rights and equal moral standing in the democratic 
public sphere. Additionally, both philosophers highlight major social institutions outside the 
federal state that afford the social conditions of freedom and equality. However, neither Rawls 
nor Honneth attach the exercise of moral agency, rooted in the moral rights of citizenship, to 
immanently-developing social practices and institutions under conditions of racist oppression in 
marginalized racial communities. Those with subordinate standing – living under the strain of the 
necessity of establishing institutional contexts that preserve their moral status as citizens – have a 
more urgent and enmeshed relationship to the moral ideals of citizenship. This feature of the 
black historical experience, as laid out by Du Bois’s characterization of the civic function of the 
black church and school in the Jim Crow era, neither Rawls or Honneth can accommodate. They 
do not focus on what it means to enact equal civic standing of members of derogated racial 
communities in an imperfect constitutional democracy – that a particular community realized a 
                                                                                                                                                             
lynching, against discrimination in work and education and against disfranchisement. The restoration of the 14th 
Amendment and further laws based on its original meaning are demanded. 
 
  Du Bois, “Civil Rights Legislation Before and After the Passage of the 14th Amendment,” p. 642. Emphasis added. 
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moral universal. 
In this chapter, in establishing the civic function of the black church and school, I 
illustrate the inadequacy of (1) John Rawls’s explanation of moral persons and moral education, 
construed as citizens’ passive participation in the institutions that comprise the basic structure; 
the exercise of the moral rights of citizenship is generalized to the polity, of which each 
individual is an abstract member, and (2) Axel Honneth’s model of the struggle for social 
recognition for the satisfaction of basic psycho-social needs in contexts of intersubjective social 
relations. I show that both accounts fail to capture how a vulnerable racial group exercises the 
moral rights of citizenship and acts as an impetus for political progress. Rawls and Honneth 
fail to chart how – and why – ‘private’ social institutions come to assume an explicitly civic bent, 
one that shapes the political will of the members of a vulnerable racial community. Because they 
neglect to theorize the historical experience of racial subordination, their views of freedom omit 
a formulation of social cooperation guided by the notion of the civic in a social whole bifurcated 
by the color-line. Consequently, they cannot account for the civic function of the black church 
and school during the Jim Crow era, when the federal government skirted its ethical obligation to 
affirm the moral status of all citizens as full members of the American civic community. Neither 
Rawls nor Honneth have the normative resources to articulate the manner black social 
institutions in the Jim Crow era functioned as sites for the collective aspiration to civic equality 
in light of the moral delinquency of the federal government.  
Finally, in delineating the normative structure of major black social institutions in the Jim 
Crow era, I do not intend to posit a fictive model of black political homogeneity or to suggest 
that the black church and school were monolithic in their political message and social 
organization. Nor do I wish to discount the religious heterogeneity of the black community 
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during this or any other historical period. Rather, in this chapter, I accept Du Bois’s claim that 
the American polity has not fully appreciated or learned from the black historical experience. I 
focus specifically on the normative significance of the black church and school, whose ethical 
work is ignored in white mainstream political philosophy and corroborates Du Bois’s speculation 
that something normatively unique transpired there, even though its significance has yet to be 
fully understood and appreciated by white mainstream political philosophers.  
 
ii. Contemporary Institution-Based Models of Freedom:  
a. John Rawls  
In this section, I present John Rawls’s account of the moral powers of citizenship that 
guides his theory of moral development. While Rawls defends the idea of the moral rights of 
citizenship, he does not give an account of how a particular social institution assumes an 
explicitly civic function that encourage the exercise of the moral rights of citizenship in light of 
the racist derogation of civic standing. Rather, on his view, citizens equally develop their moral 
powers through passive participation in the institutions that comprise the basic structure of their 
society. They have a duty to exercise the moral rights of citizenship over the course of a 
complete life in the form of carefully weighing the burdens of judgment, and, when necessary, 
engaging in acts of civil disobedience. Regardless of their status in civil society or their relation 
to major institutions of political powers, all citizens are similarly-situated with respect to the 
acquisition and enactment of the moral rights—and powers—of citizenship.  
Rawls employs a social contractarian conception of moral persons to guide his 
formulation of responsible citizenship and of their moral development through interaction with 
the basic structure. Specifically, his theory of justice presupposes a moral idea of the person as 
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reasonable and rational.20 He claims that citizens equally share in the motivation to revise the 
prevailing norms of public reason in the face of civic duties that are attached to the abstract 
model of the citizen as a moral person. The two basic moral powers that citizens possess that 
enable them to assume a responsible civic identity are the following: 
(i) One such power is the capacity for a sense of justice: it is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the 
principles of justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation. 
(ii) The other moral power is a capacity for a conception of the good: it is the capacity 
to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good. Such a 
conception is an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a person’s 
conception of what is of value in human life, or, alternatively, of what is regarded 
as a fully worthwhile life. The elements of such a conception are normally set 
within, and interpreted by, certain comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 
moral doctrines in the light of which various ends and aims are ordered and 
understood.21 
 
Ascribing to citizens the capacity for a sense of justice assumes that they are fundamentally 
reasonable. A person’s rationality, on the other hand, is manifest in her pursuit of a good life, 
which motivates her to act on self-interests and socially-shared, nonpublic reasons that give her 
life a sense of purpose. 
A reasonable and rational adult citizen has a civic duty to assume the burdens of 
judgment and direct her will towards an increasingly reasonable status quo. “[A]mong equals[,] 
they [citizens] are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to 
abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so.”22 The burden of 
judgement must “direct the legitimate exercise of political power,” revising unfair norms of 
social cooperation, thereby exercising the moral rights of citizenship whenever they see fit.23 
Rawls connects the idea of the reasonable to “a political ideal of democratic citizenship that 
                                                 
20 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 48.  
21 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 18-19. 
22 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 49. 
23 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 54. 
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includes the idea of public reason. The content of this ideal includes what free and equal citizens 
as reasonable can require of each other[.]”24 Assuming the burdens of judgment as part of the 
exercise of the moral rights of citizenship define what it means to be a reasonable democratic 
agent capable of autonomous self-determination in a society governed by a constitution and by 
reasonable principles all could accept.  
As rational persons, however, citizens have the prerogative to pursue their self-interests; 
yet, in actualizing this moral power, they need not only employ instrumental rationality. They 
“are not limited to means-ends reasoning, as they may balance final ends by their significance for 
their plan of life as a whole[.]”25 A rational plan of life gives them the freedom to satisfy their 
needs and to actualize their ends as purposive agents, without undermining the stability of the 
social order. Taken together, a theory of persons as reasonable and rational is a linchpin to 
Rawls’s theory of justice because it models the idea of responsible citizenship and the duties we 
owe each other, as well as persons’ entitlement to satisfy self-interests.  
While people’s capacity to pursue socially-shared interests without undue impediments is 
uncontroversial, their capacity to be reasonable in an imperfect democracy – and thus augment 
the substantive meaning and conditions of civic equality – requires a social theory and additional 
normative grounding. Rawls is aware of this and attempts to substantiate his moral faith in 
people’s reasonableness in a variety of ways; his abstract conception of moral persons as having 
two moral powers captures his intention.26 Notably, however, he also introduces a social theory 
                                                 
24 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 62. 
25 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 51. 
26 In the second (1995) introduction to Political Liberalism, Rawls remarks that his conception of moral personhood 
is deliberately abstract and that he makes no apologies for it. In its greater context, the passage is moving and 
reveals his reasoning on the necessity of possessing moral faith. Allow me to quote the passage at length:  
 
If a reasonably just society that subordinates power to its aims is not possible and people are largely amoral, if not 
incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask with Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on 
earth? We must start with the assumption that a reasonably just political society is possible, and for it to be possible, 
human beings must have a moral nature, not of course a perfect such nature, yet one that can understand, act on, and be 
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about the way institutions function in an imperfect, nearly just constitutional democracy. He 
ascribes to them the role of shaping the subjective will of citizens, although he does not identify 
his theory of justice as advancing a social theory of institutions.27 His most worked-out model of 
the formative role of social institutions is found in his philosophy of moral education that he 
sketches in A Theory of Justice.  There he outlines the development of citizens’ moral powers – 
especially, the capacity for justice and to be reasonable – through their participation in the basic 
structure. While he does not return to theorizing social institutions’ role in moral education, in 
his later works, he maintains that “the institutions of the basic structure have deep and long-term 
social effects and in fundamental ways shape citizens’ character and aims, the kind of persons 
they are and aspire to be.”28 He thus remains committed to the view that the capacity for justice 
is shaped by citizens’ participation in the institutions that constitute the basic structure of modern 
society.  
On Rawls’s view, interaction with the basic structure inculcates into citizens a sense of 
justice that prepares them to execute the civic obligation of monitoring the justness of their 
society, whatever their social standing, race or social identity. The basic structure is the primary 
subject of justice, such that individuals come to revise their considerate judgments through their 
participation in it, which shapes both their moral powers as citizens. Each stage of moral 
development corresponds to a unique set of norms that structure social relations among citizens.  
His philosophy of moral education does not include a no singular institution that mediates the 
subjective will formation towards a more reasonable status quo. Instead, as autonomous moral 
                                                                                                                                                             
sufficiently moved by a reasonable political conception of right and justice to support a society guided by its ideals and 
principles. […] [C]itizens need to be conceived to construct those more reasonable conceptions, and what their moral 
psychology has to be to support a reasonably just political society over time. (p. lx) 
 
27 It is a matter of debate among Rawls scholars about whether schools and families are part of the basic structure of 
society. See Hodgson, Lousie-Phillipe. “Why the Basic Structure,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42.3/4 (2012): 
303-34. 
28 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 68. 
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agents, adult citizens in an imperfect, but nearly just, democratic society, who have interacted 
with the basic structure, acquire two moral powers that enables them to share equally the 
capacity to act on the basis of justice, spontaneously – that is, whenever they see fit – over a 
complete lifetime.  
Rawls describes three stages of moral development. He believes that one stage “quite 
naturally” follows another.29 Like G.W.F. Hegel in the Philosophy of Right, he begins with the 
family, where we learn moral principles from authority and, more specifically, our parents’ 
(hopefully) unconditional love for us.30 The next stage of moral development is the morality of 
association. Through participating in various associations in civil society and the workplace, we 
learn “the art of perceiving the person of others, that is, the art of discerning their beliefs, 
intentions, and feelings.”31 Rawls is confident that the “art of perceiving the person of others” 
would be sufficient for us to enter the next state of moral development: the morality of principle. 
At this critical stage, citizens learn to use the principles of justice that underlie the ideals of 
public political culture and begin to exercise the moral rights of citizenship, in whatever 
institutional context they might find themselves in.32 Rawls does not posit a social institution for 
guiding the transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3 – the morality of association to the morality of 
principle; he does not countenance the necessity for such a singular institution to educate 
subjective will towards a moral interpretation of citizenship in light of the widespread 
undermining of equal civic standing. Rather, engagement with public political culture should 
sufficiently prepare citizens to judge responsibly and motivate the defense of the civic standing 
of all. 
                                                 
29 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. p. 370.   
30 For a feminist critique of Rawls on the family, see the pioneering work of Susan M. Okin, Gender, Justice and the 
Family. New York: Basic Books, 1989. 
31 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 469. 
32 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 323. 
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Figure 1. The Stages of Rawls’s Theory of Moral Development 





Moral Skill Set 
Stage 1 Morality of Authority Parental Figures Capacity for affective bounds, self-
confidence, and compliance 
Stage 2 Morality of Association Civil associations and 




Stage 3  Morality of Principle Public political culture? Reasoning on the basis of the moral 
meaning of citizenship  
 
 
At the final stage of moral development, citizens must assume the burdens of judgment 
and engage in acts of civil disobedience, when called for. Civil disobedience appeals to the 
public sense of justice and “declares in one’s considered opinion the principles of social 
cooperation among free and equal men are not being respected.”33 It is grounded in a political 
conception of justice, rather than in comprehensive or “religious conceptions,” which are not 
“essential” to motivating justice.34 As a mature adult, everyone in Rawls’s modern society has 
the “natural” duty to engage in civil disobedience and a “civic” duty to assume the burdens of 
judgment; the education of moral perception instills the necessary discretion to perform each 
duty.   
If public reason is the chief instructor – and a kind of institutional gateway – for citizens 
to enter the final stage of moral development, what challenges would they face in becoming 
autonomous and morally responsible citizens in a polity informed by de jure white supremacy, as 
was the case during the Jim Crow era? The moral ideal of citizenship offers an alternative 
interpretation of public values that transcends the existent terms of social institutions and of 
                                                 
33 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 320. 
34 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 337. 
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public political culture. If the state supports a basic structure and a public political culture 
disposed toward the derogation of members of marginalized racial communities, what 
opportunities would people of color have at their disposal to discern the moral status of their 
equal civic standing or even learn that they have such a status, rather than accept self-abasing 
disrespect? Rawls is correct that actions undertaken for the sake of the dignity of citizenship 
must be institutionally embedded to motivate social cooperation and mutual respect. But there 
was hardly recourse available for actualizing moral status in the absence of the recognition of the 
federal governmental, which circumscribed the American civic community as a white racial 
polity. The recourse was to resist racist exclusion by invoking the republic’s ‘higher’ moral 
ideals and institutionally embedding them through social practices that explicitly confirm the 
dignity of black citizenship. These institutions, i.e., the church and school, are not even included 
in what Rawls describes as the basic structure, which educates the will toward the morality of 
principle. 
Rawls also does not imagine how, on the initiative of disenfranchised citizens, racist 
exclusion is counteracted by the reorganization of social institutions behind the color-line. 
Indeed, he maintains that abiding by fair terms of social cooperation is an obligation, “provided 
that others also accept those terms.”35 In the extreme cases of failed states or thoroughly illiberal 
institutions, he provides no guidance to citizens and simply assumes that a “nearly just” society 
would morally educate citizens in a fashion that reliably imparts appropriate normative bearings. 
His model of moral education is thus rather claustrophobic: either accept the terms all the way 
down or that society has unraveled, in which case the acceptance of any terms at all makes no 
sense. For Du Bois, on the contrary, as a matter of necessity for both the preservation of the 
moral spirit of American democracy and the survival of black communities, black social 
                                                 
35 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xlii. 
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institutions came to have the ‘right of way’ for developing the values of public reason and 
educating citizens for the appropriate revisions to the terms of social cooperation. These were 
institutions that existed outside of the basic structure, but were nonetheless normatively-oriented 
toward reimaging the terms of social cooperation in the American civic community, while 
refusing to accept the prevailing interpretation of those terms, which reproduced formally and 
informally racial domination. The black church thus conditionally functioned as a ‘government 
of men,’ evincing a tenacious normative commitment to the ideal of a racially-inclusive and 
egalitarian civic community. It strove to actualize African Americans’ moral standing as citizens 
in the absence of the support of the federal government or a public political culture that did not 
even have in the offing an ideal of racially-inclusive democracy.  
Although Rawls provides a theory of moral development that encourages citizens to 
exercise the moral rights of citizenship over a complete life, he does not discern the potential role 
of social institutions in civil society as a crucial step in the education of reasonable will 
formation that could underwrite the moral status of racially-marginalized groups in an imperfect 
constitutional democracy, such as the Jim Crow era in the U.S.36 Instead, rather naively, he 
assumes that regardless of groups’ experiences of marginalization or the particular nature of their 
subordinate relation to major social and political institutions, each adult citizen acquires a 
sufficient democratic literacy and rational motivation to assume the burdens of judgment (and 
even engage in acts of civil disobedience in circumstances that warrant them).37 Nor does he 
                                                 
36 M. Victoria Costa argues that Rawls’s theory of moral education does not ascribe to social institution the explicit 
function of educated citizens in the exercise of morality of principle. She submits that passive participation in public 
political culture hardly results in moral maturity necessary to be a responsible citizen. I am building on her claim to 
argue that a social institution that Rawls does not theorize is part of the basic structure assumes this educative role. 
Costa, Victoria M. Rawls, Citizenship, and Education. New York: Routledge, 2010. 
37 Conceptions of the formation of moral subjectivity in critical social theory evince that passive participation in the 
basic structure of modern society reliably results in ideological indoctrination. See Marcuse, Herbert. One 
Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. Habermas, 
Jürgen. Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. 
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speculate how much systematic institutional failure, dysfunction, and irrationality a ‘nearly just’ 
society could withstand. For the duty to exercise the moral rights of citizenship when appropriate 
is founded on the social contractarian theory of the modern citizen as a moral person. That 
conception of the moral person entails that a particular citizen possesses the capacity for 
impartially judging the status quo using the norms of public reason. The structure of a modern 
citizens’ practical reasoning sustains her capacity to ‘spontaneously’ engage in the moral 
reasoning requisite for fighting for civic equality in an imperfect democracy – that is Rawls’s 
residual Kantianism and the moral faith underlining his theory of justice and our natural duty to 
fight for it. We just have to look deep within ourselves to find the abstract moral person hidden 
there.  
While Rawls countenances the obligation of individuals to make political claims for the 
sake of civic equality, he grounds such assertions in a duty that all citizens share as responsible 
adults, similarly-situated in the basic structure. He believes that citizens are “symmetrically 
situated” in both the rational decision procedure that establishes the principles of justice and with 
respect to the duties and moral powers that shape public reason.38 Even though he affirms that 
citizens’ participation in the institutions that constitute the basic structure of society inculcate a 
sense of justice into them, he ignores the extent to which in an imperfect constitutional 
democracy certain social institutions and social practices have assumed a greater burden in 
shaping the aspiration towards freedom and the exercise of the moral rights of citizenship in the 
context of civil society. In light of Jim Crow segregation, the moral economy necessary to resist 
white supremacy required African Americans to assume an active civic identity that challenged 
existent norms in public political culture, rather than passively accept the latter in guiding social 
and political praxis, just to be able to maintain a dignified self-conception as a moral person. 
                                                 
38 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 20. 
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This moral economy issued not from the spontaneous manifestation of an abstract moral 
personality, but was the result of the grassroots education initiative of black social institutions. 
So far, I have argued that Rawls has the moral faith that the average American adult, 
regardless of her standing vis-à-vis the basic structure and the particular racial communities she 
belongs to, shares with her fellow citizens the same structure of practical reason that enables – 
and motivates – her to engage in the moral reasoning necessary to defend the civic equality of 
all. His theory of citizens as persons with two moral powers asserts that any particular person is, 
in principle, similarly situated – and motivated – to judge and correct violations of justice in an 
imperfect constitutional democracy. This normative reflexivity is built into the idea of justice as 
fairness, for it “models the idea that when citizens are fairly situated with respect to one another, 
it is up to them to specify the fair terms of social cooperation in light of what they each regard as 
to their advantage, or good.”39 As I will show shortly, Du Bois does not wholly reject a Rawlsian 
model of practical reason, but he highlights the social practices and institutions in the segregated 
black community that came to foster democratic literacy and political autonomy in the defense of 
civic equality, when no other major institutions endorsed these norms of government or proferred 
such terms for civic belonging. The institutions of the black church and school educated 
subjective will, such that respect for normative principles resulted from the concerted exercise of 
the moral rights of citizenship in an institutional context that conferred the dignity of black 
citizenship among similarly-situated persons, subject to Jim Crow segregation. Moreover, given 
the denigration of black citizenship in the Jim Crow era, its collective assertion was expressed 
not in iterative acts of civil disobedience, but embedded in informally institutionalized social 
practices as a matter of necessity, actualizing the dignity of black citizenship in a white racial 
polity predicated on its systematic deprecation. 
                                                 
39 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 73.  
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A citizen’s passive interaction with the basic structure is insufficient to educate the will 
towards more reasonable ends that could shape a citizen’s political autonomy and prepare them 
to establish fair norms of social cooperation in a white supremacist society. As we shall see, in 
the case of the systematic derogation of black citizenship in major social and political institutions 
during Jim Crow, for a singular social institution to assume an explicitly educative function, with 
a civic normative orientation, was necessary to preserve the dignity of black citizenship in the 
context of juridical exclusion. The implication is that in an imperfect, nearly just constitutional 
democracy institutional social spaces in excluded racial communities have carried a greater 
burden for recognizing and enacting norms of freedom and equality in light of the federal 
government’s dereliction of its ethical responsibilities. Thus, Du Bois calls on America to 
understand and appreciate the ‘spiritual’ work of the black church in articulating the contribution 
of the black historical experience to the development of American modernity. Yet, these black 
institutional spaces have also tended to remain invisible and unacknowledged in their efforts, 
especially as they pertain to shaping major social and political institutions in the U.S. towards 
more reasonable ends.40 
 
  
ii.  Contemporary Institution-Based Models of Freedom 
 
b. Axel Honneth 
This section focuses on Axel Honneth’s philosophy of “social freedom” and the struggle 
for recognition that motivates its historical development.41 I argue that Honneth fails to posit the 
                                                 
40 Allen, Danielle S. Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education. Chicago and 
London: Chicago University Press, 2004.   
41 I will focus on his Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2014. There Honneth gives his most elaborate statement on social freedom. He borrows the concept from 
Frederick Neuhouser’s influential book on G.W.F. Hegel, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing 
Freedom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. I take it that Honneth’s earlier works, to which I also refer in 
this section, are consistent with Freedom’s Right. Honneth, Axel. The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition. 
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exercise of the moral rights of citizenship as normative grounds guiding emancipatory praxis and 
shaping the normative character of social institutions. For Honneth, the state’s ideal ethical 
function is to act as a coercive entity that secures negative freedom by using the law to remove 
obstacles to individuals’ pursuits. His philosophy of freedom thus fails to capture a salient 
feature of the African-American historical experience, as articulated by Du Bois, inasmuch as he 
rejects the moral ideal of citizenship as an impetus for political action or social organization. 
Honneth argues that intersubjective norms of recognition immanently develop through 
social practices, unleashing “potentials for subjectivity.”42 The failure to satisfy three distinctive 
kinds of basic psycho-social needs results struggle for recognition. The satisfaction of these basic 
needs should be successfully embedded in social institutions, which, taken together, comprise the 
extra-legal preconditions of individuals’ “social freedom” and normatively structure 
intersubjective social relations. Namely, the basic needs for love and intimacy in interpersonal 
relationships, for social esteem in civil society, and for equal legal rights in “the democratic 
public sphere” motivate the struggle for recognition. In advancing a scheme of basic psycho-
social needs, he provides a philosophical anthropology of the formal conditions of human 
flourishing. His political theory articulates the normative grounds of emancipatory praxis by 
reflecting on striking features of our shared moral experiences that function as the preconditions 
for the exercise of individual autonomy and successful subjectivity formation.  
His scheme aspires to keep an “empirical foothold in social reality.” 43  Seeking a 
“categorial opening to the normative standpoint from which subjects themselves evaluate the 
social order,” his tripartite scheme of needs gives his political theory a vantage point that is not 
                                                                                                                                                             
Malden: Polity, 2014 and The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995.  
42 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, p. 169. 
43 Petherbridge, Danielle. “Introduction: Axel Honneth’s Project of Critical Theory,” in Axel Honneth: Critical 
Essays. (Ed.) Danielle Petherbridge. Boston: Brill, 2011. pp. 1-30.  p. 1 
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“cut off from […] social discontent.”44 However, he does not countenance that – with respect to 
the development of American modernity – reconstructing the rationally-motivating grounds of 
emancipatory praxis would disrupt the recognitive scheme he proposes. 45  In spite of his 
aspiration to identify the formal conditions of human flourishing, he reconstructs the normative 
legacy of European modernity. If he were to address the distinct contributions of the African-
American historical experience to the rationally-motivating grounds of emancipatory praxis, he 
would find that the moral meaning of free and equal citizenship is paramount in the historical 
struggle for freedom, inasmuch as it characterized the normative orientation of black-led social 
institutions under longstanding social conditions of racist oppression and de jure segregation. 
Yet, he rejects the very idea that the exercise of the moral rights of citizenship could be a shared 
moral experience. The moral meaning of free and equal citizenship was the impetus for 
emancipatory praxis in the African-American community during Jim Crow, at least according to 
my presentation of Du Bois’s political philosophy. So, what of the exercise of the moral rights of 
citizenship in Honneth’s account of social freedom? 
Honneth’s account includes the state, but its ethical function is not to bolster civic 
community, as social institutions cannot plausibly assume a ‘civic’ normative orientation. He 
construes the ethical function of the modern state narrowly: it is a legal institution that protects 
negative liberty by removing obstacles to the fulfillment of individuals’ ends in civil society. 
While he supports the negative freedom that legal rights provide, he believes that normative 
political theory and theories of justice focus too much on the modern constitutional state as the 
                                                 
44 Nancy Fraser & Axel Honneth. Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange. New York: 
Verso, 2003. p. 134. 
45 Rogers, Melvin, “Rereading Honneth: Exodus Politics and the Paradox of Recognition,” European Journal of 
Political Theory 8.2 (2009): 183-206. In the next chapter, I focus on Rogers’s argument that black slaves’ religious 
life and imagination as provided an alternative way to enact moral agency against racist misrecognition. His 
criticism of Honneth, however, does not focus on the state, but on the tripartite recognitive scheme Honneth 
advances. 
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institutional precondition of individual autonomy. Advancing a standard liberal view of the state 
as a coercive institution, he justifies its coercive powers inasmuch as it establishes the 
institutional conditions of citizens’ mutual independence and non-interference in one another’s 
lives.46 In devising his model of social freedom, he seeks to locate the conditions of individual 
freedom beyond the purview of legal institutions and the state’s protection of basic rights. Social 
freedom justifies not just the removal of obstacles to individual autonomy, but the establishment 
of positive social relations that constitute and mold subjectivity. The struggle for recognition 
intervenes in social relations that undermine or fail to promote successful subjectivity formation; 
the latter ideally culminates in the expression of individual autonomy in major social and 
political institutions, namely, civil society and the democratic public sphere. Guided by the 
“moral sentiments” of self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect, social relations enliven 
critical dimensions of subjectivity, which must be confirmed intersubjectively. For example, 
Honneth argues that being subject to a caregiver’s unconditional love from birth instills the self-
confidence necessary for an adult to determine her own ends and to participate in the democratic 
life of the polity. 
Moral sentiments are the “categorial openings” that illustrate a first-person perspective on 
the way people make sense of, and alter, their imperfectly just world. The frustrated experience 
of these moral sentiments in social relations instigates the struggle for recognition – not the 
concerted exercise of the moral rights of citizenship. Honneth is skeptical that an abstract 
category such as civic belonging normatively binds citizens into relations of solidarity or 
provides a normative orientation that is sufficiently robust to stir a shared moral experience. 
Hence, he emphasizes extra-legal organizations and institutions that can satisfy individuals’ 
                                                 
46 For a clear presentation of the liberal view of the state, see Pallikkathayil, Japa. “Neither Perfectionism nor 
Political Liberalism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 44.3 (2016): 171-96. 
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needs as social agents. Contra Rawls’s account of moral education, for Honneth, the 
development of subjectivity must successfully embed individuals in social relations that lead to 
the satisfaction of their basic psycho-social needs, and, ideally, shores up “surplus validity,” 
which unleashes latent potential of subjectivity by amplifying the subject’s experience of self-
confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect in intersubjective social relations.47 Consequently, he 
defends the expansion of intersubjective communicative relations in the democratic public 
sphere, as well as the establishment of “pre-state” or “non-state” actors and organizations, which 
would channel “surplus validity” into as-of-yet unarticulated arcs of subjective experience. These 
arcs bend neither toward the state nor the civic community, even though – by definition – the 
moral ideal of citizenship advances a normative ideal that is “non-state,” that is, it transcends the 
existent normative structure of the relation of citizens to their institutions. For the remainder of 
my discussion of Honneth, I will focus on why he excludes the exercise of the moral rights of 
citizenship in his account of social freedom and its development. I discuss, first, his presentation 
of the democratic public sphere and, second, the sociology of European constitutional patriotism 
he presents. On his view, progressive movements that create “surplus validity” need not even 
result in institutionalization – state or otherwise – nor revise the prevailing interpretations of 
public values that define civic belonging.  
According to Honneth, the democratic public sphere is not the same thing as the state. As 
a legal entity that protects legal rights, the state sanctions individuals to reject claims the social 
world makes on them.48 It gives them the capacity to experience self-respect, carving out a 
domain of negative liberty that protects individual autonomy. Focusing on the conditions for 
becoming a full participant in democratic will formation, he assigns the state the “tasks of 
                                                 
47 Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 186 
48 Honneth, The I in We, p. 39. 
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protecting and respecting public will-formation.”49 Democratic agency yields self-respect. In 
challenging the boundaries of the democratic public sphere – as part of his formulation of the 
concept of ‘social freedom’ – he appeals to extra-legal and extra-juridical norms, actors, and 
organizations. This feature of his project he believes is its distinctive contribution, one that 
establishes its superiority over Rawls’s institution-based conception of justice. The development 
of social freedom “largely evade[s] legal and constitutional categories.” 50 Identifying a “web” of 
“weakly institutionalized practices and customs that give us social confirmation to express 
ourselves freely,” a sufficiently robust democratic public sphere can ultimately render 
“superfluous” state protection and the state’s moral obligations to its citizens.51 In fact, Honneth 
postulates the “transnationalization of public self-legislation,” which would globalize the 
democratic public sphere, such that democratic ties extend “beyond the cultural space of the 
‘nation.’”52  
Public forums might emerge in a particular civil society that advocate the recognition of 
basic rights or push social relations to incorporate social esteem. Even in these forums, however, 
Honneth omits the civic moral reinterpretation and redirection of the ends of political power – 
indeed, the ends are prescribed as the satisfaction of basic psycho-social needs in a global 
setting. He identifies public forums for “unforced will-formation” as essential for constituting the 
“We” of democratic politics, but he vaguely intimates the public values, interests, and scope of 
this “We.”53 He elaborates the normatively under-determined character of democratic public 
forums by appealing to John Dewey:  
[T]he formation of a public […] would require that a group of people, brought together 
                                                 
49 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 307. 
50 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 67. 
51 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 67 & p. 329. 
52 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 288-90 & p. 327-28.  
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by the interdependence of their individual actions, reach an understanding about the 
‘consequences’ of their ‘associated activities’ and thus about which of these they take to 
be desirable. Only if such a communicative understanding about the consequences of 
their associated action in the group comes about can we speak of the ‘We’ of the public. 
[…] Dewey uses the term ‘democratic public’ to describe the totality of all the 
communicative processes that enable the members of ‘large societies’ […] to take up the 
perspective of such a ‘We’ while judging the consequences of their actions. It constitutes 
a form of social freedom by enabling individuals, in communication with all the members 
of society, to improve their living conditions.54 
 
Note that for a democratic public to assume the perspective of a ‘We,’ it looks for “desirable” 
consequences that “improve living conditions.” But in reaching an “understanding about the 
consequences” of its “associated activities,” Honneth does not articulate the normative basis of 
public political judgment.55 Short of free and open discussions that “clarify and realize […] 
political intentions in an unforced manner and by reciprocally taking up the role of speaker and 
listener,” Honneth does not provide additional normative grounds for guiding public will 
formation or how one ought to engage “the public exchange of experiences.”56 Consumption of 
print media, the telegraph, and the telephone are extensions “within” the democratic public 
sphere.57 To his great credit, however, he necessitates “concrete interactions” and “voluntary 
services needed for the material preparation and execution of actual events.”58 Presumably, this 
would shore up surplus validity from the inside-out – that is, immanently – imbuing the social 
world with a new normative order.  
A concept akin to the moral rights of citizenship that Honneth introduces for motivating 
democratic agency is “constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus).59  He defines the 
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concept: “By viewing the constitution of their democratic community as an inspiration to realize 
and perfect the universal moral principles contained in these documents in light of their own 
historical experiences, citizens can gain confirmation of their political cohesion and emotional 
connection to one another.”60 In place of a moral interpretation of civic belonging as guiding the 
fair terms of social cooperation, constitutional patriotism is an “emotionally anchored 
commitment to the good of the community.”61 To this end, his description of how “constitutional 
patriotism” has been rationally-motivating in political praxis focuses on 20th c. European politics, 
where this sort of “emotionally anchored commitment” and “political cohesion” had often gone 
awry and subordinated moral values to an exclusionary ethno-nationalism.   
The idea of constitutional patriotism […] continues to have little attractiveness[.] It lacks 
historical concretion, a narrative of collective triumphs and defeats in the light of which 
citizens can view themselves as sharing a common destiny and commit to mutual support. 
Therefore, at the end of our treatment of the socialization of legal, moral and social 
freedom, we are faced with the question of where to obtain the moral resources that could 
enable a democratic citizenry to withstand in solidarity […] various misdevelopments[.]62 
 
To the extent that constitutional patriotism has been rationally-motivating, it espouses ethno-
nationalism and fails to guide a “democratic citizenry” through “various misdevelopments.” 
Constitutional patriotism, for Honneth, endorses ethno-nationalism, rather than ethno-
nationalism preventing the normative efficacy of constitutional patriotism.  
His skepticism about moral ideals galvanizing masses is grounded in his rejection of the 
abstract social contractarian model of moral persons. He reasons that constitutional patriotism 
presupposes a social contractarian model of the citizen as a reasonable and rational person, who 
has a civic duty – and an acquired capacity – to make universal judgments. Yet, he believes that 
in practice, in concrete social relations, these judgments are often misguided and 
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“indeterminate.”63 Unsurprisingly, on his view, when the moral ideal of citizenship guides praxis 
it tends to devolve into ethno-nationalist fervor. The Rawlsian moral imperative commands that 
citizens regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims who direct the principle 
of political legitimacy through the enactment of duties of civility. Honneth consider such a moral 
characterization of persons highly speculative; at times, he even suggests that assuming the 
orientation is ‘ontologically’ impossible, given the way individuals must be embedded in social 
relations in order to find their normative bearings. Yet, in highlighting the naivety of Rawls’s 
abstract conception of the moral person, he endorses the rather cynical view that democratic 
agents are normatively impotent and unmotivated to fight for robust moral ideals in the struggle 
for actualizing civic equality: “To want to detach ourselves [from existent relations of 
recognition] in order to get sight of them is to entertain an illusion that is just as empty and idle 
as the desire to shape them as we please.”64 He thus considers the moral ideal of citizenship an 
implausible normative basis for entering into positive relations with others without degenerating 
into pernicious ethno-nationalism.  
His denial of constitutional patriotism and similar moral ideals of citizenship centers on 
such ideas’ causal-efficacy for guiding the norms of immanently-emerging social and political 
praxis. “This […] demonstrates why a reconstructive theory of justice is generally more skeptical 
than its proceduralist alternatives, because it does not trust a fictitious procedure of agreement to 
inform us realistically about principles of justice. It will always be doubtful whether these 
principles overtax existing social relations.”65 But, historically, the exercise of the moral rights 
                                                 
63 Pensky, Max. “Social Solidarity and Intersubjective Recognition: On Axel Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition,” 
in Axel Honneth: Critical Essays. (Ed.) Danielle Petherbridge. Boston: Brill, 2011. pp. 125-53. p. 140. 
64 Honneth, The I in We, p. 42. 
65 Honneth, The I in We, p. 48. Emphasis added. It is instructive to read the passage from which I pull this quote:  
 
Compared to proceduralist approaches, this type of reconstructive theory of justice is both more trustful and more 
skeptical of historical reality. It is more trustful because it sees within already established relations of communication 
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of citizenship proved to be a shared moral experience; furthermore, it was not an impracticable 
“impartial” standpoint divorced from disempowered racial groups’ self-conception as moral 
persons. Furthermore, rather than “overtaxing social relations,” it provided unique insight into 
the grounds motivating political praxis from the standpoint of the collective moral experience of 
oppression and subordination. He dismisses the possibility of immanently developing moral 
ideals that, while reflecting particular experiences and an embedded social location, actualize 
civic virtues and develop the norms of public political culture: 
But the skepticism reaches even further. There might be hopes that in the course of this 
normative reconstruction, we will come across an historically existent discursive method 
– the very same method appealed to fictitiously by proceduralists. If that were the case, 
we could discern a special relation of recognition in modern social reality, one in which 
citizens achieve autonomy by participating in democratic processes of will formation, 
thereby defining together the principles of social justice. Under these circumstances, the 
theory could pull out of the business of determining principles of social justice, for it 
need only distill the normative preconditions under which the discursive results of the 
already existing procedure could count as justified. The reason why I distrust such an 
historically situated form of proceduralism is that individual autonomy demands more 
and other forms of social recognition than are guaranteed by participation in public 
processes of will formation.66  
  
He thus refuses countenance how marginalized racial groups struggle for social and political 
power on the revised terms of civic belonging. Not only pressing for rights and esteem, black 
social institutions reimagine the very nature of public goods, what constitutes the basic structure, 
and how we conceive citizens as moral persons (i.e., whether they are part of a racial plurality or 
not). Surely, these are ‘extra-legal’ conditions – in his sense of the term – that enable individual’s 
autonomous self-realization as ‘social’ agents. But, in seeking to avoid institutional over-
                                                                                                                                                             
the normative principle that underlie demands for social justice. It can therefore restrict itself to explicating the 
principles that socialized subjects are already guided by in their relationships of recognition. However, if these 
preconditions are absent – that is, if we are dealing with ethically damaged and demoralized social relationships – this 
theory of justice will be relatively powerless. It, too, will have to resort to an impartial standpoint in order to not 
wholly lose sight of the principles of social justice. This extreme case also demonstrates why a reconstructive theory of 
justice is generally more skeptical than its proceduralist alternatives, because it does not trust a fictitious procedure of 
agreement to inform us realistically about principles of justice. It will always be doubtful whether these principles 
overtax existing social relations. 
 
66 Honneth, The I in We, p. 48. Emphasis added. 
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determination at the state-level that curtail “freely-formed” ties of democratic “solidarity,” he 
misses the opportunity to theorize social freedom in the context of the expanding scope and ends 
of a civic community, whose normative reference point is developing notions of civic belonging 
in a modern state.  
Yet, following Du Bois, I submit that outside the debate between transcendentalism and 
institutionalism, normative idealism and social theory, black people in America were fighting for 
freedom under longstanding conditions of racist oppression and exclusion. 67 Honneth is unable 
to explain what preserving the dignity of black citizenship under these conditions meant or how 
to rationally reconstruct the normative orientation of segregated social institutions. To put it 
bluntly, he is unable to explain what these institutions were doing. Given their aims and concrete 
activities, it is implausible to assert that pressing for legal protection and social esteem exhausted 
their function. For, they articulated claims that were yet to be recognized as rights; and, they 
challenged the legitimacy of the prevailing interpretation of constitutional rights, the existent 
terms of social belonging, and what even constitutes a public good – (i.e., are hospitals, school 
systems, orphanages included?) in a white racial polity. On his model, the exertion of black 
political will would be interpreted as a struggle to gain legal protection or social esteem, rather 
than as a challenge to the prevailing consensus on what is political legitimate in a white 
supremacist status quo, which does not believe it has flouted the values of freedom and equality. 
The actualization of the moral powers of citizens posited determinations of the substantive 
conditions of civic equality that are “civil, political, and economic,”68 thereby instilling a new 
meaning into what it means to extend legitimate state power and esteem towards one’s fellow 
                                                 
67 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 42. 
68 Du Bois, Souls, p. 164. 
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citizens.69  
Describing the political disenchantment of the 20th c. Western Europe, Honneth writes 
that the “public […] turns away from state-mediated politics. [T]he peoples of Western Europe 
have […] muted moods of ‘disenchantment’ with politics [Politikverdrossenheit] – a diffuse 
mistrust in [the state].” 70  He continues, “the only way out of this crisis of the democratic 
constitutional state would be to bundle the public power of organizations, social movements, and 
civil associations in order to put coordinated and massive pressure on the parliamentary 
legislature, forcing it to take measures to ensure social re-embedding of the capitalist market.71 
However, he observes that “the necessary resources provided by a common background culture 
are gradually beginning to dry up.”72  He thus offers little by way of reinvigorating the normative 
grounds that could motivate action and revamp “the cohesion of citizens.”73 
Perhaps Du Bois can dispel his somber mood and undue cynicism. The exercise of the 
moral rights of citizenship from behind the Jim Crow color-line amounted not only to a defense 
not of freely-formed ties of democratic solidarity, but invoked the failure of the modern state to 
discharge its integrative ethical function. It affirmed the moral status of citizens of color to 
participate in the establishment of the fair terms of social cooperation that should ultimately 
revise the ends of the state. For Du Bois, the idea of civic community does not endorse ethno-
nationalism nor “overtax” social relations, but functions as a causally-efficacious moral ground 
                                                 
69 Du Bois challenges us to be specific about what it means to recognize the value of our fellow citizens in civil 
society. Rather than press for a general category of esteem, he advocates focusing on particular issues such as 
recompense in labor, familial organization, policing policies, intimate relations, views on beauty and pain, to name a 
few, to collapse these considerations under the banner of ‘esteem’ empties the issues of their normative force and 
specificity. When one is denied a fair wage, it is an injustice that is stronger than a failure to confer ‘esteem.’ When 
one’s family unity is attacked, again, it is an injustice stronger than a withdrawal of esteem.  
70 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 325. 
71 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 326. 
72 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 327. 
73 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, p. 288. I omit discussion of the ethical significance of love as the social condition of 
social freedom, although Honneth includes it as a critical element of social freedom.  
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for injecting a radically new interpretation of political values into the white polity and for 
restructuring the existent social relations between citizens who are members of different racial 
groups. The category of civic belonging can disrupt the normative structure of the given 
interracial social relations; it challenges the racist social exclusion in the American polity, as it is 
reflected in civil, economic, and political life.74 Du Bois’s critique of Jim Crow reimagines the 
















                                                 
74 Tellingly, Honneth writes that the impetus for social struggle is the experience of disrespect, a moral feeling that 
arises with the violation of established conventions of social engagement: “[S]uch expectations are the product of 
the social formation of a deep-seated claim-making potential in the sense that they always owe their normative 
justification to principles institutionally anchored in the historically established recognition order.” Fraser and 
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 137. 
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Figure 2. “Jesus Christ in Baltimore” Crisis 1(3): January 1911 
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iii. The Civic Function of the Black Church and School during Jim Crow 
 
In the previous sections, I have argued that Rawls and Honneth fail to provide an account 
of the civic function of social institutions, which was manifest in the 20th c. black historical 
experience of Jim Crow. These institutions fostered and formed black moral agency in the 
struggle for civic equality. I have argued that while Rawls shares Du Bois’s normative 
commitment to the moral ideal of citizenship, he does not countenance how the organization of 
institutions in a particular marginalized racial community could be founded on habits of 
citizenship that ensure both the community’s (contested) moral standing as a full member of the 
American civic community and its survival under persistent attack and longstanding federal 
neglect. He instead believes that all citizens are “similarly-situated” in relation to the basic 
structure, such that a section of civil society need not assume an explicitly civic function, given a 
“basically” just constitutional democracy. Honneth, on the other hand, rejects the moral ideal of 
citizenship in favor of extra-legal and extra-juridical social relations that fill essential features of 
flourishing subjectivity. He favors immanently-developing social norms that amplify individual 
autonomy by expanding the scope and depth of shared moral experiences, but is highly skeptical 
that the exercise of the moral rights of citizenship could qualify as a shared moral experience.  
In this section, I present Du Bois’s conception of the civic function of black social 
institutions during the Jim Crow era. I argue that Du Bois presents an alternative view of the 
imbrication of moral ideals, citizens, and their social institutions – a third way, so to speak. He 
endorses the moral ideal of citizenship, but argues that its normatively-robust proposals, which 
offer a substantive interpretation of the meaning of freedom and equality, arise from 
immanently-developing social practices tied to a particular set of social institutions that reflect a 
shared moral experience, namely that of the lived experience of black racial embodiment, needs, 
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and collective vulnerabilities in a racial caste system.  
Du Bois describes the black church and school as “social settlements” that operated as 
“governments of men,” carrying “the inner ethical life of a people.”75  He ascribes to these 
institutions the following goals: 1) to recognize and 2) to actualize the full moral standing of 
black citizens in a white racial polity that systematically denigrated the dignity of black 
citizenship.76 These institutions, in Du Bois’s view, not only carried the ethical spirit of a people 
from behind the color-line, but imparted – however, imperfectly – that spirit into the polity. From 
behind the color-line, that is, from a vantage point of civil, economic, and political 
marginalization, the immanently-developing norms that guided the activities of the black church 
and school not only appealed to the principles of freedom and equality, but challenged the 
prevailing interpretations of these values for legitimatizing racist exclusion. For Du Bois, these 
social institutions pursue a critical role in light of the federal government’s refusal to represent 
black interests with the dismantling of Reconstruction policies. Yet, the normative significance 
of American citizenship guided their organizational activities, even as they were stationed 
‘outside’ the formal domains for exercising social and political power; their moral powers as 
members of the American civic community were nonetheless in full force and politically 
legitimate.  
In 1) recognizing that black persons are full members of the American civic community, 
these institutions centered on the unacknowledged status of black citizens as sources of moral 
value and moral interpretation with respect to establishing the terms of civil, economic, and 
political life – or to use the more abstract Rawlsian phrase, “the fair terms of social cooperation.” 
Affirming their contributions in adjudicating the fair terms of social cooperation, Du Bois refers 
                                                 
75 Du Bois, Souls, p. 161. 
76 Du Bois, Souls, p. 86-87, 90. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 621 & p. 667. 
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to black “striving” behind the veil after “ideals” that capture a racially-inclusive interpretation of 
the substantive meaning of freedom and equality, propounding “not antagonistic ideals but 
[norms that are] part of one ideal; [ones that] did not increase segregation, but [emerged in light 
of] segregation [that] was there and would remain for many years.”77 To be sure, the proffered 
terms challenged the distribution of social and political power; the organization of the basic 
structure – particularly, what ought to count as a public good or a public institution that serves 
the common good. For example, Du Bois questions whether private ‘associational’ institutions in 
civil society must become essential contexts for receiving a civic education and imparting civic 
virtue in an “imperfect” society founded on the civic inconsequentiality of black people. 78 
Furthermore, black institutions advanced informal social welfare policies that treated housing, 
food, education, medical services, and childcare – just to name a few – as public goods funded 
by an informal tax system (progressive developments slow to win wider appeal in the national 
polity.) And finally, formulations of the fair terms of interracial social cooperation, emerging 
from black social institutions, that challenged conceptions of who is a citizen and what 
obligations that should carry.  
Of course, highlighting these challenges to American social and political culture does not 
establish them as a priori valid, but it does elucidate the substantive meaning of freedom and 
equality from the elided black perspective, whose moral value was not recognized. For, “even 
the invisible never leave politics; they remain always actively engaged in their polities, even if 
no one notices.”79 The moral powers of citizenship are thus constructed in a racialized plurality, 
where notions of political legitimacy reflect evaluative judgments about the status and lived 
experience of black racial embodiment, the latter being denigrated and “veiled” in the Jim Crow 
                                                 
77 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 777. 
78 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, p. 621. 
79 Allen, Talking to Strangers, p. 103. 
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era.80 To be sure, Du Bois does not believe in the moral superiority of oppressed black people as 
sources of moral value and interpretation, but he does submit that incorporating their input would 
dramatically revise the normative structure of social and political culture.81 As Danielle Allen 
elaborates, “autonomy no more consists of getting one’s own way all the time in the political 
realm than in the sphere of friendship. It consists instead of getting one’s way in concert with 
others, and as modified by them.”82  
In 2) actualizing black persons as full members of the American civic community, these 
social settlements were “a great school of prospective citizenship.” 83And their organizers – 
preachers, regular church-goers, and teachers – were “ethical and social leaders” of the black 
community and, ultimately, for Du Bois, of the nation as a whole, although the nation hardly 
recognizes their sacrifices for the preservation of the moral spirit of the republic.84 In Souls, he 
even refers to the preacher and the teacher as a sort of “politician” working in the “social, 
intellectual, and economic centers” of the segregated black community. 85  In Du Bois’s 
estimation, they inculcated civic virtues in defense of the common good, democratic literacy, and 
reimagined the American civic community in racially inclusive terms – moral ideals hardly in the 
offing elsewhere in the U.S. at the time. Of course, inasmuch as African Americans are not 
recognized as full members of the American civic community and do not partake in the public 
adjudication of the fair norms of social cooperation in the wider polity, their civic standing is not 
fully actualized. 
                                                 
80 For my definition of a racialized plurality, see chapter 1. Additionally, see Charles Mills on racial ideology for a 
detailed explanation about how the status of racial embodiment is reflected in evaluative judgments pertaining to 
political legitimacy. 
81 Du Bois consistently refers to historical moments that witness the incorporation of black input in the organization 
of society as “revolutionary” or as “social revolutions.”  
82 Allen, Talking to Strangers, p. 133. 
83 Du Bois, Souls, p. 34. 
84 Du Bois, Souls, p. 163; Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 712-15; Allen, Talking to Strangers, p. 114. 
85 Du Bois, Souls, p. 155. 
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Du Bois’s political critique of Jim Crow presents a philosophical challenge. On the one 
hand, Jim Crow segregation constitutes racist oppression. On the other hand, it conditions the 
exercise of the moral autonomy of black citizens that resulted in a “second sight,” revealing 
habits of citizenship that delineate a substantive, but politically legitimate, interpretation of the 
meaning of freedom and equality from the elided black perspective. 86  With the rise of 
segregation, Adolph Reed argues that “in Du Bois’s view, simple good judgment called for 
fortifying […] black institutions as existed behind the walls of segregation.”87 In highlighting a 
prudent political strategy for navigating racist oppression, Reed interprets the activities of black 
social institutions as evincing “a necessary concession to the reality of segregation.”88 Du Bois, 
however, illustrates that the “necessary concession” was suffused with a moral interpretation that 
impelled a new developmental arc in the struggle for civic equality.  
Even with the withdrawal of federal support, the concrete activities of black institutions 
remained grounded in the public values of freedom and equality, illustrating that the ideal of 
citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty; of course, inasmuch as the existent laws were 
unjust, the ideal is necessarily moral, as it transcends the existent normative structure of social 
and political culture and rallied against the civic inconsequentiality of black people.89 For “the 
law is not an artifact, or made object, that embodies the will of the people once and for all, but a 
practice in which any and every citizen may be involved at any moment, through deliberation, 
                                                 
86 Du Bois, Souls, p. 8; Allen, Talking to Strangers, p. 114. 
87 Reed, Adolph Jr. W.E.B. Du Bois and American Political Thought. p. 74. Reed, however, is certainly correct in 
that for Du Bois legally-sanctioned segregation called for a different kind of black politics, one that began to 
resemble black nationalism in its appeal to black self-determination behind the “veil,” so to speak, and functionally 
independent of white-controlled social and political institutions. In 1935, Du Bois observes: “The colored people of 
America are coming to face the fact quite calmly that most white Americans do not like them, and are planning 
neither for their survival, nor for their definite future if it involves free, self-assertive modern manhood.” Quoted 
from Marable, W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat, p. 147.  
88 Reed, Adolph Jr. W.E.B. Du Bois and American Political Thought. p. 77. 
89 In his exchange with Booker T. Washington, Du Bois clarifies that Washington’s style of concessionist politics 
leads to the civic death of black people in America. While Du Bois had a sober understanding of the realities of 
segregation, he never advocated black folk’s foregoing the exercise of civic virtues or their claim to equal moral 
standing in the American civic community.  
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legislation, or enforcement.”90 The black church and school assumed an explicitly civic function, 
but one that carried on the normative legacy of Reconstruction through grassroots initiatives, as 
well as social practices and the daily interactions of black citizens. Du Bois thus links the 
historical sociology of the black church and school to the Freedmen’s Bureau, which he also 
identifies as a ‘government of men.’ With the dismantling of the Freedmen’s Bureau and the 
termination of Radical Reconstruction policies enabling states to reintroduce de jure white 
supremacist policies such as the Black Codes – culminating with the Plessy decision by the 
Supreme Court – black social institutions filled a void. They intervened in the reestablishment of 
a racial caste system. Moreover, Du Bois believes they emerged from the bottom-up. “The upper 
class Negro […] has never planned or thought of a Negro state or a Negro church or a Negro 
school. This solution has always been a thought up-surging from the mass, because of pressure 
which they could not withstand and which compelled a racial institution or chaos.”91 In order to 
avoid chaos, these institutions assumed a civic function with a far-reaching ambition, scope, and 
administrative prowess. 
 
a) The Black Church 
According to Du Bois, freedom for African Americans often bore a religious 
connotation. 92  The black interpretation of political values was suffused with religious 
metaphor.93 Emancipation was “the literal Coming of the Lord” for freedmen and black refugees 
of the Civil War.94 But “the white Christian church [from Reconstruction to Jim Crow] accepted 
the program of caste for Negroes,” writes Du Bois. The breaking away of the black church from 
                                                 
90 Allen, Talking to Strangers, p. 170. 
91 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 9. 305. Quoted from Reed.   
92 Du Bois, “Religion in the South,” p. 69. 
93 Glaude, Eddie S., Jr. Exodus! Religion, Race, and Nation in Early Nineteenth-Century Black America.  Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000. chp. 5 
94 Du Bois, Souls, p. 164. 
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denominations controlled by whites signified the rejection of the Christian doctrine of 
submission and humility in light of racist oppression. Because “the Negroes had no Zion,”95 a 
new religious ideal emerged: “Some day the Awakening will come, when the pent-up vigor of 
ten million souls shall sweep irresistibly toward the Goal, out of the Valley of the Shadow of 
Death, where all that makes life worth living – Liberty, Justice, and Right – is marked ‘For 
White People Only.’”96 In divining a “new Zion,” the black church would forge to make a new 
world here on earth – in the United States, of all places – where “liberty, justice, and right” 
would enfold the actual experiences of black Americans. 
The “Awakening” spelled the expansion of the democratic public sphere into the black 
church. Eddie Glaude observes that the church “represents the first national forum for civic 
activity among African Americans…[It] provided, along with the black newspaper, a national 
public forum for civil debate about the well-being of the community.” 97  Evelyn Brooks 
Higginbotham confirms that “the church itself became the domain for the expression, 
celebration, and pursuit of black collective will and identity. At issue here is the public 
dimension of the black church, not the religious dimension of the public realm.”98 The walls of 
segregated black institutions provided an opportunity to exercise democratic agency without the 
risk of public humiliation, violence, or death. For, as Du Bois puts it, “a proscribed people must 
have people must have a social center.”99 
Du Bois claims that the black church was “a social institution first, and religious 
                                                 
95 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 777. 
96 Du Bois, Souls, p. 168. 
97 Glaude, Exodus!, p. 17-18. 
98 Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks. Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 
1880–1920. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. p. 10. 
99 Du Bois, Souls, p. 158. 
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afterwards.”100 There “the race problem in all its phases is continually being discussed, and 
indeed, from this forum many a youth goes forward inspired to work.”101 He even adds that 
“purely spiritual aims […] suffer somewhat” because the church “is more than a church, it is a 
government of men.”102 In my discussion of Honneth, I have argued that the notion of civic 
belonging carries greater normative force than that of the democratic public sphere, although 
conceptions of civic community include free and open democratic deliberation. A civic 
normative orientation redirects social and political power by assailing the “dead weight of social 
degradation;”103 it does not merely establish legitimate norms, but undertook the task of “social 
regeneration” without the support of the federal government. It “reproduced in microcosm, all 
that great world from which the Negro is cut off by color-prejudice and social condition.”104  In 
executing its civic function, the church did not simply reimagine what constitutes public goods 
and the basic structure, as well as racializing conceptions of moral personhood in a racial 
plurality. It effectively actualized the moral status of black persons by challenging the 
reemergence of a de jure racial caste system through the administration of public goods and the 
provision of basic social welfare services that alleviated pressing social need and distress. There 
wasn’t just talking – there was doing.  
In the context of Jim Crow segregation, the moral ideal of citizenship thus demanded the 
assistance of the worst off in the community. Reallocating resources volunteered by black 
people, mostly poor, these institutions promoted a minimum basis for the common good, 
administrating basic social welfare provisions that included but were not limited to: education, 
                                                 
100 Du Bois, W.E.B. The Philadelphia Negro in Du Bois on Religion. (Ed.) Phil Zuckerman. New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000. p. 35. 
101 Du Bois, On Religion, p. 36. 
102 Du Bois, On Religion, p. 37. 
103 Du Bois, Souls, p. 9. 
104 Du Bois, Souls, p. 158. 
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healthcare, and rudimentary anti-poverty measures. For, besides advocating blacks’ political 
literacy and inculcating civic virtue, the church helped organize – and in some cases, directly 
provide – childcare, domestic services, the distribution of housing stock, food, and clothing. As I 
will discuss in the next subsection, the black church also worked to increase adult and children’s 
literacy, primarily through bible circles, makeshift schoolhouses, and financing schooling at all 
levels. Higginbotham observes that the black Baptist church conventions even ran committees 
that issued statistical reports on child welfare, nutrition, mortality, and life expectancy rates, and 
reported the prevalence of various diseases (including an open discussion of venereal disease), as 
well as pioneering methods for teaching and rearing children.105  
The administration of public goods and social welfare policies was made possible by 
volunteer labor and donations. Du Bois illustrate black sacrifice to increase the welfare of more 
vulnerable members of the community, although many hardly earned enough for their own 
subsistence. The vast informal social welfare policy to aid the poor and working class who were 
neglected by state and federal governments functioned as an epistemic conduit to how “the other 
half” was living and strengthened the cohesion of citizens. 106  The Du Bois scholar Lawrie 
Balfour observes that civic power assumed a distinctly gendered form in black social institutions. 
Du Bois “both advocates the inclusion of African American women as full citizens and 
acknowledges their historical importance as political actors, even in the absence of recognition 
by the polity.”107 She continues, Du Bois “gestures toward what Hortense Spillers calls ‘the 
insurgent ground’ of an alternative female subjectivity, and with it, alternative possible 
                                                 
105 See Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks. Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black Baptist Church 
1880-1920. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. p. 178-80. 
106 Du Bois, On Religion, p. 41.  
107 Balfour, Democracy’s Reconstruction, p. 100.  
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conceptions of democratic citizenship.”108 
Black women (and women whose grandmothers were black) are today furnishing our 
teachers; they are the main pillars of those social settlements which we call churches; and 
they have with small doubt raised three-fourths of our church property. If we have today, 
as seems likely, over a billion dollars of accumulated goods, who shall say how much of 
it has been wrung from the hearts of servant girls and washerwomen and women toilers 
in the fields.109 
 
This volunteer labor force accomplishing the civic function of the black church was thus 
dominated by black women. It was “largely through their efforts” that the dignity of black 
citizenship was actualized under extreme duress: “Largely through the efforts of women, the 
black church built schools, provided clothes and food to poor people, established old folks’ 
homes and orphanages, and made available a host of needed social welfare services.”110 Du Bois 
comments, “one can see in the Negro church today, reproduced in microcosm, all that great 
world from which the Negro is cut off by color-prejudice and social condition.”111 One can 
specify that women “reproduced in microcosm” a “great world.” What was reimagined as public 
goods alleviated the burden typically shouldered by women. Unfortunately, seldom did their 
sacrifices lead into “entrance into American national life” for black citizens or for their 
substantive interpretation of public values that, for example, encompassed childcare as a public 
good.112  
Du Bois held a nuanced position on the fact that entrance into national life was not won 
inasmuch as he had a long view of what the realization of civic equality entailed. He maintained 
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that black social institutions must confront the color-line and advocated basic civil and political 
rights. Yet, he also assented that from behind the color-line black civic power could be, at times, 
more effectively fortified than through integration into a white world unwilling to recognize 
African Americans as moral equals in the adjudication of the terms of social cooperation – even 
when the state legally compelled integration. He was accused by NAACP leaders to endorse 
black nationalism and accept segregation. This is not quite fair to his view. Preserving the 
integrity of black citizenship was his priority and, in light of the problem of the racial caste 
system, achieving it would pose difficulties in light of hostile, ignorant, and resentful whites. 
Effective integration – one that recognized and actualized black standing as moral equals in the 
American civic community – requires the concomitant “revolutionary” restructuring of the white 
racial polity.113 Until then, Du Bois observes, “cooperation with the white South means in many 
cases the surrender of the very foundations of self-respect.”114 And so, on his view, Jim Crow 
segregation also afforded “a special chance for a new trial of democratic development without 
force among some of the worst victims of force.”115 To be sure, Du Bois never gave up the hope 
that the color line would eventually disappear in the United States.116 However, on account of its 
continued existence, both formally and informally, he expressed concern that the dismantling of 
black institutions with an explicit civic function and administrative prowess sensitive to black 
needs would negatively impact the struggle to realize civic equality. Moreover, from behind the 
color-line, certain public goods were often also more likely to be in the offing for black citizens. 
For example, Du Bois criticized the dismantling of excellent black schools with the Brown vs. 
                                                 
113 My presentation of Du Bois’s view on black nationalism shares features of what Tommie Shelby describes as 
“pragmatic nationalism.” See chapter 6 of his We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black 
Solidarity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. 
114 Du Bois, W.E.B. “Negro Education,” in W.E.B. Du Bois: Writings. New York: The Library of America, 1986. p. 
875. 
115 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 714. 
116 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, 9. 309-10. Quoted from Reed.   
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Board of Education decision. He believed that black children– first and foremost – should be 
able to receive a quality education, but worried this would be unavailable in integrated schools, 
largely controlled by resentful whites and ignorant of the black historical experience. Even as Du 
Bois advocated the protection of basic rights, he articulated the institutional conditions that 
would effectively realize black self-respect as a precondition of political autonomy, secure basic 
goods, and confirm blacks’ sense of their own inviolable dignity as American citizens. In the 
context of a hostile and violent Jim Crow society, perhaps black institutions were better 
structured to achieve some of these goals. This presents a special challenge to theorizing how the 
wider polity and the federal government should responsibly discharge its ethical obligation to 
actualize the moral powers of all citizens and support the black community. For, Du Bois 
believed that ultimately black social institutions carried too great a burden to actualize civic 
equality and ultimately must be re-embedded into the social and political culture on fair terms all 
could reasonably accept. 
 
b) The Black School and University 
Although Du Bois does not claim that the black college is a ‘government of men,’ in an 
essay on education, he claims that a school is a “fraud,” if it does not have for “its object” the 
“needs of the pupils and the community.”117 In rejecting civic inconsequentiality and assailing 
the dead weight of social degradation, the struggle for democratic literacy and effective civic 
power was imbricated with the struggle for actual literacy. The history of the emergence of black 
schools and churches are thus intertwined. Schools were often housed inside churches, and 
                                                 
117 Du Bois, W.E.B. “Negro Education,” W.E.B. Du Bois: Writings. Nathan Huggins (Ed.) New York: The Library 
of America, 1986. p. 870.  
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organized and funded by churches. 118  “In the midst of reaction and disenfranchisement, of 
poverty and growing caste, [schools] became centers of a training of leadership and ideals for the 
whole Negro race, and the only fine and natural field of contact between white and black 
culture,” writes Du Bois. 119  He kept track of the teachers and preachers black schools and 
universities trained, who would become the ethical and social leaders of the community, 
contending that black schools were integral for providing a civic education and imparting civic 
virtues that are attentive to the black historical experience and instill determination to confront 
the obstacles imposed by the color-line. The quality and type of schooling also reflected 
assumptions about the status of black persons as free agents. That is, whether American society 
welcomed black professionals or pushed them into unskilled menial labor reflected assumptions 
about the value of black life. The organization of labor thus functioned as a cite for the 
reproduction of a racial caste system. Diminishing opportunities for meaningful economic self-
determination tracked the diminishing of civic standing inasmuch as black citizens were not 
considered autonomous agents but objects to be controlled and exploited for whites.  
Du Bois describes the connection between economic self-determination and civic 
standing in sketching the role of schools and universities:  
Many [whites] began to express a fear lest the Negro become ‘overeducated’ and too 
ambitious, and America began to face frankly the problem as to just what it wanted the 
Negro to be. Was he to be trained as a free citizen, economically and socially equal to 
other Americans, or was he to be trained as a servile caste, the recipient of charity and 
good will, but not a full-fledged member of American democracy?120  
 
He argues that schools should not only educate students well. He was emphatic that black 
students have the opportunity to pursue a liberal arts higher education that broadened the intellect 
                                                 
118 Du Bois, On Religion (from Philadelphia Negro), p. 36.  
119 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 665. 
120 Du Bois, W.E.B. “Will the Church Remove the Color Line?,” in Du Bois on Religion. (Ed) Phil Zuckerman. New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. pp. 173-80. p. 176. 
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and articulated an alternative vision of black life in non-menial and non-vocational professional 
settings, which he believed confirmed social domination and degrading stereotypes. As an 
institution with a civic function, he contends that notions of education reflect assumptions about 
where one belongs in civil society and in the wider polity. In order to be effective, black schools 
had to challenge these assumptions.  
Furthermore, in a speech delivered in 1933 at his alma mater, Fisk University, he adds 
that localized knowledge about one’s identity, the black historical experience, and the obstacles 
the color-line imposes should be transmitted through higher education. Allow me to quote at 
length:  
[T]he American Negro problem is and must be the center of the Negro American 
university. It has got to be. You are teaching Negroes. There is no use pretending that 
you are teaching Chinese or that you are teaching white Americans or that you are 
teaching citizens of the world. You are teaching American Negroes in 1933, and they are 
the subjects of a caste system in the Republic of the United States of America and their 
life problem is primarily this problem of caste. 
 
Upon these foundations, therefore, your university must start and build. Nor is the thing 
so entirely unusual or unheard of as it sounds. A university in Spain is not simply a 
university. It is a Spanish university. It is a university located in Spain. It uses the 
Spanish language. It starts with Spanish history and makes the conditions in Spain the 
starting point of its teaching. Its education is for Spaniards, -- not for them as they may be 
or ought to be, but as they are with their present problems and disadvantages and 
opportunities. 
 
In other words, the Spanish university is founded and grounded in Spain, just as surely as 
a French university is French. There are some people who have difficulty in 
apprehending this very clear truth. They assume, for instance, that the French university 
is in a singular sense universal, and is based on a comprehension and inclusion of all 
mankind and of their problems. But it is not so, and the assumption that it is arises simply 
because so much of French culture has been built into universal civilization. […] 
 
In the same way, a Negro university in the United States of America begins with Negroes. […] 
[A]bove all, it is founded or it should be founded on a knowledge of the history of their 
people in Africa and in the United States, and their present condition. Without white-
washing or translating wish into fact, it begins with that; and then it asks how shall these 
young men and women be trained to earn a living and live a life under the circumstances 
in which they find themselves or with such changing of those circumstances as time and 
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work and determination will permit.121   
 
In this passage, we see that for Du Bois, the black college, like the black church, must confront 
the “problem of caste.” Schools encouraged free ideals of self-realization, but also responded to 
the sobering circumstances that impacted both political and economic self-determination. In 
discharging its civic function, the school system should facilitate self-knowledge of vulnerable 
racial communities. This pedagogical goal, he believed, complements a liberal arts education. 
“What was wrong,” he writes, “was that I and people like me and thousands of others who might 
have my ability and inspiration, were refused permission to be part of this world.”122 To partake 
of the world, however, required both self-knowledge as a member of a race and the broader 
cultural and intellectual exchange afforded by a liberal arts education. 123 
Though the actualization of civic standing, the exercise of the moral rights of citizenship 
attached certain public goods to the achievement of civic equality. Part of the redefining of the 
meaning of democratic citizenship was the securing of public education as a public good – this 
good, unlike other informally administrated public goods in black institutions, such as subsidized 
daycare – won national acceptance. It has become inextricably bound up with the moral meaning 
of American citizenship. Access to free and open public schools is now taken to be as a given 
right.124 The call for free and open education also advanced the interests of whites – especially 
poor whites125 – but it emerged from the grassroots effort of the postbellum black community. 
                                                 
121 Du Bois, W.E.B. “The Negro College,” W.E.B. Du Bois: Writings. Nathan Huggins (Ed.) New York: The Library 
of America, 1986. P. 1011-12. My emphasis. 
122 Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 574. 
123 Du Bois, Souls, p. 89. 
124 The push for charter schools, however, is chipping against this gain. Noticeably, communities of color, children 
with disabilities, and the working poor suffer from the expansion of charter schools and the general privatization of 
schools. 
125 Marable, W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat, p. 152. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 638. 
   
White laborers did not demand education and saw no need of it, save in exceptional cases. They accepted without 
murmur their subordination to the slaveholders, and looked for escape from their condition only to the possibility of 
becoming slaveholders themselves. Education was regarded as a luxury connected with wealth. 
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When the governor of Louisiana revoked a general tax that fund public schools and libraries, in 
1864, he “received a petition, 30 feet in length, represent[ing] ten thousand Negroes, who signed 
mostly with marks.”126 Du Bois thus maintains that the public school system in the South was a 
black invention.  
[Freedmen] were consumed with the desire for schools. The uprising of the black man, 
and the pouring of himself into the organized effort for education, in those years between 
1861 and 1871, was one of the most marvelous occurrences of the modern world; almost 
without parallel in the history of civilization. The movement that was started was 
irresistible. It planted the free common school in a part of the nation, and in a part of the 
world, where it had never been known, and never been recognized before. Free, then, 
with a desire for land and a frenzy for schools, the Negro lurched into the new day.127  
 
The public school system, ultimately a nation-wide initiative, expanded the basic structure of 
American society. Pressed to recognize as political legitimacy of it as a public good, the 
American civic community expanded its social infrastructure. This gain attests to the dramatic 
revision of the moral entitlements of citizenship within the wider polity, won on the initiative of 
the black community exercising the moral rights of citizenship in a manner that attended to the 
community’s local needs and vulnerabilities, but generalized as a public good.  
Thus, as the black college nourished black political autonomy, Du Bois’s affirmation of 
black social institutions under Jim Crow does not forego – but presupposes – the ideal of a 
racially-inclusive democratic regime. Ultimately, for him, it animates the black contribution to 
the reimagining of civic identity and terms of social belonging. With the eventual inclusion in 
official institutions of political power, black interests should be weighed in the public 
adjudication of the common good within the American civic community. As I explain in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
It was only the other part of the laboring class, the black folk, who connected knowledge with power; who believed that 
education was the stepping-stone to wealth and respect, and that wealth, without education was crippled. Perhaps the 
very fact that so many of them had seen the wealthy slaveholders at close range, and knew the extent of ignorance and 
inefficiency among them, led to that extraordinary mass demand on the part of the black laboring class for education. 
And it was this demand that was the effective force for the establishment of public schools in the South on a permanent 
basis, for all people and all classes. (Black Reconstruction, p. 641, emphasis added).  
 
126 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 644. 
127 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 123. 
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previous chapter, the modern state is not a static object for Du Bois. The civic community that 
advances moral ideals of constitutional democracy was also in flux, as black citizens addressed 
the obstacles to their dignified flourishing.  
 
iv. Provisional or Definitive? The Ethical Significance of Institutional Sites of 
Difference for Theorizing Democracy 
In light of presentation of Du Bois’s critique of Jim Crow, one must ask whether his 
analysis of 20th c. black institutions is specific to Jim Crow conditions, or helps guide politics in 
other conditions and time periods. The application of Du Bois’s critique of Jim Crow involves at 
least three distinct issues. I identity and consider them here briefly, but they require further 
exploration that I save for another time, and are not comprehensive.  
 
(1) The reconstruction of the concept of modern freedom necessitates rethinking 
modernity from its ‘underside.’128 Ordinary, disenfranchised racial groups exercise 
the moral rights of citizenship that develop the ideals of modernity, where the 
constitution is a normative reference point for advancing political claims and 
standing. The development occurs through the dialectical mediation of institutional 
sites of difference, which protect citizens’ precarious equal moral standing as citizens, 
and the formal public spaces in the polity, which are ultimately responsible for 
publically recognizing and actualizing civic standing. Confronting the ethical labor of 
                                                 
128 See for examples in Latin American philosophy, Linda Alcoff & Eduardo Mendieta (Eds). Thinking from the 
Underside of History: Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. See also 
Quijano, Aníbal. “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Social Classification,” Coloniality at Large: Latin 
America and the Postcolonial Debate. Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui (Eds.). Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2008. Neil Roberts’s work also merits mention again. See his Freedom as 
Marronage. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
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institutional sites of difference issuing from the trans-Atlantic slave trade, 
colonialism, and neo-neoliberalism, and expropriation of indigenous land—just to 
name a few major historical episodes of global scope—must serve as the litmus test 
of the rationality of modern constitutional democracies, globally. Thus, while they 
should be provisional, these institutional sites of difference have also proven 
necessary, in light of federal neglect of, and violence against, marginalized racial 
communities.  
 
The application of Du Bois’s critique of Jim Crow pertains to my reconstruction of a 
philosophy of modern freedom from his oeuvre. On a Du Boisian methodology, in rethinking 
modern freedom, as part of a normative political philosophy, there is a dialectical mediation 
between institutional sites of difference and the basic structure at large. But note that agreeing 
with liberal, critical, and republican accounts of freedom, the democratic constitutional state is 
ultimately responsible for the recognition and actualization of the moral meaning of civic 
equality. From institutional sites of difference, however, the moral rights of citizenship not only 
impel the enactment of the moral agency by disenfranchised racial groups, but provide a clear 
conceptual framework for conceptualizing the nature of progress in constitutional republics 
worldwide, which are founded on racial violence and carry the historical memory of racial 
trauma. 129  Institutional sites of difference present a challenge for the more reasonable 
reorganization of the basic structure of modern democratic societies, however much the 
historical details and normatively salient institutional spaces and social groups vary.  
                                                 
129 Framing progress in this way discounts the political legitimacy of institutional sites of difference that reassert 
white nationalism and spread xenophobic and nativist sentiment. The exercise of the moral rights of citizenship are 
necessary increasingly inclusive of different racial and social groups. Its goal is the institutional embedding of 
disenfranchised groups’ equal moral standing in a civic community. 
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Demographic shifts may serve as an impetus for the structural transformation of 
democratic societies. As minority communities grow in the U.S., for example, formerly 
powerless voices carry more votes in national politics, which also issue a challenge to the 
reorganization of the polity.130 Yet, the achievement of citizens’ rights and capacities for self-
determination will not be carried by demographic shifts alone; the white racial polity can double-
down and refuse claims of enfranchisement, refusals which are increasingly reflected in recent 
racial gerrymandering and voter ID law controversies.131 Hence, what Hegel calls “the labor of 
the negative” is unavoidable (PhG 18). In other words, the development of modern constitutional 
societies requires a “self-conscious” acceptance of fair terms of social cooperation that address 
racial matters directly. Progressive change that is, then, “actual”: it is an achievement in evident 
in the basic structure, as evinced in a dialectical mediation of institutional challenges that force 
the hand of a white racial polity and reorganize the terms of the basic structure, making it fairer 
and racially-inclusive. Demographic changes alone will not reshape the terms of interracial 
social cooperation and may even lead to the re-entrenchment of a white racial polity as whites 
vie for power as a racial minority. 
 
(2) Political morality in a “post-racist” constitutional democracy can include institutional 
sites of difference, where associational social ties among formerly-oppressed racial 
groups are preserved, including but not limited to, the freedom to live among others 
who share one’s social identity and history of racial trauma.132 With the realization of 
                                                 
130 In the United States whites are predicated to become a racial minority by 2055. D’Vera Cohn and Andrea 
Caumont “10 Demographic Trends that are shaping the U.S. and the world,” Pew Research Center, 31 March 2016. 
131 Berman, Ari. “The Man Behind Trump’s Voter-Fraud Obsession,” New York Times Magazine 13 June 2017; 
Feingold, Russ, “America risks one-party rule if gerrymandering isn’t stopped,” The Guardian 16 June 2017. 
132 Shelby defends a similar position view. See his We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black 
Solidarity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005; Shelby, Tommie. Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and 
Reform. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.  
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civic equality, wherein the polity does not thwart racial inclusion, institutional sites of 
difference can still have value, even if not a civic one. Note that the preservation of 
institutional sites of difference does not carry to whites as whites.  
 
Without systemic injustice, segregated institutions may yet be helpful, if not necessary 
for explicitly civic purposes. Because we continue to live in a society rife with racial tensions 
and violence, I offer here a highly speculative observation about what ties of racial identity might 
mean in a post-racist society. Yet, invoking constitutional norms accepted today, one could 
justify institutional sites of difference for groups that were formerly the target of racial violence, 
marginalization, and oppression in the right to free association and cultural preservation. 133 
Commenting on the prospect of black self-segregation, Shelby assents that black neighborhoods 
should neither be “proscribed” nor “poor black inhabitants” be “dispersed.” 134  Moreover, 
speaking speculatively, such sites might continue to offer meaningful ways of forging social, 
cultural, and aesthetic affiliations, which might issue from the preservation of the historical 
memory of racial trauma and collective perseverance. 
Even when the institutional sites of difference is no longer necessary to militate for civic 
equality, in a fully free society, where all citizens can realize their social and political self-
determination via the institutions of the basic structure, the choice to live with those who share 
one’s social identity and stand in a similar relationship to the past, the socio-historically 
constructed hermeneutic horizon of difference can continue to provide rationally motivating 
                                                 
133 Please note that the overarching thrust of my thesis is that appreciating the ethical labor of historical sites of 
difference revises the public conception of constitutional rights.  
Benhabib, Seyla. The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002. Gutmann, Amy. Identity in Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
134 Shelby, Dark Ghettos, p. 275. 
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grounds for action, including ethical affiliation, cultural, and aesthetic production. Reference 
point for coalition building among more disadvantaged social groups, who are in their own 
struggle to achieve civic equality from an institutional site of difference.    
 
(3) The question of how best to conceptualize and achieve civic equality looms in anti-
racist and black politics now. Institutions in civil society no longer serve a civic 
function, albeit systematic political, social, and economic injustice persists in 
communities of color that are increasingly ghettoized and impoverished. In light of 
the re-entrenchment of the federal neglect of the black community, the recognition 
and actualization of the moral status of disenfranchised racial groups remains a 
political imperative, as it was during Reconstruction and Jim Crow. However, 
increasingly, established black political figures and a new generation of radical 
grassroots organizers question whether it is appropriate to reorient emancipatory 
politics towards the state, which is viewed as electoral politics. While Du Bois cannot 
provide an ethical theory of the state that answers contemporary questions of political 
organization, my reconstruction of his philosophy of modern freedom—via Hegel—
affirms the political legitimacy of state-oriented politics that centers on racial matters 
and the experience of racial embodiment—germs that are already contained in the 
Black Lives Matter Movement. With respect to normative validity, the recognition 
and actualization of the moral rights of citizenship remains an objective. The question 
that cannot be settled philosophical is which articulation of social and political praxis 
is apt to achieve the end of civic equality. 
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With the weakening of institutions that have carried a civic orientation in the black 
community, American society remains riddled with racial violence and tension. What future does 
the black church aim for—one in which its existence is no longer needed or desired? Even 
storied civil rights groups such as the NAACP are publically criticized by black intellectuals as 
ineffectual. Mellissa Harris-Perry has recently called it an “inconsequential,” “entrenched 
bureaucracy.”135 While the black church remains a powerful entity in the United States, it is no 
longer a central institution shaping the civic orientation of the black community. In 2010, Eddie 
Glaude writes in the Huffington Post, “The Black Church, as we’ve known it or imagined it, is 
dead.”136 Yet, in spite of his harrowing pronouncement, Glaude, along with William Barber, call 
upon the institution to reinvigorate its civic spirit in national political life, even though some 
believe it has lost considerable political credibility.137  
All is not lost. Although there is an ethical void that powerful black-led institutions have 
left behind, which inspired Du Bois to reimagine the ways black Americans participate in 
national political life, a new articulation of racial justice within cross-racial alliances have leapt 
into the national political stage. Black Lives Matter Movement has expanded the moral 
imagination for reimagining civic enfranchisement in U.S. national politics. The movement has 
forged cross-racial partnerships with the LGBTQ community, economic and climate justice 
actions, and women’s rights community organizations. Its organizing tactics illustrate not only 
the abiding ethical relevance of racial difference in the public adjudication of the common good 
with respect to a wide variety of causes. But it also stresses civic education and democratic 
literacy towards political participation, though not quite with the same institutional durability as 
                                                 
135 Harris-Perry, Mellissa. “How to Save the N.A.A.C.P. From Irrelevance,” The New York Times 30 May 2017. 
136 Glaude, Eddie Jr. “The Black Church is Dead,” Huffington Post, Original Publication 26th April 2010 (Updated 
23rd August 2012). 
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the black church and school in Jim Crow, or the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction. In a 
free society, all citizens must partake of social and political self-determination as moral equals in 
a civic community. In concert with their fellow citizens, they must establish fair terms of social 
cooperation on good faith and with mutual respect. The terms of engagement must be embedded 
in the organization of the basic structure. This remains an inescapable task of modern democratic 
societies that unfold within the institutional context of a constitutional democracy, where 
formerly disempowered political actors articulate their voice as moral equals.  
 
v. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I defend Du Bois’s assessment of the civic function of the black church 
and college during Jim Crow. I articulate what it means for an institution in civil society to 
assume a civic function to preserve the dignity of black citizenship in light of racist exclusion 
from ‘official’ institutions of political power and the denigration of the dignity of citizenship. In 
the absence of federal recognition, the exercise of the moral rights of citizenship was recognized 
and actualized in these institutions, which sustained a model of interracial democracy in a polity 
whose moral imagination was saturated by white supremacist ideology. This signifies the ethical 
achievements that are embedded in the black historical experience, but are often misunderstood 
and unappreciated.  
I have demonstrated the challenge such institutions pose to dominant liberal models of 
the relation between moral ideals, citizens, and their institutions. Honneth and Rawls’s political 
philosophies emphasize the institutional conditions for realizing individual autonomy in a 
modern constitutional democracy. They advance a conception of freedom that is tied to social 
institutions, which assume a distinctive normative significance. For Rawls, social institutions 
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comprise the basic structure of society and educate the moral subjectivity, whereas Honneth 
highlights rights and esteem-based social relations that neglect the category of civic belonging. 
Neither philosopher imagines how the moral rights of citizenship might shape activities in civil 
society.  
All is not lost, however. There is much that is useful in their philosophies. Rawls 
endorses the idea of the exercise of the moral rights of citizenship “direct[ing] the legitimate 
exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.” Honneth, on the other hand, advocates 
immanently-developing social norms as guiding emancipatory praxis. I show that in the absence 
of basic legal protections, good will and mutual respect in the wider polity, Du Bois argues that 
black citizens advanced normatively-robust norms that immanently developed through social 
practices in the segregated black community. They did this by asserting the dignity of their 
citizenship in an institutional context that shaped the exercise of subjective will in response to 
the lived experience of Jim Crow. Du Bois thus contends that the black church and school 
maintained a tenacious normative commitment to the moral ideal of citizenship, even as it was 
embedded in concrete social practices and particular marginalized communities.  
Because during the Jim Crow era the moral agency commanded by African American 
citizens was anchored within concrete social institutions, a significant number of black citizens 
had a direct, daily interaction within their walls and civic account of moral purpose was a 
causally-animating force.138 Racial identity thus situated citizens within a distinct constellation of 
power that called for a unique moral economy for confronting the color-line. Within the walls of 
the black church, Du Bois observes that the “soul” of the nation flickered against the ethical void 
of white supremacist violence, disenfranchisement, and exclusion that was often passively 
                                                 
138 Not in the amorphous substance of “public reason” as such. Rawls’s description of the latter often appears to 
analogize Simone Weil’s theology, where god’s withdrawal from the world attests to his omnipresence – public 
reason is everywhere, while it is nowhere in particular.  
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accepted – or actively defended – by whites.139  And so, at the height of Jim Crow, he still 
believed the nation had a soul. 
 
                                                 
139 Higginbotham, Righteous Discontent, p. 10. 
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Chapter IV.  
 
Du Bois and the Republican Critique of Freedom 
 
 
I believe in Liberty for all men: the space to stretch out their 
arms and their souls, the right to breathe and to vote, the freedom to 
choose their friends, enjoy the sunshine, and ride on the railroads, 
uncursed by color; thinking, dreaming, working as they will in a 
kingdom of beauty and love.1 




Republican conceptions of freedom have gained prominence in political philosophy and 
recent Afro-modern political thought. Strands of republican political thought are found in Greek 
and Roman antiquity, as well as in the modern political philosophies of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
and Immanuel Kant. Broadly construed, republicanism is a theory of political liberty that prizes 
the rule of law, citizens’ participation in democratic life, and highlights structural inequalities in 
civil society that characterizes systematic patterns of social domination. Given that the American 
state was founded on republican ideals, republican principles were often invoked by historical 
actors to justify their actions, from the revolutionary war to the drafting of the constitution. 
Unsurprisingly, republican commitments are also manifest in the political demands of the 
African-American community in the wake of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction.2 For 
example, in his well-known speech delivered in 1852, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?,” 
Frederick Douglass rebukes the hypocrisy of the nation’s proclamation of equal rights in the 
                                                      
1 Du Bois, W.E.B. “Credo” (from Darkwater), in Du Bois on Religion. (Ed.) Phil Zuckerman. New York: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2000. p. 44. 
2 Melvin Rogers also notes the transformation of republican ideals by black political figures, not merely their use. 
See his forthcoming Race and Republicanism: Reflections on Early African-American Political Thought. The 
historian Eric Foner also claims that post-bellum black citizenship drew on republican principles: “black politics was 
fully absorbed into the American republican heritage.” “Reconstruction Revisited,” Reviews in American History 
10.4 (1982): 82-100. p. 90. 
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constitution, when the document also protects black chattel slavery.3 Yet in granting that 
republicanism influences the political demands of the African-American community, the 
doctrine’s resourcefulness for articulating emancipatory ends is not settled.  
With the revival of republicanism in contemporary Afro-modern political thought, 
W.E.B. Du Bois’s political philosophy has become the object of republican critique. In his tour 
de force monograph In the Shadow of Du Bois, Robert Gooding-Williams argues that Du Bois 
endorses “a politics of expressive self-realization […] in the romantic tradition” and 
illegitimately appropriates Frederick Douglass’s political legacy.4 Gooding-Williams 
reconstructs a republican framework to establish the superiority of Frederick Douglass’s non-
expressivist republican-inspired politics over what he identifies as Du Bois’s romantic political 
expressivism. In interpreting passages of Douglass’s autobiography, My Bondage, My Freedom, 
he illuminates that as a political treatise Bondage resonates with two strands of republican 
thought, namely Arendt’s civic republicanism and the contemporary neo-republicanism of Philip 
Pettit. Recast in a republican framework, he illuminates the political culture of slave plantations 
that slaves kept intact in order to affirm their dignity as moral persons, which he takes Douglass 
to narrate.5 
Gooding-Williams argues that, unlike Douglass’s republicanism, Du Bois’s political 
expressivism is not oriented toward a political culture of freedom, but rather to a “politics of 
rule” and “rule-centered leadership” that subverts the emancipatory potential of antebellum and 
postbellum black politics.6 In particular, Du Bois provides few normative resources to articulate 
the emancipatory praxis of slaves. Instead, in Gooding-Williams’s estimation, Du Bois claims 
                                                      
3 Douglass, Frederick. “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?,” in My Bondage and My Freedom. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2014. pp. 368-73. 
4 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow, p. 14.  
5 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow, p. 12. 
6 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow, p. 9. 
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that black elites and charismatic leaders—the talented tenth—curate authentic expressions of a 
“spiritual” folk identity that antecedently unite black Americans, facilitating their assimilation to 
American folkways. “As Du Bois represents it, the politics of expressive self-realization 
proceeds through the subordination of the black masses to the directives and policy dictates of 
cultured, aristocratic leadership—the so-called talented tenth.”7 On Du Bois’s rule-centered 
politics, black leaders find strategies to fight against “backwardness;” they work to assimilate the 
“uncultured” and “premodern” black masses to accepted conventions of cultural comportment.8 
The moral ideal of citizenship is omitted from his characterization of Du Bois’s political 
philosophy, for “Du Bois’s argument is neither about a modern African American state nor about 
the leaders of such a state.”9 Consequently, he does not raise the struggle for freedom in 
connection to Du Bois’s political philosophy.  
In distinguishing Douglass from Du Bois, Gooding-Williams recounts Douglass’s 
formative experiences of resisting his captors on a Maryland slave plantation. A physical 
altercation with the slave-breaker Covey, and the leaderless, secretive plotting of a “band of 
brothers”—fellow slaves-in-arms whom Douglass led—are emancipatory political practices that 
contribute to the refounding of the republic under “reconstituted practices of citizenship.”10 
These actions, he argues, mitigated the arbitrary interference of slaveholders in the young 
Douglass’s life and in the lives of other slaves. Furthermore, the “refounding” of the polity 
negated the basic structure whose normative organization is intrinsically racist, according to 
Gooding-Williams. In precipitating a radical political break with the basic structure and 
American folkways, these actions promoted freedom as non-domination and established 
                                                      
7 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow, p. 10. 
8 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow, p. 4-5 & p. 131-2. 
9 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow, p. 14. 
10 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow, p. 192 & p. 185, 
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“discursive arenas” for divergent views about the political significance of black identity in 
antebellum and postbellum U.S.11  
In this chapter, I dispel Gooding-Williams’s mischaracterization of Du Bois’s political 
philosophy as romantic political expressivism. I reject his ascription to Du Bois of an 
expressivist politics of self-realization and of culturally-elitist leadership that facilitates the 
assimilation of “backward” black masses. In previous chapters, I have argued that Du Bois 
defends the moral ideal of citizenship as a normative basis for reinterpreting the basic structure 
in light of black historical actors’ reinterpretation of the moral meaning of free and equal 
citizenship, including its obligations and entitlements. The moral ideal of citizenship legitimates 
principles all citizens should reasonably accept in an imperfect constitutional democracy. Yet, 
for Du Bois, the principles’ articulation foregrounds the moral experiences and interpretations of 
black Americans, for whom the promise of Emancipation has yet to be fulfilled through the 
reconstitution of the institutions of the basic structure.  
While he rejects the view that the basic structure of American society is irredeemably 
racist, preparing the institutional conditions of black Emancipation (as comprehensive 
institutional enfranchisement) necessitates reinterpreting the purpose and function of major 
social and political institutions. The black historical experience carries the disregarded moral 
experiences and interpretations of the black community of the world around them, including the 
experiences of enslaved Africans, their hopes and expectations for a better world. Guiding the 
reconstitution of the basic structure should be public engagement with the first-person 
perspective of black historical actors in their struggle for freedom on the normative basis of free 
and equal citizenship. Thus, in underlining the black historical experience, Du Bois champions 
not passive assimilation but underwrites the moral agency of African-American historical actors, 
                                                      
11 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow, p. 203. 
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who, in his estimation, were the impetus for developing the ideals of American modernity.12  
In his treatment of the moral agency of African-American historical actors, Du Bois 
underscores 1) the ineradicable moral agency of the oppressed under the aegis of the moral ideal 
of citizenship, including the institutional context of slave plantations, and 2) major social and 
political institutions—namely, the federal government—contain a germ of black moral agency 
that reimagined its purpose and function in a manner that would fulfill the promise of 
Emancipation, even if the white racial polity refuses to acknowledge that germ, the historical 
legacy of the “striving” of black Americans.  
How does this two-pronged conception bear on the lives of enslaved Africans? The Du 
Boisian approach showcases the moral agency of slaves, as it was oriented toward the 
dismantling of the institution of slavery and envisioning a world without slaves—an outlook 
Douglass also held, but which Gooding-Williams’s deemphasizes in his conception of plantation 
politics. In order to demonstrate that Du Bois’s two-pronged normative commitment detailed 
above also captures slaves’ moral agency, I begin by assailing Gooding-Williams’s republican-
inspired account of plantation politics, which he reconstructs using the writings of Frederick 
Douglass. To be sure, this chapter does not offer a comprehensive treatment of Douglass’s 
thought. Rather, it critically engages Gooding-Williams’s depiction of Douglass’s republicanism, 
for that depiction impacts the cogency of his critique of Du Bois and ignores the potential 
contribution of Du Bois’s two-part thesis on the nature of moral agency under conditions of 
racist oppression, including that of slave plantations. To experience slavery as oppressive—
rather than as an institution sanctioned by the will of god—expresses moral agency. In the wider 
democratic polity, it shifts the federal government from a de jure white supremacist state to a 
                                                      
12 Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk, New York: Penguin Books, 1989. p. 34. 
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racially-inclusive constitutional democracy during the Civil War and Reconstruction.13 The state 
retained this newfound “revolutionary” insight that begins with slaves going on a massive 
general strike, until the rise of the southern Redemption movement, which chipped away at the 
political legitimacy of representing the moral experiences of former slaves and their descendants 
in national politics.14 The reconstruction of citizenship as racially pluralistic and the newfound 
rights and protections guaranteed by citizenship that freedmen had fought for were imperiled, but 
nonetheless set the bar for the highest ideal of the republic – of American modernity itself.15  
In the first section, in explaining civic republicanism and Pettit’s neo-republicanism, I 
demonstrate that both versions of republicanism support a philosophy of the modern state as the 
principal institution that is responsible for creating a political culture that promotes the rule of 
law and furnishes the indispensable conditions of citizens’ enfranchisement. Second, I show that 
Gooding-Williams’s republican-inspired account of plantation politics deemphasizes this critical 
feature of republican political thought: moral and political agency as enabled by, and oriented 
towards, the modern constitutional state. Third, I examine what the moral ideal of citizenship 
amounts to—if anything—on slave plantations. Because the federal government refused to 
extend the rights of citizenship to enslaved Africans, there is an institutional lacuna, which must 
recognize the exercise of political agency. As a moral ideal, however, the ideal of citizenship 
reflects the underlining normative structure of black religious life on slave plantations. The latter 
reveals the interpretations and experiences of plantations from the point of view of enslaved 
Africans, for whom even in the absence of federal protection, “a faith in the ultimate justice of 
things” animated the religious practices of song and sustained a moral vision of the republic that 
                                                      
13 Du Bois, Souls, chp. 2. 
14 Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk 
Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880. New York: Free Press, 1992. p. 59 & p. 
64. 
15 Du Bois, Souls, p. 11. 
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would one day include black people as citizens of the United States.16  
 
II. Two Strands of Republican Political Thought 
In this section, I distinguish two strands of republican political thought, civic 
republicanism and neo-republicanism that conceives of freedom as non-domination, as advanced 
by Philip Pettit and pioneered by Quentin Skinner.17 In order to present Gooding-Williams’s 
account of the political culture of slave plantations, particularly with respect to the relation 
between master and slave in the antebellum South, I lay out his republican commitments. I show 
that in spite of his desiderata for a “rule-free” and “leaderless” politics, the republican 
frameworks he appeals to – and creatively combines – both uphold the political ideal of 
citizenship and prescribe habits of citizenship for the promotion of the mutual independence in 
the institutional context of the modern state. In particular, the state protects and adjudicates 
citizens’ mutual independence through securing their rights in a ruler- and rule-centered 
fashion.18 Although he does not wholly exclude the state from his analysis, he posits a politics on 
slave plantations that largely bypasses it through his emphasis on one-on-one physical combat 
and secretive plotting. In the next section, I offer a model of plantation politics that countenances 
the moral ideal of citizenship as the implicit normative orientation of black religious life on slave 
plantations.  
The ideal of citizenship entails distinct models of democratic life in each version of 
republicanism. Civic republicanism invokes a neo-Aristotelian conception of democratic politics 
                                                      
16 Du Bois, Souls, p. 213.  
17 I follow Cécile Laborde’s presentation of these two forms of republicanism. See Laborde, Cécile. Critical 
Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pettit, 
Philip. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012. Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. Quentin. Liberty before Liberalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
18 Laborde, Critical Republicanism, p. 3. 
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that affirms democratic political participation as an essential feature of human flourishing. 
Melvin L. Rogers describes this feature: “On this account, one’s identity as a republican and a 
human being is bound up with realizing a distinctive essence that can only be realized through 
one’s participatory activities. [It endorses] the view that [our] essential nature is most fully 
realized in a democratic society where there is widespread and vigorous participation in political 
life.”19 The justifications for democratic life given by Jean-Jacque Rousseau, Hannah Arendt, 
and, to a lesser extent, Jürgen Habermas share the commitment to the notion that citizens’ moral 
and ethical personalities should be expressed through democratic politics and the communicative 
practices constitutive of it. Exercising democratic agency over a complete lifetime is a human 
good, especially in the face of anonymizing bureaucracies and totalitarian states that strip 
citizens of their capacity to assume moral authority publically. Without active democratic 
participation, critical features of the human personality atrophy and the necessary checks on state 
power dissolve. Citizens must acquire distinctive virtues through free and open participation in a 
democratic process in order to vindicate themselves as self-validating sources of political claims 
and define their ethical personalities; these virtues include habits of effective listening and 
speaking, public deliberation and oratory skills, and civic identification with the flourishing of 
the whole. A citizen’s free and open participation in the public sphere restores the conditions of 
human flourishing and civic virtues.20 Seyla Benhabib ascribes to civic republicanism a 
philosophical anthropology that “proceeds from a level of abstraction that treats all forms of 
cultural, social, and historical differentiation among human beings as irrelevant when measured 
                                                      
19 Rogers, Melvin L. “Republican Confusion and Liberal Clarification,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 34.7 (2008): 
799-824. p. 801. See also Pettit, Philip. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.  
20 Again, for further elaboration, see Melvin L. Rogers’s “Republican Confusion and Liberal Clarification,” 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 34.7 (2008): 799-824. 
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up against the ‘fundamentals’ of their condition.”21 Accordingly, the political ideal of citizenship 
included here is citizens’ self-constitution through free and open participation in the democratic 
process – those are the “fundamentals” of the human condition. 
Alternatively, the neo-republican model of freedom contends that all political values 
derive from the value of liberty, which extols the undominated choice of individuals, not a 
philosophical anthropology of the human species that outlines the conditions of our flourishing 
and the contours of ethical character. This alternative view incorporates features of civic 
republicanism, including its stress on democratic participation and civic identification with the 
common good. Yet its emphasis is not simply on public deliberation, but the institutionalization 
of the resultant norms.22 As I will elaborate presently, Pettit—as well as Arendt—defends the 
state as the essential public institution for securing the conditions of non-domination and 
citizens’ mutual independence.  
Pettit argues that liberalism is indifferent to power relations; a political community 
organized by the value of liberty must address social domination and unequal interpersonal 
power relations. Republicanism, he submits, is a formidable alternative to political liberalism for 
conceptualizing freedom inasmuch as it addresses social domination. Liberalism is unable to 
address unequal power relations because it conceptualizes freedom as non-interference. But, for 
Pettit, modeling freedom in terms of non-interference, rather than non-domination, creates 
problems. One can refrain from interfering with another, but nonetheless remain in a position 
that gives one arbitrary power over the lives of others. As long as one has the capacity to 
                                                      
21 Benhabib, Seyla. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
2000. p. 195.   
22 The difference between these two forms of republicanism blur. Habermas stresses the institutionalization of the 
results of public deliberation and, as I will show presently, even on Arendt’s account, the appropriate arrangement of 
public and social institutions is critical for the flourishing of democratic life. Additionally, Marilyn Freedmen argues 
that Pettit’s republicanism is a version of civic republicanism. See her “Pettit’s Civic Republicanism and Male 
Domination,” in Republicanism and Political Theory. (Eds.) Cécile Laborde and John Maynor. Malden: Blackwell, 
2008. pp. 246-68. 
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exercise arbitrary power, citizens are not free, even if the available channels for arbitrary 
interference are seldom used by those with the capacity to use them. One may have a benevolent 
master who refrains from interfering with a potential victim, or the potential victim may be 
shrewd enough to avoid the machinations of the master, but the slave remains a slave—at any 
moment subject to the whims of her master.23 It is thus “possible to have domination without 
interference.”24 Yet it is also possible to have “interference without domination.”25 One can be 
interfered with in a manner that advances one’s interests and amplifies one’s undominated 
choice. Such interference is non-arbitrary and does not constitute the undue mastery of another. 
Pettit explains that in this case “the person envisaged relates to me, not as a master, but more in 
the fashion of an agent who enjoys a power of attorney in my affairs.”26  
The extent to which the two strands of republicanism—civic republicanism and Pettit’s 
neo-republicanism—run together is most evident in their solution to the problem of diminishing 
liberty in modern constitutional democracies. Both Arendt’s and Pettit’s republicanism thus 
emphasize that public institutions and the modern state furnish the necessary conditions of 
freedom.  
Consider again their distinctive accounts of the political ideal of citizenship with respect 
to the proper arrangement of social and political institutions. Pettit links freedom to citizenship in 
a democratic constitutional republic: “the laws of a republic create the freedom enjoyed by 
citizens; they do not offend against that freedom.”27 Freedom is identified with the public 
adjudication of the general will or the common good, which results in juridical legislation that 
inscribes the outcomes of citizen’s democratic deliberation in the lawful administration of public 
                                                      
23 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 23. 
24 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 23. 
25 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 23. 
26 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 23. 
27 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 36. 
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institutions.28 “[R]epublicanism always had a juridical cast in which a central place was given to 
the notion of rights – customary, legal, and constitutional rights – as bulwarks against absolute 
power.”29 The juridical cast of freedom as non-domination positions the federal government as a 
unique institution that is a necessary bulwark for citizens to enjoy “undominated” and “non-
arbitrary” choice. The laws must disrupt interpersonal relations that harbor pernicious 
dependencies.  
Thomas Simpson elaborates:  
Other people might have the power to invade some particular person but the state averts 
this ‘horizontal’ domination, dominium, by protecting the one individual from the others. 
It does so by enforcing the criminal law, which is a system of external checks on private 
interference. The state also enacts policies in pursuit of social justice. But both these 
powers of the state restrict the individual’s choices; public interference has replaced 
private interference. As a group agent, the state also possesses a will.30 
 
Discharging a “will,” a state’s laws should “secure against the powerful” by express design, not 
by “precarious contingency” that happens to represent the common good issuing from 
democratic deliberation.31 Citizenship is thus a political ideal—save for lawful and public 
recognition of a constitutional government, little else can create the conditions of non-
domination. To put a fine point on it, “The non-mastering interferer envisaged by republicans 
[…] was the law and government that obtains in a well-ordered republic.”32 Pettit targets not 
laws and leaders as such in his critique of the diminishing liberty of constitutional democracies, 
                                                      
28 Pettit uses the term ‘interests’ to describe law as the non-mastering interference that conditions citizens’ liberty. 
He thus departs from a Kantian/Rousseauian rendering of the law as legislation that originates in principles 
necessarily binding on the autonomous general will of the people -- the ‘interest’ of the universal or public right -- 
and thus cannot soundly be conceptualized as ‘interference’, a lesser ‘evil’, or ‘coercion’ at all. Yet, Pettit maintains 
that law is “essentially coercive” and “interferes,” even as it “is creative of” liberty inasmuch as it “conforms to the 
opinions received among the citizenry.” (Republicanism, p. 36-7.) 
29 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 21; Pettit, Philip. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of 
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 58. 
30 Simpson, Thomas, “The Impossibility of Republican Freedom,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 45.1 (2017): 27-53. 
p. 30.  
31 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 24. 
32 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 32. 
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but despotic rulers and arbitrary laws that fail to recognize the moral standing of citizens and do 
not advance their interests. In such cases, the “will” of the state is alienated from citizens’ 
collective judgment.33 A ruler- and rule-centered politics is the indispensable condition of 
republican liberty. 
Similarly, Arendt defends a political ideal of citizenship that requires institutional 
arrangements protected by the modern constitutional state, which creates the necessary 
conditions for the exercise of citizens’ democratic agency. Roy Tsao draws out Arendt’s often-
overlooked commitment to the modern state, for all her criticisms of its bureaucratic and 
totalitarian deformations: 
[Arendt] attaches paramount importance to the modern state’s dual function of 
integrating its diverse populations into a single body politic and upholding the rule of law 
for all. To be sure, Arendt never sets out a detailed normative model of a successful state 
along these lines. Instead she addresses the matter obliquely […] Her long detours […] 
supplement her argument by illustrating a set of ‘perversions of human self-
consciousness’ that she associates with the failure of law-governed political 
community.34  
 
Inheriting the distinction between the polis (political realm) and the oikos (household) from 
Aristotle’s Politics, she holds that the political realm is where spontaneous, concerted action 
erupts, allowing for the public reconstitution of citizens’ character through honorable words and 
deeds, which—if worthy—ought to be preserved in the collective memory of the polity. Politics 
is the only activity that requires the “presence of others” for its possibility: “Action alone is the 
exclusive prerogative of man; neither a beast nor a god is capable of it, and only action is entirely 
dependent upon the constant presence of others.”35 In contrast, in the oikos, which in European 
modernity would include the family and civil society, speech has no purchase on stirring 
                                                      
33 He writes that laws must track the public’s “welfare and worldview.” Pettit, Republicanism, p. 56. 
34 Tsao, Roy T. “Arendt and the Modern State: Variations on Hegel in ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism,’” The Review 
of Politics 66.1 (2004): 105-36. pp. 106-7. 
35 Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998. p. 22-3. 
180 
behavior, so much so that necessity, force, and violence reign.36 In the oikos, human beings are 
enslaved to the simultaneously chaotic and monotonous order of the natural world. Ministering 
to the physical body, the oikos fails to differentiate human beings into ethical, idiosyncratic 
personalities, and, instead, homogenizes them into a featureless organism that could be more or 
less hungry, more or less clothed, physically powerful or vulnerable. With respect to our 
corporeal aspect, we are all the same.37  
In modern Europe, a politics emerges that administers basic needs and intervenes in the 
organization of labor and reproduction—formally the apolitical activities of the oikos to which 
normative standards were inapplicable. Now these are the central objects of public 
administration. This development signals for Arendt the triumph of the “social” over the 
“political,” the animal laborans over zoon politikon; and the triumph of the animal laborans is 
the harbinger of totalitarian states. “Freedom,” she writes, becomes “located in the realm of the 
social, and force or violence becomes the monopoly of government.”38 The task of our age, then, 
is to drive the social out of the political. Recuperation of the civic ideal of the state is  
necessary for the reemergence of democratic freedom. But the recovery of the ‘political’ tasks 
the modern state to dispel contamination by illegitimate social forces. In effect, democratic 
agents who effectively command public authority must protect the rule of law and the 
constitution, if the animal laborans is to be controlled. This overarching emancipatory end 
obtains, even in light of an agonal politics in the democratic public sphere, where citizens 
‘freely’ engage in spontaneous actions in concert, cultivating civic virtues. In other words, the 
36 Numerous feminist philosophers have pointed out that Arendt in effect justifies the unyielding power of the 
patriarch in the household. See Benhabib, Seyla. “Feminist Theory and Hannah Arendt’s Concept of Public Space.” 
History of the Human Sciences 6.2 (1993): 97-114. 
37 Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998. p. 5. 
38 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 31. 
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constitutional state must support such ‘free’ engagement.  
While engendering different expressions, the political ideal of citizenship motivates both 
civic republicanism and Pettit’s neo-republicanism. Modern constitutional states must protect the 
ideal institutional arrangements that make the exercise of citizens’ democratic agency possible, 
and conversely, an active citizenry must protect the rule of law and the constitution to ensure the 
institutional conditions of their liberty. These two republican approaches for conceptualizing 
liberty are, ultimately, both ruler- and rule-centered. They are “ruler” centered in the sense that 
elected civil servants must run the state and they are “rule” centered in the sense that the rule of 
law and the constitution delineate what counts as “undominated” choice and “free” concerted 
action. In light of the shared republican commitment to rule- and ruler-based politics in the 
constitutional state, I now turn to assess how Gooding-Williams downplays this commitment in 
his depiction of emancipatory practices in the black counter-public, even though Frederick 
Douglass himself does not follow this route inasmuch as he advocates political abolitionism and 
condones slave rebellions that aimed to take state power.   
 
III. Gooding-Williams on Douglass’s Republican-Inspired Plantation Politics 
In his book In the Shadow of Du Bois, Gooding-Williams theorizes plantation politics 
that secure slaves’ “independence,” while they are still enslaved on plantations. He favors a 
republican framework for conceptualizing slaves’ resistance to slaveholders and, conversely, for 
characterizing slaveholders’ domination over slaves. He combines the two strands of 
republicanism outlined above and attributes this hybrid republican view to Frederick Douglass. 
Moreover, this hybrid republicanism is the normative basis of his critique of Du Bois’s political 
philosophy. In contrast to Du Bois, Douglass does not assume a given “spiritual” identity that 
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antecedently unites black people and motivates them to undertake political action, nor does he 
prize cultural elites and charismatic leaders whose advocacy of ruler- and rule-following 
facilitates black assimilation to American folkways—to passively obey the rulers and rules of the 
basic structure of American constitutional democracy. 
Gooding-Williams argues that the domination of black life on plantation politics is 
manifest in the master’s capacity to exert arbitrary interference in the lives of slaves. Even in the 
absence of interference, the capacity to arbitrarily interfere constitutes domination. He describes 
two instances of emancipatory political practices on slave plantations that enforce a limit to the 
arbitrary interferences of slaveholders in the lives of their slaves and animate the “independent” 
political culture of slave plantations: 1) the young Douglass’s physical altercation with the slave-
breaker Covey that reduces physical abuse at Covey’s hands, and 2) Douglass’s secretive 
plotting with his fellow slaves and brothers-in-arms to escape slavery, which amounts to a 
“subversive political activism” without rules, leaders, or a romantic conception of a pre-given, 
“spiritual” black identity. Taken together, these two elements are a declaration of independence 
— “the beginning of a revolution […] that aims to reconstitute the American nation.”39 These 
acts aim to refound the existent institutions of the basic structure of American society. 
 
i. Douglass’s Battle with Covey: The Form and Fact of Freedom in light 
of Pettit’s Republicanism  
Recall that both civic republicanism and neo-republicanism dichotomize social location 
in terms of those who possess sovereign agency for determining the world they inhabit and those 
who are the vulnerable subjects of unmitigated force; the constitutional state mediates citizens’ 
social location by guarding against their vulnerability to unmitigated force. Leaving the state of 
                                                      
39 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 192. 
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nature or the oikos to join a political community is the necessary institutional condition for 
exercising democratic agency. A favored example for presenting the merits of the neo-republican 
view of freedom as non-domination is the relationship between a master and slave.  
Domination […] is exemplified by the relationship of master to slave or master to 
servant. Such a relationship means, at the limit, that the dominating party can interfere on 
an arbitrary basis with the choices of the dominated: can interfere, in particular, on the 
basis of an interest or an opinion that need not be shared by the person affected. The 
dominating party can practice interference, then, at will and with impunity: they do not 
have to seek anyone’s leave and they do not have to incur any scrutiny or penalty.40 
 
In this passage, the master is an agent of domination because of the structural position she enjoys 
that allows her to interfere with a subject at her pleasure—“at will and with impunity.” But the 
example presupposes the background institutional context of a shared political community; for, 
what Pettit has in mind here is not actual slavery, but “political slavery,” wherein citizens’ voices 
are excluded from the formalization of the general “will” of the state.41 The master and the 
slave/servant share a background institutional context as members of a democratic polity. The 
restructuring of their social relations by the state secures their mutual independence through the 
enforcement or passage of laws. Undominated choice is the goal that the political ideal of 
citizenship ought to promote in a modern constitutional democracy, according to Pettit. 
Correcting relations of domination and pernicious social dependencies requires the redistribution 
of state power. The upshot of this favored example is that in a free society, “state agencies [must 
not] act according to their own judgment irrespective of the interests and desires of citizens.”42 
That is, state power ought not be “discretionary.”43 Otherwise, there emerges a “political 
slavery,” where citizens are dependent on the whims of bureaucrats, state administrators, and 
                                                      
40 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 23. 
41 Rogers, “Race and Republicanism,” p. 32. 
42 Rogers, “Republican Confusion,” p. 809. 
43 Rogers, “Republican Confusion,” p. 810. 
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their fellow citizens who happen to shore up power.44 The state must mitigate interference on the 
basis of public rules that promote the interests and welfare of subjects or, construed in the 
Rousseauian/Kantian sense, represent moral ideals that issue from the public adjudication of the 
republic’s common good, a deliberative procedure grounded in citizens’ shared capacity for 
reasonable judgement.45 
Now consider Gooding-Williams’s description of domination on slave plantations: 
 
Douglass’s account of the nature of slavery […] conceptualizes the relationship of master 
to slave as, fundamentally, a form of domination. Following Philip Pettit’s recent 
reconstruction of the republican tradition of political thought, we may say that one agent 
dominates another if, and only if, he possesses the power (the capacity) to interfere with 
that other on an arbitrary basis. A person possesses that power when, through coercive or 
manipulative actions, he is able to worsen another person’s choice situation […] at will, 
or, more generally, without having taken account of the interests or opinion […] of that 
other person. For Pettit, one person can dominate another even when she is not actually 
interfering with him, because she still enjoys the power to interfere arbitrarily in his 
choices. […] The master’s impulse, his whim, reigns, because his treatment of his slaves 
suffers no limits.46 
 
As an enslaved person, the young Douglass was subject to the arbitrary interference of his 
master—namely, the slave-breaker Covey—who at his pleasure and whim attacked and debased 
him by way of “breaking” him in for the life of a docile slave. Douglass fights to resist 
brutalization at Covey’s hands. Gooding-Williams asserts that Douglass declares his 
independence against the slavocratic regime by physically fighting Covey.47 Because the 
declaration of “independence” is based on a physical altercation, it occurs through “nonverbal 
deeds.”48 Douglass “fight[s] to enforce a limit to domination” and his physical prowess is 
                                                      
44 Rogers, “Race and Republicanism,” p. 32. Note that this kind of deformation of political power is also what 
preoccupies Arendt. 
45 Rogers, “Race and Republicanism,” p. 32. 
46 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 170-71. 
47 The emphasis on physical combat to assert independence also has some worrisome implications for 
conceptualizing the resistance of enslaved women. Douglass recounts the harrowing story of a young enslaved 
woman who unable to resist her assailants, leaps from a bridge to her death. Surely, this suicide does not contribute 
to her –or anyone else’s – “freedom.” Except in the sense that she is “free” of the world itself.  
48 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 181. 
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sufficiently demonstrative to curtail further attacks.  
Gooding-Williams claims that the altercation thereby secures Douglass’s “manly 
independence:”49  
And it [combat] is tantamount to imposing a limit on the degree to which an otherwise 
dominated subject depends on the will of another – to the degree to which his ability to 
live as he wishes depends on another’s decisions. Combat brought Douglass (“manly”) 
independence, because it executed his determination no longer to depend for his well-
being on Covey’s “merciful” decision not to whip him. […] In keeping with the 
republican tradition of political theory, Douglass represents independence as freedom and 
freedom as nondomination. As he describes the fight with Covey, it secured him a limited 
freedom by establishing a limit to domination.50 
 
But how exactly does physical combat secure “manly independence” in the form of freedom as 
non-domination? Furthermore, is such a declaration of independence consistent with the 
republican tradition?  
Douglass himself recounts that the altercation left him enslaved in “form” only, not in 
“fact.”51 Here he recounts the encounter in Narrative: 
This battle with Mr. Covey was the turning-point in my career as a slave. It rekindled the 
few expiring embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own manhood. It 
recalled the departed self-confidence, and inspired me again with a determination to be 
free. The gratification afforded by the triumph was a full compensation for whatever else 
might follow, even death itself. He only can understand the deep satisfaction which I 
experienced, who has himself repelled by force the bloody arm of slavery. I felt as I never 
felt before. It was a glorious resurrection, from the tomb of slavery, to the heaven of 
freedom. My long-crushed spirit rose, cowardice departed, bold defiance took its place; 
and I now resolved that, however long I might remain a slave in form, the day had passed 
forever when I could be a slave in fact. I did not hesitate to let it be known of me, that the 
white man who expected to succeed in whipping, must also succeed in killing me.52 
 
And again, he recounts the encounter in My Bondage, My Freedom, which figures prominently 
in Gooding-Williams’s analysis: 
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52 Douglass, Frederick. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass: An American Slave. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
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Well, my dear reader, this battle with Mr. Covey,—undignified as it was, and as I fear my 
narration of it is—was the turning point in my ‘‘life as a slave.’’ It rekindled in my breast 
the smouldering embers of liberty; it brought up my Baltimore dreams, and revived a 
sense of my own manhood. I was a changed being after that fight. I was nothing before; I 
was a man now. It recalled to life my crushed self-respect and my self-confidence, and 
inspired me with a renewed determination to be a freeman. […] After resisting him, I felt 
as I had never felt before. It was a resurrection from the dark and pestiferous tomb of 
slavery, to the heaven of comparative freedom. I was no longer a servile coward, 
trembling under the frown of a brother worm of the dust, but, my long-cowed spirit was 
roused to an attitude of manly independence. I had reached the point, at which I was not 
afraid to die. This spirit made me a freeman in fact, while I remained a slave in form. 
When a slave cannot be flogged he is more than half free. He has a domain as broad as 
his own manly heart to defend, and he is really ‘‘a power on earth.’’ While slaves prefer 
their lives, with flogging, to instant death, they will always find Christians enough, like 
unto Covey, to accommodate that preference. From this time, until that of my escape 
from slavery, I was never fairly whipped.53 
 
Violent resistance stayed the hand of Douglass’s would-be aggressors and reinvigorated his 
“determination” to run away. In both passages, Douglass highlights the newfound “form” of his 
freedom had rekindled a “crushed” sense of self-confidence and self-respect. Note that in the 
passage from Bondage, from which Gooding-Williams mainly draws, Douglass stresses the 
psychological experience of his burgeoning personal power, his lost “sense of his manhood,” and 
his determination to escape bondage.    
Quoting extensively from Bondage, Gooding-Williams argues that Douglass’s physical 
prowess had secured the form of freedom because, as Douglass puts it, “a man, without force, is 
without the essential dignity of humanity. Human nature is so constituted that it cannot honor a 
helpless man, although it can pity him; and even this it cannot do long, if the signs of power do 
not arise.”54 The young Douglass, then, wins the “honor” of his owners that stays their hands 
from visiting more violence on his body and enforces a limit on arbitrary interference.  
While Gooding-Williams does not claim that the failure to risk death and resist one’s 
                                                      
53 Douglass, Frederick. My Bondage and My Freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014. p. 196-7. My 
emphasis. 
54 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 177. 
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subjugation stymies the honor of the enslaved, he accents that a diminishing sense of self-
confidence and self-respect occasions violence at the hands of an oppressor; risking death 
appears to be a precondition of securing “manly independence.”55 However, while republican 
conceptions of freedom can encompass the moral value of self-respect and self-confidence, they 
are not grounded in a general “sense” of “self-reliance” nor in the temerity of a people, but in 
publically-accepted rule of law, which the constitutional state demands that all citizens accept. 
Gooding-Williams argues that the altercation with Covey demonstrates that “[s]elf-reliance, then, 
is antithetical to dependence on laws, books, customs, and the like.”56 Following the republican 
conception of liberty, the “choice situation” of a slave is not to be enslaved—by law—to gain 
one’s freedom through the recognition of the rights of citizenship. Republican conceptions of 
liberty are best suited for capturing the fact of freedom or the lack thereof, rather than its form, 
which delineates the requisite moral psychology for resisting oppression under institutionalized 
conditions of extreme duress and brutalization. To be sure, Gooding-Williams is correct to 
                                                      
55 The emphasis on risking death in physical combat to assert “manly” independence also has some worrisome 
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poor girl now saw that there was no chance for her. It was a trying time. She knew if she went back, she must be a 
slave forever—she must be dragged down to the scenes of pollution which the slaveholders continually provide for 
most of the poor, sinking, wretched young women, whom they call their property. She formed her resolution; and 
just as those who were about to take her, were going to put hands upon her, to drag her back, she leaped over the 
balustrades of the bridge, and down she went to rise no more. She chose death, rather than to go back into the hands 
of those Christian slaveholders from whom she had escaped. (Bondage, p. 335-6) 
 
56 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 177. 
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emphasize Douglass’s struggle for freedom in terms of the form of freedom, but republicanism is 
best suited to capture the fact of freedom.  
Like other existentialist interpretations of Douglass’s encounter with Covey, notably 
those advanced by Lewis Gordon and George Yancy, Frank Kirkland points out that there is a 
“resounding […] silence” on political abolitionism and slave rebellions in theorizing Douglass’s 
republican politics.57 Even in the case of a victorious outcome through physical combat, as 
detailed in Douglass’s narration, Covey’s capacity for arbitrary interference is – by definition – 
intact insofar as Douglass remains a slave in “fact.” Douglass just happens to subdue Covey, but 
the structural inequality that defines their relationship as master and slave and conditions 
Douglass’s dependency on the whims of his owners remains an institutional fact. It is that 
systematic dependency that a republican conception of liberty helpfully illuminates as 
oppressive.58 
 Although Gooding-Williams invokes republicanism to justify redirecting practices of 
citizenship, he does not posit the task of securing citizenship as the moral end of enslaved 
Africans, one that Douglass holds dear as a political abolitionist and condoner of slave rebellions 
that aimed to destroy the institution of chattel slavery. Indeed, the republican framework that 
casts freedom as non-domination appeals to the lawful representation of persons as full citizens 
that would sanction either kind of action – abolition or rebellion – as emancipatory political 
practices that capture the “fact” of the domination of black Americans in the Southern 
slavocracy and the nation as a whole. The model of freedom as non-domination thus posits an 
essential link between the rule of law and the creation of the structural conditions of 
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undominated choice. The democratic institutionalization of laws, under the aegis of a fair-
minded people, ensures that arbitrary interference in citizens’ lives is eliminated. But for this 
republican view of liberty to hold water, the political ideal of citizenship must be preserved. 
Pettit thus rejects non-foundational views that advocate self-reliance, which Gooding-Williams 
prizes. To be sure, Douglass having regained a sense of self-confidence and self-respect spells a 
decisive break in his life as a slave. The fortification of his sense of personal power—that 
crucially wins him the “form,” if not the “fact” of freedom—instills in him the moral courage 
that spurs his escape. Yet, true to his republicanism, Gooding-Williams himself observes that 
Douglass subsequently dedicates his life to the struggle for the constitutional rights of black 
Americans, that is, to achieve the “fact” of freedom.59  
 
ii. Douglass’s Band of Brothers: Arendt’s Action-Oriented 
Republicanism in Antebellum & Postbellum Black Politics 
In the next section, I address the issue of how—and whether—the moral ideal of 
citizenship can inspire plantation politics, in addition to legitimating political abolitionism and 
slave rebellions. Before tackling the issue, in this subsection, I assess the dimension of Gooding-
Williams’s account of plantation politics that is inspired by Arendt’s political philosophy. 
Drawing from Douglass’s narrative of his formative experiences as a young enslaved man, he 
argues that a “band of brothers” won “independence” for Douglass and his friends on slave 
plantations through spontaneous, secretive, rule- and ruler-free plotting. The “politics” of the 
band of brothers “points not only to his [Douglass’s] action-in-concert and affiliation-based 
conception of plantation politics, but, likewise, to his rejection of the view, later embraced by Du 
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Bois, that politics is exclusively a practice of rule.”60 His depiction of Douglass’s 
republicanism—indebted to his reconstruction of Arendt’s vision of politics—advances a 
secretive, rule- and ruler-free politics, while rejecting Du Bois’s rule- and ruler-based politics. 
Yet, I argue that a critical dimension of Arendt’s philosophy of freedom is missing: political 
action should be normatively oriented towards the rule of law and public governance, which 
provide the institutional conditions of democratic agency. Indeed, these normative commitments 
are par for the course of republican political thought generally—yet, they are precisely the 
features of Du Bois’s political thought that Gooding-Williams lambasts in the name of 
republicanism. The politics without rule that Gooding-Williams envisions is a “politics of a few 
[…] who pledge themselves to one another, not a politics geared to ruling the many.”61 The 
radical potential of republican political critique lies in theorizing the expansion of the democratic 
public sphere for the many—that is, for all whom are oppressed and subject to the arbitrary 
interference and unmitigated force by the reckless and powerful. Political abolitionism and slave 
rebellions tap into this radical potential of the justificatory force that fuels republican accounts of 
progressive change.  
With respect to the affiliative bond of a band of brothers as an emancipatory practice 
preserving political culture on slave plantations, Gooding-Williams defends concerted 
action flouting governance. Enslaved persons resisted subjugation by undertaking small-scale, 
covert, and leaderless actions, where shared black identity mediated bonds of trust and 
solidarity, but underdetermined collective political purpose. He details Douglass’s 
formative experiences joining a band of brothers: 
Thrown together on Mr. Freeland’s plantation, Douglass and his fellows find themselves 
working the same farmland. Soon, however, they begin to consult one another, and as 
60 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 186. 
61 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 187. 
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Douglass suggests, […] to debate and deliberate the merits of different courses of action. 
Douglass and his friends (they move together), cultivate ties of loyalty, and form 
themselves into a band of subversive activists […] consenting through their speech, 
action, and mutual commitments to resist slaveholder tyranny.  Together they constitute a 
band of ‘brothers,’ not because they have affiliative relationships to the same parent, but 
because they have affiliative relationships to one another – that is, because each has 
agreed to adopt as his own a mutually shared sense of political purpose. 
   
As “subversive activists,” they “resist slaveholder tyranny” through speech and action that 
defined their freely-forged, affiliative bonds. Together, they plotted in secret to run away, but 
their “sense of solidarity […] [was] predicated not on obedience to a ruler but mutual 
commitment and self-sacrifice.”62 In the absence of readymade familial or “spiritual” bonds, a 
sense of solidarity arises through the small group’s plotting. Douglass acts as the “leader-as-
initiative-taker” rather than “leader-as-ruler.”63 The “band of brothers” politics functions as 
forerunner of the ideal of the black counter-public that encompasses heterogeneous voices 
without devolving into a politics of rulers- and -rules. 
In developing the idea of a band of brothers as an emancipatory practice, Gooding-
Williams appeals to Arendt’s defense of the public sphere, where speech and deeds skirt law, 
while showcasing the “boundlessness” of action.64 “Free,” spontaneous action does not reveal 
law-like regularity in human behavior. Occasionally, Arendt appears to be suspicious of the 
constitution and positive systems of laws it supports, as institutional entities that limit the 
“boundlessness” of political freedom.65 In response to the totalitarian government of 20th-c. 
Europe, she countenances that technocratic rationality in the guise of law has penetrated the 
democratic public sphere. Her conception of political judgment and action rejects prescribed 
categories for judgement and action, a rejection which must be understood in light of her critique 
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of totalitarianism and the rise of the social sphere.66 Gooding-Williams observes: “With her 
reference to the frailty of human affairs, Arendt recurs here to her thesis that human action tends 
to transgress the limits and boundaries fixed by legal rules, institutional norms, and territorial 
demarcations – thus, to establish relationships that cut across those limits and boundaries – and 
that these rules, norms, and demarcations cannot offset action’s ‘inherent unpredictability.’”67 
Nevertheless, in advancing her critique of the expansion of the bureaucratic modern state, she 
calls for the reconstruction of the public sphere. There is a distinction, then, between the apparent 
“lawlessness” of free action with respect to “the frailty of human affairs” and the public rules and 
laws that preserve the institutional conditions of free action in the first place, in light of the threat 
of totalitarianism and technocratic rationality.68  
The distinction is not pronounced in Gooding-Williams’s critique of plantation politics, 
but it has resounding implications for his presentation of the latter. Secretive collusion that is 
neither embedding in, nor morally oriented towards, a constitutional republic may very well be 
“lawless” and “leaderless,” as well as expressing a sense of solidarity, mutual support, and 
collective purpose, but it is unclear in which respect it secures the independence of enslaved 
persons. If in order to avoid further attack and interference from their master, the young 
Douglass and his brothers-in-arms secretly plot to work the fields more efficiently and reach an 
agreement to demoralize other slaves in a display of allegiance to their owner—rather than to run 
                                                      
66 Strong, Tracy B. Politics without a Vision: Thinking without a Banister in the Twentieth Century. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013. p. 334. 
67 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 11. See also Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind. New York: 
Harcourt Books, 1981. p. 199: 
Political communities, in which men become citizens, are produced and preserved by laws, and these laws, made by 
men, can be very different and can shape various forms of government, all of which in one way or another constrain 
the free will of their citizens. Still, with the exception of tyranny, where one arbitrary will rules the lives of all, they 
nevertheless open up some space of freedom for action that actually sets the constituted body of citizens in motion. 
The principles inspiring the actions of the citizens vary in accordance with the different forms of government, but 
they are all, as Jefferson rightly called them, “energetic principles;” and political freedom “can consist only in the 
power of doing what we ought to will and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will.  
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away—the mere form of their actions conforms to the model Gooding-Williams describes, but it 
seems counterintuitive to accept that following this course of action is an emancipatory political 
practice.  
Gooding-Williams minimizes the moral and political ideal of equal citizenship as the 
normative basis of republican conceptions of liberty. As a result, the normative basis of his 
account of emancipatory practices of slave plantation is unclear. He also unfairly criticizes Du 
Bois’s notion of black leadership as “dominating” black masses because he minimizes not only 
in Douglass, but in Du Bois too, the ideal of citizenship. The talented tenth are responsible for 
combatting the so-called “Negro problem.” Gooding-Williams characterizes their efforts in terms 
of 1) combatting white racism and 2) the general unpreparedness of the black masses to master 
conventions for participating in the basic structure. In “uplifting” the black masses to cultural 
literacy, the talented tenth integrate them into basically just institutions. On his characterization 
of Du Bois’s view of black enfranchisement, he argues that Du Bois champions assimilation 
through self-assertion: he underscores white racism, but the existent basic structure—as well as 
American folkways—are sound and recommendable for black mastery. However, depicting Du 
Bois’s account of leadership as dominating the black masses would obtain if and only if Du Bois 
fails to posit a critical link between black leadership and the moral ideal of civic 
enfranchisement, construed as collective social and political self-determination, which is not the 
case.69  
That one accepts the moral and political ideal of citizenship does not mean that the 
existent normative design of the basic structure does not require revision. The talented tenth, 
writes Du Bois, “must be prepared to fight an army of devils” and sacrifice themselves in order 
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to achieve the civic enfranchisement of their people.70 Du Bois describes the talented tenth as 
“plead[ing] for black men’s rights.”71 The first generation of the talented tenth, which includes 
Douglass, Du Bois identifies as political abolitionists.72 With the passage of Reconstruction 
Amendments that emancipated black Americans, the talented tenth 
[t]hrough political organization, historical and polemic writing and moral regeneration, 
[…] strove to uplift their people. It is a fashion of today to sneer at them and to say that 
with freedom Negro leadership should have begun at the plow and not in the Senate—a 
foolish and mischievous lie; two hundred and fifty years more the half-free serf may toil 
at his plow, but unless he has political rights and righteously guarded civic status, he will 
still remain the poverty-stricken and ignorant plaything of rascals, that he now is.73 
 
With Emancipation, in order to substantiate freedmen’s newfound moral status as legal members 
of the American civic community, the talented teach must “righteously guard their civic status.” 
Instead, Gooding-Williams equates black leadership with the domination of freedmen, whereby 
they are mastered and subject to their elitist arbitrary interference. He omits that leadership 
oriented towards participation and inclusion in the modern state is foundational to republican 
conceptions of liberty, which, as I have demonstrated in the previous sections, are founded on the 
advocacy of the political ideal of citizenship, and, consequently, are predicated on ruler- and 
rule-based politics.74 Moreover, Douglass himself was a Reconstruction politician who qualifies 
as a leader among the so-called “Talented Tenth.” Gooding-Williams instead characters a 
politics of rule as curating cultural authenticity, rather than encouraging contestation of the 
organization of the basic structure on the basis of the moral—and political—ideal of citizenship. 
He thus identifies Du Bois’s account of political legitimacy with the curation of authentic 
                                                      
70 Du Bois, W.E.B. “Conservation of Races,” in W.E.B. Du Bois: Writings. New York: The Library of America, 
1986. pp. 815-26. p. 824. 
71 Du Bois, “Talented Tenth,” p. 844. 
72 Du Bois, “Talented Tenth,” p. 845. 
73 Du Bois, “Talented Tenth,” p. 846. 
74 Kirkland, Frank. “Robert Gooding-Williams’s In the Shadow of Du Bois: ‘Kirklandish’ Rejoinders,” Author 
Meets Critics Eastern Division APA Panel, 2011. Cited with author’s permission. 
 195 
expressions of black cultural identity, rather than with political enfranchisement.75  
 To be sure, Du Bois later revisits his idea of the talented tenth and casts doubt on his 
earlier formulation of the concept. In Dusk of Dawn, he speculates about the political promise of 
college educated African Americans, whose allegiance to the wider community appears 
undermined by material interests. Note that he revises his position not because he believes that 
middle-class black Americans dominate and interfere with the poorer black masses, but that they, 
as an increasingly affluent group, have grown indifferent to the plight of working class African 
Americans. This is a concern about leadership in the black community that is still manifest 
today.76 The political promise and pitfalls of black leadership leave unanswered the question of 
how to struggle for civic enfranchisement, given the re-entrenchment of the federal neglect of the 
black community. The latter issue requires redress through the basic structure and norms of 
public governance. 
Consider Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor’s recent discussion of black leadership and electoral 
politics. Taylor writes 
the pursuit of Black electoral power became one of the principal strategies that emerged 
from the Black Power era. Clearly it has been successful for some. But the continuing 
crises for Black people, from under-resourced schools to police murder, expose the 
extreme limitations of that strategy. The ascendance of Black electoral politics also 
dramatizes how class differences can lead to different political strategies in the fight for 
Black liberation.77  
 
As I hope I have shown in here and in earlier chapters, for Du Bois, the task of civic 
enfranchisement is not reducible to electoral politics; yet the radical potential of the republican 
critique of freedom lies precisely in delineating the challenge of including black interests in 
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public governance. On the heels of the Black Lives Matter Movement, racial gerrymandering 
and voter suppression are making gross inroads in contemporary American democracy. 
Representing an internally differentiated, class sensitive, and comprehensively inclusive 
conception of “black” interests in public governance remains necessary to achieve civic equality. 
Indeed, whether whites are inclined to represent black interests in national politics is unclear.78 
What is clear is the no one can “stand aside as critical and rather pessimistic spectators; when in 
fact the burden [of the Negro problem] belongs to the nation, and the hands of none of us are 
clean if we bend not our energies to righting these great wrongs.”79 
Perhaps one can interpret Gooding-Williams’s account more charitably. He stresses that 
Du Bois’s model of leadership assumes that there is something deficient about average black 
people, a deficiency that causes their denigration. Enfranchisement should not be contingent on 
the mastery of cultural conventions; from the normative standpoint of (republican) liberty such 
considerations are irrelevant for achieving equal moral standing. Indeed, Du Bois at times 
appears to argue as if enfranchisement is contingent on the mastery of American folkways, as 
when he suggests that poor hygiene and an ‘improper’ sexual morality undermines black 
women’s ‘respectability’ as members of the American civic community.80 Yet, Booker T. 
Washington’s politics of racial uplift consistently offers an interpretation of black ‘deficiency,’ 
which construes average black citizens as being unprepared to assume the rights of citizenship. 
In spite of the tenor of some of his comments about uplift, in Souls, Du Bois rejects a notion of 
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politics that positions black Americans as unprepared for the rights and privileges of American 
citizenship.81 Indeed, his polemic with Washington underscores that a political conception of 
citizenship should underpins black politics, rendering political enfranchisement not contingent 
on empirically-measureable technical prowess or cultural competency.82 
 
IV. An Alternative Account of Plantation Politics? 
I address the question of what—if anything—the ideal of citizenship amounts to for 
enslaved persons whom the constitution declares not to be full persons, denying them the 
protections of citizenship. What, then, would it mean for the political culture of a slave to be 
oriented toward the moral ideal of citizenship? Can such a conception of citizenship—republican 
or otherwise—add to an account of emancipatory practice on slave plantations? Recall that 
physical combat, such as Douglass’s struggle with Covey, preserves the self-respect of an 
enslaved person; and the political ideal of republican citizenship justifies political abolitionism 
and slave rebellion—these efforts aim to destroy the institution of slavery. In this section, I 
explore how slave resistance on slave plantations was oriented toward freedom, construed under 
the aegis of the moral ideal of citizenship. Following Eddie Glaude, Melvin Rogers, and Frank 
Kirkland, I affirm religious imaginary and religious practices as upholding the moral ideal of full 
citizenship, which posited the end of universal emancipation. There is a rich and extensive 
literature in Africana political philosophy and study of religion that assents to the centrality of 
religious life on slave plantations. In this section I make the minor addition of reframing the 
implicit normative structure of black religious life as invoking the moral ideal of racially-
inclusive American citizenship. Yet in the context of Gooding-Williams’s critique of Du Bois, 
                                                      
81 Du Bois, Souls, chp. 3. 
82 Du Bois, Souls, chp. 3.  
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this rather minor reframing has considerable implications for conceiving antebellum black 
politics and interpreting Du Bois’s explanation of the role of the talented tenth.  
Du Bois links emancipation is suffused with religious imagery and symbolism: 
Foolish talk, all of this, you say, of course; and that is because no American now believes 
in his religion. Its facts are mere symbolism; its revelation vague generalities; its ethics a 
matter of carefully balanced gain. But to most of the four million black folk emancipated 
by civil war, God was real. They knew him. They had met Him personally in many a wild 
orgy of religious frenzy, or in the black stillness of the night. His plan for them was clear; 
they were to suffer and degraded, and then afterwards by Divine edict, raised to manhood 
and power; and so on January 1, 1863, He made them free. 
 
It was all foolish, bizarre, and tawdry. Gangs of dirty Negroes howling and dancing; 
poverty-stricken ignorant laborers mistaking war, destruction and revolution for the 
mystery of the free human soul; and yet to these black folk it was the Apocalypse. The 
magnificent trumpet tones of Hebrew Scripture, transmuted and oddly changed, became a 
strange new gospel. All that was Beauty, all that was Love, all that was Truth, stood on 
the top of these mad mornings and sang with the starts. A great human sob shrieked in the 
wind, and tossed its tears upon the sea,—free, free, free.83 
 
Du Bois here affirms the first-person perspective of freedmen. Relaying the significance of 
emancipation and the radical break from slavocracy it precipitated, religious symbolism 
elucidates the significance of the moment in subjective experience.   
“In the context of slavery,” writes Eddie Glaude, the story of Exodus “empowered 
Christian slaves and free persons to look beyond their condition and envision a future in which 
they were truly free.”84 In the absence of any and all institutional embedding of black persons as 
moral equals in a civic community, the normative structure of black religious life articulated an 
ideal of freedom through the biblical story of Exodus, a transformative journey to a promised 
land, where an oppressed people are delivered to freedom. Glaude elaborates the significance of 
the story of Exodus in 19th c. black politics: 
Indeed, the story demonstrated God active in history and his willingness to intervene on 
                                                      
83 Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 124. 
84 Glaude, Eddie S., Jr. Exodus!: Religion, Race, and Nation in Early Nineteenth-Century Black America. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000. p. 4. 
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behalf of his chosen people. But my interest in the Exodus story is not so much to provide 
an account of conceptions of deliverance or liberation in religious terms—even though 
the story is obviously about an act of God. My intention is to explore the ways the story 
became a source for a particular use of national language among African Americans as 
well as a metaphorical framework for understanding the middle passage, enslavement, 
and quests for emancipation, for although Exodus was a sacred text, it was not 
understood only in religious terms. The history of the story and its broad application 
across a disparate field of political engagements suggest that it was also interpreted in 
this-worldly and historical terms as a model for resistance and, perhaps revolution.85 
 
While Glaude acknowledges the original religious intention of the story of Exodus, he recasts it 
as a metaphorical model for envisioning racially-inclusive, conception of political freedom, 
making “particular use of national language.” The story is not interpreted strictly in “religious 
terms.” Instead, the “story and its broad application” warrants the reconstruction of the moral 
ideals of American modernity and the political project of Emancipation from the perspective of 
the moral experiences and interpretations of slaves, enciphered in religious practices on slave 
plantations.86 
For Kirkland, drawing on religious sources to articulate the first person moral 
experiences of enslaved persons warrants reinterpreting Du Bois’s conception of the talented 
tenth in the antebellum period. According to Kirkland, the talented tenth were charged with 
rendering “freedom” the “salvation” of their people, thereby taking a nation beyond itself to a 
metaphorical, but “this-worldly,” promised land.  
[F]reedom was the object of discourse for the talented tenth of the enslavement period, 
and their call for the abolition of slavery became identified with the salvation mission of 
African-American religion. With this identification, the talented tenth of the enslavement 
period was able to shift for African-Americans the idea of salvation and the interest in 
compensation from an other-worldly to a this-worldly orientation.87 
 
A “this-worldly orientation” to salvation merits exploring the moral significance of artistic 
                                                      
85 Glaude, Exodus!, p. 3. 
86 Glaude, Exodus!, p. 4; Gooding-Williams, Robert. “Politics, Racial Solidarity, Exodus!,” The Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy 18.2 (2004): 118-28. p. 123. Kirkland, Frank M. “Modernity and Intellectual Life in Black,” 
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87 Kirkland, “Modernity and Intellectual Life in Black,” p. 152. Emphasis added. 
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production and social practices of enslaved persons whose moral agency is neither recognized 
nor avowed. Du Bois approaches the spirituals and folk songs as cultural vehicles carrying 
slaves’ collective moral experiences of suffering in light of the denial—and hope for the 
realization—of collective enfranchisement. A pre-cursor to the emergence of the black church, 
black religious life on slave plantations thus contains echoes of moral vision of a racially-
inclusive civic community, one that would galvanize the segregated black community during Jim 
Crow but was already manifest in the black historical experience in the antebellum period.  
Black spirituals evince the ineradicable moral agency of slaves under the aegis of the 
moral ideal of citizenship conceived as Exodus. Because emancipation became identified with 
deliverance, I suggest that implicitly, the state, as a political institution, was the object of “hopes 
and expectations.”88 By way of the folk song, Gooding-Williams argues that Du Bois “proclaims 
that the Negro folk song is the uniquely veridical representation of the Negro people’s soul-life,” 
as if it contains cultural information about what it means to be uniquely and accurately a member 
of the African American community.89 Yet, if one reframes the normative significance of these 
folk songs, one sees that it carries the disregarded moral experiences and interpretations of 
enslaved Africans of the world around them. They capture not veridical accuracy, but rather 
affirm the ethical validity of incorporating the black historical perspective in the public 
adjudication of juridical right and the common good—the litmus test of American modernity that 
burst onto the scene of postbellum American democracy. Affirming black Americans as sources 
of moral value and interpretation, foregrounds spirituals and folk songs not as a cultural 
reference point for who African Americans are or ought to be, but a normatively salient historical 
experience of trauma and achievement, whose incorporation into public political culture is 
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89 Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois, p. 150. 
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requisite for the development of American modernity.  
Why else would Du Bois concern himself with the “hearts” of black Americans, if not to 
promote their freedom? In the refashioning of a biblical Exodus, the ‘coming of the Lord’ is 
universal Emancipation. “When Emancipation finally came, it seemed to the freedman a literal 
Coming of the Lord…Joyed and bewildered with what came, he stood awaiting new wonders till 
the inevitable Age of Reaction swept over the nation and brought the crisis of today.”90 Recall 
the two-part model of black moral agency under conditions of oppression that Du Bois 
maintains. He highlights 1) the ineradicable moral agency of the oppressed under the aegis of the 
moral ideal of citizenship, and 2) major social and political institutions—namely, the federal 
government—contains a germ of black moral agency that reimagined its purpose and function in 
a manner that would fulfill the promise of Emancipation. Following Melvin Rogers, I propose 
that black spirituals evince both parts of Du Bois’s vision of moral agency, one that sustained a 
plantation politics.  
Rogers explains: “The Negro Spirituals or ‘sorrow songs’ as Du Bois calls them represent 
precisely this kind of cultivation – the way enslaved blacks penetrated their circumstances 
through the construction of symbols that held out hope for transformation in the world but which 
simultaneously presupposed their agency.”91 Rogers elaborates why we have warrant to interpret 
spirituals in this way: 
[T]he Negro Spirituals implied not only suffering, but a reconstitution of the suffering 
subject into a free agent. And so here the slaves were not passive receptacles of their 
‘Master’s Religion’ […]  Rather, they were active interpreters of scripture in an effort to 
forge meaning and resistance that was resilient in the face of white proscription: ‘By 
obeying the commands of God, even when they contradicted the commands of men, 
slaves developed and treasured a sense of moral superiority and actual moral authority 
over their masters.’  Moral superiority and authority is appropriate in this instance 
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precisely because the description of autonomy escaped the paradox of recognition – that 
is, reliance on those who undermine human worth – and so provided an opportunity, 
however fleeting, to refashion one’s self-understanding [as an autonomous moral 
agent.]92 
 
Gooding-Williams himself observes that “revolutionary politics [is] fueled by rights-conscious 
thinking that is averse to the condition of slavery,” but does not incorporate religious and its 
concomitant cultural productions in this light.93 I would add that for Du Bois – as well as for 
Douglass – it must be averse to the legal existence of the institution of slavery. Yet, a slave’s 
religious life bolsters the moral authority of slaves. It does not quite mitigate arbitrary 
interference in their lives nor is it comprised of the secretive plotting of the few. Yet, religious 
practices, folk songs, and spirituals reveal their moral interpretation and experiences, showcasing 
slaves’ moral agency and its efficacy in leading the reconstitution of the U.S. federal government 




Republican political thought asserts that the function of the state is—at the very least—to 
furnish the basic institutional conditions for the recognition and exercise of democratic agency. 
In this chapter, I have argued that Gooding-Williams fails to note that on both strands of 
republican thought with which he engages—Arendt’s civic republicanism and Pettit’s neo-
republicanism—the public recognition of civic standing is indispensable for the realization of 
political freedom, conditions and normatively orients collective political action. Short of 
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abolishing slavery or leading a revolutionary insurrection aimed to destroy the Southern 
slavocracy and permanently institutionalizing abolitionist laws, it is hard to pinpoint what 
“independence” amounts to in a foundationless, leaderless, and rule-less plantation politics. I 
have suggested that in the context of slave plantations the moral ideal of civic enfranchisement 
was imbued in the underlining normative structure of slaves’ religious practices and resultant 
cultural artifacts, such as folk songs and spirituals. These practices preserved slaves’ unavowed 
moral agency and moral authority under conditions of extreme duress; and it also imparted a 
vision of a racially-inclusive federal government that would erupt in a contentious national 
politics during Reconstruction.  
While accepting that habits of citizenship should restructure the white racial polity, Du 
Bois conceives of these habits as immanently emerging from the conditions of racist oppression, 
including slave plantations, issuing a challenge to the normative design of the basic structure. He 
thus may reject the view that existent major social and political institutions are irredeemably 
racist—true to Gooding-Williams’s charge—but he does so because he considers black moral 
agency to have been an effective causal impetus negating the white racial polity and guiding the 
transition into postbellum American democracy. From the standpoint of enslaved persons, 
biblical story of Exodus became a metaphorical promise and a rallying cry for the emergence of 
a truly modern American state without slavery, where black Americans enjoyed the full rights of 
citizenship as recognized members of the American civic community. The moral ideal of 
citizenship was in the offing in plantation politics insofar as it foreground the implicit normative 
structure of religious practices orientation to Emancipation as the ‘literal coming of the Lord.’ 
On Gooding-Williams’s view, pace Du Bois, black politics takes the form of charismatic 
leadership that curates authentic expressions of black identity without regard to political 
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enfranchisement. He opposes Du Bois’s ostensibly expressivist politics with Frederick 
Douglass’s republican-inspired declarations of manly independence. In place of what he 
describes as Du Bois’s politics of expressive self-realization, he posits a politics of spontaneous, 
concerted action without foundations, rulers or rules—a position inspired by a hybridized 
reading of Arendt’s and Pettit’s republicanism.95 Yet, he neglects to address that Pettit invokes 
the rule of law as the chief bulwark against social domination. Even Arendt’s action-oriented, 
leaderless republicanism is “rule-centered” inasmuch as it requires the institutional underpinning 
of a democratic public sphere; otherwise, the crucial distinction between social and political 
action is lost. Thus, the normative basis of Gooding-Williams’s appropriation of the republican 
framework for theorizing plantation politics omits the core tenets of republican political thought. 
I have advanced, instead, as a matter of “extra”-plantation politics, political abolitionism and 
slave revolts that aimed to overthrow the institution of slavery, and within plantations, I suggest 
that the moral ideal of civic enfranchisement suffused slaves’ religious practices.  
 However, Du Bois did not believe that the victory of abolitionism and the passage of the 
14th Amendment signaled the fulfillment of slaves’ “hopes and expectations.” He warns against 
the rise of a “second slavery” in the postbellum U.S—a slavery “under another name.”96 It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to assess whether republicanism provides sufficient normative 
resources to deliver the demand for freedom that Emancipation promised. I will conclude by 
noting that while Du Bois’s political philosophy shares features with republican political 
thought, particularly the emphasis on civic enfranchisement in the institutional context of the 
modern state, he is skeptical of Douglass’s pronouncement that the mere extension of rights is 
sufficient for achieving the full promise of Emancipation.  
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Gooding-Williams affirms Douglass’s pronouncement that by winning of the ballot, the 
free slave “is all right.”97 “For Douglass, ‘free the slaves and leave them alone’; they did not 
require any extraordinary educational effort for entrance into the modem world. ‘There is 
nothing the matter with the Negro whatever; he is all right. Learned or ignorant, he is all 
right.’”98 Douglass conceives the moral ideal of citizenship strictly in terms of political 
enfranchisement, that is, he envisions it through the lens of juridical right, leaving freedmen 
normatively unanchored in major social and political institutions. In previous chapters, I have 
argued that for Du Bois the ongoing restructuring of major social and political institutions on the 
moral basis of free and equal citizenship would alone would fulfill the promise of Emancipation 
and articulate the institutional basis of collective self-determination. The exercise of the moral 
rights of citizenship revised the scope and ends of the American civic community, challenging 
the organizations of major social and political institutions, as well as public conceptions of who 
is a citizen and what entitlements and protection citizenship should carry. The contestation of 
these issues unfolds with the historical struggle to recognize and actualize the dignity of black 
citizenship.  
Du Bois focuses on the background institutional conditions that make certain kinds of 
actions possible in the first place.  Concurring with at least Pettit’s republicanism, he believes the 
legislature is essential for preserving freedom. He therefore begins the story of black 
emancipatory politics with the legalized destruction of the institution of slavery and the 
concurrent rise of Reconstruction. Yet, unlike the republican model, he emphasizes that 
institutions beyond the state condition the exercise and formation of political autonomy. His 
conception of freedom is thus richer than either the ideals of the undominated choices of a 
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sovereign, atomized subject or the ideal of the rupture of spontaneous, concerted action.  
Without undermining the value of individual choice, I stress that republican liberty 
reduces the normative demand of realizing the promise of freedom to mitigating social 
domination via juridical rights, whereas on the Du Boisian model of freedom à la Hegel the 
“‘rights claims’ and ‘moral claims of duty’ are themselves expressions of, presuppose, already 
established social bonds.”99 Du Bois illuminates the intersection of racial identity and civic duty, 
which transcends positive legalistic interpretations of freedom in terms of basic rights and 
negative liberty. In highlighting the background institutional conditions of political autonomy, 
one discerns that whites’ arbitrary will is constrained not merely for the sake of increasing 
freedmen’s unhampered choices or for the sake of their engagement in polyvocal, spontaneous 
actions. Rather, the preservation of ethical, social, and political relations is paramount in the 
expansion of the legitimate scope and ends of the American civic community. The principal aim 
was not to be “free” from the will of others, but to sketch the ethical norms that should structure 
citizens’ positive relations to each other. Ultimately, for Du Bois, the “ideal of human 
brotherhood [is] gained through the unifying ideal of Race.”100 
We, then, return to the issue that we first encountered in chapter one: how positive social 
relations and identities intersect with and amplify the demand for emancipation. One cannot 
articulate from a wholly ‘exterior’ vantage point what un-dominated individual choice and non-
domination entails. In situating ourselves within concrete institutions, social identities, and roles 
we inherit, we possess the necessary vantage point for undertaking their development; 
additionally, we ascertain a vantage point from which we can judge when the basic structure of 
our society and our relationship with our fellow citizens extend or undermines the exercise of our 
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practical agency. For, as I have argued in the previous section, with the rise of Jim Crow, the 
black church and college provided an institutional setting for reflecting on the lived experiences 
of racial embodiment in a white supremacist society and fostered the establishment and 
preservation of social relations, which were grounded in a sense of civic duty and mutual 
beneficence attuned to the disenfranchisement of African Americans. Ultimately, these 
institutions aimed for a greater reconciliation of African Americans with white Americans, 
which would make possible civic harmony within the national political community. Neither 
strand of republican theory of liberty can successfully capture these aspirations.101 Most 
importantly, these institutions educated the state by setting the bar for what constitutes a 
reasonable political claim and fair terms of social cooperation. Until public political culture has 
incorporated the “message” – the “ideal” and “legacy of striving” – such institutional spaces 
remain necessary for achieving out the full promise of freedom.102  
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perhaps.) A critical social theory, of course, would try to aver the ethical norms that out to structure social relations 
and the institutions of the family and of civil society (the institutional administration of needs) in general. 





 I. Summary of Main Arguments  
 In my dissertation, I have reconstructed W.E.B. Du Bois’s philosophy of modern freedom 
from his critique of Reconstruction and Jim Crow. I have drawn from sources as wide-ranging and 
disparate as G.W.F. Hegel and Charles Mills in order to illustrate that Du Bois upholds a tenacious 
normative commitment to the moral ideal of a racially-inclusive civic community. The normative 
framework I present is both the most charitable and the most tenable way of interpreting Du Bois’s 
oeuvre. The following clusters of concepts are central to my presentation of his political 
philosophy: 1) the moral rights of citizenship are exercised in the context of the racist derogation 
of American citizens and a racialized hermeneutic horizon informs the formation of moral 
subjectivity; 2) the institutional structure of modernity, including the modern American state and 
the basic structure, conditioned and were subject to the moral agency of black citizens; and, 3) the 
relationship between history and philosophy shows that the concept of freedom becomes 
increasingly determinant through confronting contingencies that undermine public norms of self-
determination; these ultimately yield necessary revisions to public norms that articulate the 
concept of freedom. In fine, the historical exercise of the moral rights of citizenship revised the 
scope and ends of the American civic community, challenging the organizations of major social 
and political institutions, as well as public conceptions of who is a citizen and what moral 
entitlements citizenship ought to carry. The historical exercise of the moral rights of citizenship 
by freedmen and ordinary citizens in the black church and school contributed to the development 
of public norm—the ideals of American modernity.  
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One cannot think then of democracy in America or in the modern world without reference 
to the American Negro. The democracy established in America in the eighteenth century 
was not, and was not designed to be, a democracy of the masses of men and it was thus 
singularly easy for people to fail to see the incongruity of democracy and slavery. It was 
the Negro himself who forced the consideration of this incongruity, who made 
emancipation inevitable and made the modern world at least consider if not wholly accept 
the idea of a democracy including men of all races and colors.1 
 
Du Bois would like American and the world to understand and appreciate their efforts. 
 I will address each cluster of concepts by way of providing an overview of the central 
arguments of my dissertation.  
 
(1) The ethical salience of racial difference in the context of a democratic plurality.   
I argue that Du Bois’s racialism provides an account of racial identity that conceptually 
anchors the normative significance of racial difference in democratic politics. Operating within the 
constraints of political liberalism, the doctrine exhorts public confrontation of racial traumas and 
racialized patterns of meaning-making. I have focused my presentation on the socio-historical 
construction black racial identity in the U.S. by underlining the ethical significance of the historical 
memory of slavery and Jim Crow. I reject the view that emphasizing these historical memories 
generates a homogeneous, unified account of the political morality of black identity.2 By 
foregrounding these memories, the terms of democratic politics that could address racial matters 
remain open for debate. Because liberal models of plurality favor highly-volitional models of 
difference reflecting assent to either private reasons (Gilbert) or social reasons (Rawls), they are 
unable to explain the nature of social differentiation that results from racist and racializing 
historical events, which create the hermeneutic horizon that in turn impacts the formation of moral 
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subjectivity, and is not itself the result of subjective volition. Indeed, understanding how such a 
hermeneutic horizon impacts subjective experience and the enactment of moral agency will 
bolster, rather than foreclose, individual autonomy.3 If the ethical salience of the hermeneutic 
horizon is explored in a public setting, it can illustrate the racialized forms that the expression of 
moral agency has assumed in the U.S. in light of racist derogation. I assent that, for Du Bois, the 
Sorrow Songs constitute the unavowed “gift” of African Americans to American culture and 
politics inasmuch as they showcase black moral agency in light of racist derogation. 
Black Americans’ moral agency was preserved in cultural artifacts such as the Sorrow 
Song, according to Du Bois. Inasmuch as Du Bois aims to reconstitute the terms of social 
cooperation through sober and forthright confrontation with the past, I advanced the Sorrow Songs 
as the cultural vehicles of historical memory, articulating the “sorrow” of living under the 
longstanding duress of racist oppression and nonetheless exercising one’s moral agency. I have 
argued that as cultural artifacts they attest to both the ethical salience of black racial embodiment 
and a meaningful difference in social location. Namely, the Songs articulate citizens’ different 
relationship to the past: the institution of black chattel slavery.  
Moreover, I have argued that the ethical significance of racial identity does not entail assent 
to a comprehensive doctrine, notions of cultural legitimacy, or a theory of the good life. Rather, 
appreciating the ethical specificity of racial difference would enable mutual respect and esteem 
among citizens in a democratic plurality, which, in the U.S., often denies the existence of the racial 
trauma it has created and continues to create. Lawrie Balfour explains the significance, then, of a 
public confrontation with the sorrow of the Sorrow Songs: 
Nor must an emphasis on a history of suffering entail an unhealthy investment in that 
                                                      
3 Alcoff, Linda M. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006. p. 243. Jeffers, Chike. “The Cultural Theory of Race: Yet Another Look at Du Bois’s ‘The Conservation of 
Races,’” Ethics 123.3 (2013): 403-26. 
 211 
suffering or a stance of moral superiority. For the history recalled is not only a history of 
injury but also, crucially, a history of survival and achievement against long odds. 
Moreover, drawing attention to the suffering of African Americans can constitute a form 
of opposition in a society that has historically denied the reality of black pain.4 
 
Du Bois claims the black historical experience is a “message” to the world whose delivery 
has been thwarted. In foregrounding the ethical salience of racial difference, I affirm that if citizens 
publically address the following key questions it could help articulate the “message”: (1) Which 
models of the American civic community have actively thwarted black moral agency? (2) What 
features of racial embodiment do not attest to a ‘particular’ theory of the good or of racialized 
cultural difference, but contribute to the public adjudication of the common good? (3) How would 
public acknowledgement of the unavowed moral agency and sorrow of black Americans 
reformulate the terms of social, economic, and political institutions? 
Citizens’ public engagement with these questions will lead to the revision of existent 
conceptions of political legitimacy in weighing political claims; a democratic plurality will become 
more sensitive to the ethical significance of the socio-historical construction of racial difference. 
 
(2) The institutional structure of American modernity is the condition and object of the 
moral rights of citizenship. 
In the wake of the Civil War, Du Bois writes that there was a lack of “moral strength” in 
the South that could have created a sense of civic responsibility towards recently emancipated 
slaves. He does not make this observation to champion that freedmen should have been an object 
of charity. Rather, he links the moral and practical “force” of the federal government with 
freedmen’s “clear conception” of their own “political power”: 
There was no such disposition, and under the profit ideal of a capitalist organization, there 
could not have been. That would have required, after the losses of the war, an industrial 
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unselfishness of which capitalist organization does not for a moment admit. Force, 
therefore, and outside force, had to applied or otherwise slavery would have persisted in 
a but slightly modified form, and the persistence of slavery in the United States longer than 
it has already persisted would have been a calamity worse than any of the calamities, real 
or imagined, of Reconstruction.  
  
Consequently, with Northern white leadership, the Negro voters quite confounded the 
planter plan; they proved apt pupils in politics. They developed their own leadership. They 
gained clearer and clearer conceptions of how their political power could be used for their 
own good. They were unselfish, too, in wishing to include in their own good the white 
worker and even the ex-master. Of course, all that was done in Constitution-making and 
legislation at this time was not entirely the work of black men, and in the same way all that 
was done in maladministration and corruption was not entirely the fault of the black man. 
But if the black man is to be blamed for the ills of Reconstruction, he must also be credited 
for its good, and that good is indubitable. In less than ten years, the basic structure of 
capitalism in the South was changed by his vote. A new modern state was erected in the 
place of agrarian slavery. […] 
 
The Negro buttressed Southern civilization in precisely the places it was weakest, against 
popular ignorance, oligarchy in government, and land monopoly. […] If now he became 
a recognized part of the state, a larger and larger degree of social equality must be granted 
him[.]5  
 
The state is not a static institution that dispenses or stores goods like a granary. It responds to 
citizens’ practical agency and is subject to dramatic transformation; it is both guided by the 
constitution and is “constitution making” in response to the initiatives of citizens. When freedmen 
became “a recognized part of the state,” they “erected”—in concert with white allies—“a new 
modern state […] in the place of agrarian slavery.”  
I support Du Bois’s defense of a state-oriented black politics by appealing to G.W.F. 
Hegel’s justification of the state as the refuge of modern freedom. In line with the high modern 
German philosophical tradition, Du Bois conceptualizes modern freedom in terms of citizens’ 
collective self-determination according to principles all could accept. On the Hegelian model of 
freedom, which I advance to ground Du Bois’s critique, it is insufficient for citizens to endorse 
                                                      
5 Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played 
in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880. New York: Free Press, 1992. p. 621. Emphasis 
added. 
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just principles, have good intentions, or discourse endlessly about justice. The state must rationally 
effectuate inclusive principles that integrate disenfranchised citizens into a modern political 
community. Yet, I have argued that even a Hegelian framework is unable to accommodate the 
groundswell of freedmen and refugees in the aftermath of the Civil War, who, according to Du 
Bois, revolutionized the basic structure of American society and transformed the normative 
structure of the modern American state. Former slaves not only assumed political power, but 
radically altered the terms of civic enfranchisement and what was conceived as a legitimate 
entitlement of citizenship. In dismantling an agrarian slavocracy in order to render black 
citizenship substantive, it was necessary that a centralized federal state emerge, with expanded 
public works programs spearheaded by the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Bureau established a public 
school system in the South, a tax collection system, and a racially inclusive model for the 
administration of the common good in national politics. The efforts of the Bureau even included 
fostering “good will” between “ex-masters and freedmen.”6 “The path of wisdom and 
statesmanship,” writes Du Bois, the nation “might for a generation or more make the freedmen 
[its] wards—protecting them, encouraging them, educating their children, giving them land and a 
minimum of capital and thus inducting them into real economic and political freedom.”7 Induction 
into “real” economic and political freedom necessitated educative institutional embedding into the 
body politics to make black citizenship substantive.  
Modern political philosophers have not countenanced the dramatic transformation of 
modern state, conceived in terms of the democratic expansion of the ideals of modernity. Du Bois 
argues that “the Negro in the United States has emancipated democracy, reconstructed the 
threatened edifice of Freedom and been a sort of eternal test of the sincerity of our democratic 
                                                      
6 Du Bois, Souls, p. 31. 
7 Du Bois, The Gift of Black Folk, p. 199. 
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ideals.”8 The ideal, integrative function of the modern democratic state, as a philosophical 
framework, I believe, justifies Du Bois’s repeated call from Souls to Black Reconstruction that the 
U.S. government should have made the Freedmen’s Bureau a permanent institution and appreciate 
its function as a “government of men” that hastened a “social revolution.”9 It strove to carve “an 
assured and self-subsisting place in the body politic and economic [for] four million slaves.”10 
Induction into the body politic is necessary to actualize the moral meaning of free and equal 
citizenship. “Naive faith in bare law” is insufficient to recognize and actualize such a dramatic 
democratic “social revolution.”11 
I thus depart from the view espoused by the majority of Du Bois scholars – Robert 
Gooding-Williams, Anthony Appiah, Paul C. Taylor, and Tommie Shelby12 – who agree that, save 
for the demand for basic civil and political rights, Du Bois does not stress African-American 
participation, leadership in, and resultant transformation of, the modern American state.13 
Furthermore, in stressing Du Bois’s reliance on a normative theory of the modern state, I address 
a common mischaracterization of his political critique, one most pressingly advanced by Gooding-
Williams. Rather than ascribe to him an elitist politics of racial ‘uplift’ and assimilation to Anglo-
American folkways, I argue that his comments about ‘uplift’ defend the exercise of the moral rights 
of black citizens in guiding their own enfranchisement as moral equals in the American civic 
community, evinced in the ongoing realization of the moral value of citizenship from 
                                                      
8 Du Bois, The Gift of Black Folk. p. 257. 
9 Du Bois, Souls, p. 14. 
10 Du Bois, Souls, p. 25. 
11 Du Bois, The Gift of Black Folk, p. 186. 
12 Taylor, Paul C. “What’s the Use of Calling Du Bois a Pragmatist?” Metaphilosophy 32.1-2: 2004. Gooding-
Williams, Robert. In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011. Appiah, Anthony. Lines of Descent: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Emergence of Identity. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014. Shelby, Tommie. We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Black Solidarity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. 
13 None of these philosophers discuss the Freedmen’s Bureau, the black church, school, or the American state. 
 215 
Reconstruction onwards.  
Finally, my presentation of Du Bois’s political philosophy is consistent with Charles 
Mills’s assertion that Du Bois is a black radical liberal, but I further complicate Du Bois’s 
relationship to political liberalism.14 To be sure, Du Bois expects the normative resources of 
political liberalism to extend with greater consistency to marginalized racial groups in modern 
constitutional democracies. He undertakes normative theorizing from the first-person standpoint 
of ordinary actors partaking in major events in American history. Focusing on the issue of the 
recognition and actualization of moral personhood with respect to the state, I argue that during 
Reconstruction, on the initiative of self-empowered freedmen—who, à la Rawls, one should view 
as “self-validating sources of moral claims”—the American state inched closer to executing its 
ideal ethical function. Racialized subpersonhood is therefore not a fixed subordinate social location 
that tracks African and African-descendent persons or persons of color. It must be indexed to 
divergent constellations of social and political power. Social orders meet with varied success the 
challenges issued by the collective practical agency of racially-derogated groups.  
Even among communities of color, subpersonhood is an under-determined social status. 
While that status is secondary inasmuch as it does not track the privileges associated with 
whiteness, subpersonhood is differentiated among the communities of color. A Chicano migrant 
laborer in the Jim Crow era or a black refugee in the Civil War can both strive to achieve equal 
moral standing in the American civic community, but the social location of each carries a specific 
social intelligibility in a white racial polity. To be sure, qua subpersonhood, they each can 
contribute a unique moral perspective that could revise the public terms of social cooperation 
within the polity. In confronting the specific configuration of racist obstacles, an individual 
                                                      
14 Mills, Charles. “W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Liberal,” in A Political Companion to W. E. B. Du Bois. (Ed.) Nick 
Bromell. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, forthcoming. 
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occupying either social location may draw from their respective historical legacies of enacting the 
moral powers of citizenship in their communities, while nonetheless sharing an overlapping set of 
moral and political values that could become the normative basis of forging pragmatic alliances in 
the fight against the secondary social status that the white racial polity ascribes to them.  
Through the enactment of the moral powers of citizenship, black citizens challenged their 
status as racially derogated in the American civic community with varying success. My remarks 
are not intended to detract from Mills’s assertion that white supremacy is a political system that 
circumscribed the political legitimacy of public claims, bolstering whites and derogate non-whites. 
Yet, subpersonhood is not an inert social location—it delineates an internally-differentiated 
hermeneutic horizon to which the idea of freedom is pertinent and impelled the collective practical 
agency of marginalized racial groups. In this dissertation, following Du Bois, I have focused on 
the moral powers of black citizens to judge the given world, which has neglected black voices as 
sources of moral value and interpretation. 
With Mills, I assign to liberal constitutional democracies the responsibility of protecting 
all citizens’ moral personhood. But, I also show that for Du Bois the achievement of civic equality 
requires embedding in major social and political institutions. Accepting that the recognition and 
actualization of moral personhood should rely on the state, Du Bois shows that the sense of civic 
responsibility for recognizing black moral personhood shifted from the state to black-run social 
institutions in civil society. We are thus confronted with the struggle to recognize and actualize 
equal civic standing that occurs outside of formal institutions of political power, namely in the 
black church and school during the Jim Crow era. Du Bois’s unique contribution to thinking about 
freedom in America is that he tackles the expansion of the moral agency of black citizens with the 
denial of their membership in the American civic community. He thus theorizes the dialectical 
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relation between institutional sites of difference and the wider polity in modern constitutional 
democracies. That dialectical relation is constitutive of the broadening of the ideals of modernity, 
given that the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonial expropriation, and racist 
exclusion has touched the basic structure of nations worldwide. A normative commitment to the 
recognition of moral personhood is evident in Du Bois, but complementing Mills’s approach, I 
show that Du Bois tackles how black citizens struggled to actualize that status by asserting 
themselves as inviolable sources of moral value and interpretation behind the color-line, when 
public political culture was saturated with white supremacist ideology. 
 
(3) The Relationship between Historical Periods, such as Reconstruction and Jim Crow, 
and the Philosophical Reconstruction of the Concept of Freedom. 
 
In his recent book, Dark Ghettos, Tommie Shelby writes: “The ghetto should be abolished. 
Like American slavery and Jim Crow segregation, it should have never come into existence.”15 
With the failure of the state to execute its ethical responsibility to enfranchise its citizens 
politically, socially, and economically, it must be pressed to do so. Indeed, racism an all its 
concomitant practices “should have never come into existence.” Similar to each philosopher I have 
assessed in my presentation of his thought, from Hegel to Mills, Du Bois seeks to establish the 
institutional conditions that make social domination impossible. Yet, given that the ghetto does 
exists and it—as well as the history of slavery and Jim Crow—is enmeshed with the articulation 
of political claims, Du Bois confronts the question of how racist exclusion, present and historical, 
should impact the interpretation of respect for equal moral personhood and claims of 
                                                      
15 Shelby, Tommie. Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. p. 
275. 
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disenfranchisement. Shelby describes a “political ethics of the oppressed” to meet the challenge, 
detailing the actions of black historical actions as “moral responses to injustice.”16   
Similarly, Du Bois argues at the time of Jim Crow segregation:  
Our advance in the last quarter century has been in segregated, racially integrated 
institutions and efforts and not in effective entrance into American national life. In Negro 
churches, Negro schools, Negro colleges, Negro business and Negro art and literature our 
advance has been determined and inspiring; but in industry, general professional careers 
and national life, we have fought battle after battle and lost more than we have won. […] 
 
The next step, then, is certainly one on the part of the Negro and it involves group action. 
It involves the organization of intelligent and earnest people of Negro descent for their 
preservation and advancement in America, in the West Indies and in Africa; and no 
sentimental distaste for racial or national unity can be allowed to hold them back from a 
step which sheer necessity demands.17 
 
I submit that the moral responses to injustice have instilled new content to political claims about 
what constitutes dignified collective self-determination, given the “demands” of “sheer necessity.” 
The new content in the U.S. includes, I countenance, the ethical salience of racial difference in a 
racially-inclusive democratic plurality. Alternative interpretations of public reason often ignore 
major racializing and racist episodes in American history and argue that engagement with the 
ethical salience of racial difference is not necessary. Speculatively speaking, if the ghetto, 
segregation, and racist subjugation have never existed, perhaps such a colorblind politics would 
hold water. And yet, it does not. Colorblind politics often ignores racial injustice or is a coded 
reactionary politics advanced in the name of freedom and equality.  
One might object that I have not made a case for how history should contribute to theorizing 
normative claims. For, one can use a rudimentary liberal framework to address racial injustice, 
perhaps even center it in public discussion. Following Du Bois, I add that the way to guide public 
                                                      
16 Shelby, Dark Ghettos, p. 14. 
17 Du Bois, W.E.B. “On Being Ashamed of Oneself,” in W.E.B. Du Bois: Writings. New York: Viking Press, 1986. p. 
1024. Emphasis in the original.  
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discussion of racial matters is through engagement with historical memory, privileging the first-
person perspective of political actors from marginalized racial communities. Such a public 
procedure would impact conceptions of political legitimacy, especially with respect to the idea of 
redress justice, which is essential for realizing collective self-determination in the U.S., as well as 
any republic founded on racist institutions. Thus, consistent, substantive reference to the past 
reconstructs conceptions of democratic legitimacy by getting the details right of the first-person 
experience of disenfranchisement. “Perhaps most crucially, taking Du Bois’s work seriously 
requires a rigorous engagement with the past and an active refutation of declarations of a 
‘postracial’ age that belie yawning racial inequalities, the continuing devaluation of non-White 
lives, and the unredressed injuries—to American citizens, to the polity itself, and to women and 
men well beyond U.S. borders—of White supremacy.”18 The manner Du Bois helps center racial 
matters in democratic discussion is through accenting historical memory. He thus weakens the 
distinction between distributive justice and redress justice in articulating collective norms of self-
determination that all citizens could reasonably endorse.19 
Speaking with respect to the U.S., Du Bois believes that the black “gift” to the U.S. includes  
contributions to the way Americans conceive of the administration of justice: the institutional 
broadening of the state to encompass public works programs, the establishment of a centralized 
state, national banks, progressive tax schemes, and a public school system in the South.20 During 
Reconstruction, these additions to the public terms of substantive freedom issued from “sheer 
necessity”—or as he puts it, it was “what manifestly must be done” to avoid “re-enslavement.”21 
Conceived as part of a historical pattern of moral responses to racial injustice, as political claims, 
                                                      
18 Balfour, Lawrie. “Inheriting Du Bois,” Du Bois Review 8:2 (2011): 409–16. p. 409.  
19 Balfour, “Inheriting Du Bois,” p. 412. 
20 Du Bois, The Gift of Black Folk, p. 191-2.  
21 Du Bois, Souls, p. 23.  
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these additions instilled new features —“moral responses”—to the highest “ideal of democracy.” 
In other words, the abstract concept of freedom and mutual respect can be helpfully gauged by 
considering the recommendations of freedmen and those subject to Jim Crow segregation. Indeed, 
the insights they offered continue to furnish the rationally-motivating grounds for citizens’ 
collective self-determination in the American civic community.22  
I have also shown, with the rise of Jim Crow, social institutions from behind the color-line 
assumed the responsibility of an educative civic function in the segregated black community. But, 
what can Jim Crow, in particular, show us about the nature of freedom? Racial categories of 
enforcing juridical right express white supremacist ideology. The white racial polity has created 
the racist institutional conditions of racial segregation, yet those very institutional conditions have 
also mediated the exercise of the moral, cultural, and aesthetic agency of the oppressed. Moreover, 
the civic function of social institutions, such as the back church and school during Jim Crow, are 
necessary for democratic literacy and comprehensive civic enfranchisement. What is more, the 
systematic dismantling of the institutional conditions of racial segregation in some cases, under 
certain conditions, can be consistent with strengthening of identity-constitutive social bonds.23 
Onora O’Neill observes that public reason is always host to irrational forces that cannot withstand 
public scrutiny. Du Bois employs the universal moral value of citizenship to correct the moral 
biases in public reason.24 Pursuing corrections to public reason is an ineliminable feature charting 
                                                      
22 Contrast my presentation of the development of historical reason in American modernity with Elizabeth Anderson’s 
explanation of moral progress. She draws on John Dewey to advance a naturalized epistemology. On her view, 
democracy consists of “cooperative social experimentation.” If it is to succeed, it requires the expansion of practical 
intelligence through social experimentation that relies on the scientific method for problem solving and moral 
imagination. See her “The Epistemology of Democracy,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 3.1-2 (2006): 
8-22. “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices,” Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 89 (2015): 21-47. 
23 While social bonds always influence the construction of juridical right, that influence can be pernicious to juridical 
right and strengthen social bonds that are hostile to an expansive democratic community. Du Bois shows that the 
activities of the black church and school behind the color-line operated in an expansive fashion, even if it “closed 
rank.” 
24 O’Neill, Onora. “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. (Ed.) Samuel Freeman. 
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the growth of modern societies. Du Bois shows us, however, that the expansive growth of 
democracies could be imbricated with the fortification of the identities and outlooks of particular 
social groups whose contributions have positively shaped the basic structure of their societies, and 
may continue to do so.   
The models of freedom I have surveyed in this dissertation—liberal, republican, and 
critical—could be construed to display an endorsement of the abstract demand to engage the 
questions: who is a citizen and what protections should citizenship entail? (In some cases, such as 
Gilbert and Honneth, these questions gain little traction.) Providing detailed answers to these 
questions—in the revision of public norms of self-determination—requires understanding major 
historical episodes that proffered practically successful visions of civic enfranchisement. None of 
the substantive demands that issued from black communities during Reconstruction and Jim Crow 
can be read off from the formal demand to either respect moral persons or achieve civic equality, 
albeit these demands comprise the normative foundation of doing politics in modern constitutional 
democracies. Yet, these substantive demands have also become salient features of the democratic 
ideal of collective self-determination in the U.S., giving it concrete shape and moral direction. 
 
II. Two Closing Considerations 
 
a. The American Civic Community, Pan-Africanism and Cosmopolitanism? 
 
Du Bois experimented widely with political strategies to enfranchise African and African-
descendent peoples in the United States and around the world. The historian Manning Marble 
writes that Du Bois founded the Pan-African movement and presided over its congresses in the 
                                                      
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp. 347–67. See also Elizabeth Anderson on how social movements 
function to correct moral biases: “Social Movements, Experiments in Living, and Moral Progress: Case Studies from 
Britain’s Abolition of Slavery.” Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas, 2014.        
http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/handle/1808/14787.  
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early 20th c.25 In Dusk of Dawn, Du Bois gives a moving narrative of his first journey to the African 
continent and ultimately dies in exile in Ghana in 1963.26 The Du Bois scholars Kwame Anthony 
Appiah and Chike Jeffers take Du Bois in a rather different direction. They argue that his global 
orientation is sufficiently pronounced that his political thought is cosmopolitan—a moral view 
championed by Immanuel Kant that argues that human beings are citizens in the world and thereby 
moral equals.27  
Given my emphasis on the reconstitution of the American civic community in my 
presentation of Du Bois’s philosophy of modern freedom, one might inquire whether my approach 
is incompatible with his pan-Africanism and global initiatives. While Du Bois held a global 
concern for colored peoples and their struggles, a global orientation is compatible with an emphasis 
on the constitution—and reconstitution—of particular civic communities delineated by national 
constitutions. In fact, echoing Balfour, I affirm that Du Bois’s understanding of the reconstruction 
of American democracy, and the democratic lessons of the broadening of its ideals, can inspire 
democratic politics globally.28 The normative framework of cosmopolitan citizenship does not 
subvert—but can inspire—fair terms of civic belonging within particular political communities. In 
fact, political cosmopolitanism requires public authority embedded in constitutional democracies 
that institutionalize the terms of civic belonging.29 Du Bois’s defense of the interracial terms of 
fair social cooperation emphasizes a local, historical narrative of struggle and triumph, but the 
experience it conveys can also help dismantle social domination in polities around the world. 
                                                      
25 Marable, Manning. W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat. Boston: Twayne. 1986. p. 99. 
26 Du Bois, W.E.B. Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. chp. 5. 
27 Appiah, Kwame Anthony. Lines of Descent: W.E.B. Du Bous and the Emergence of Identity. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2014. Jeffers, Chike. “Appiah’s Cosmopolitanism,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 51.4 
(2013): 488-510. “The Cultural Theory of Race: Yet Another Look at Du Bois’s ‘The Conservation of 
Races,’” Ethics 123.3 (2013): 403-26. 
28 Balfour, “Inheriting Du Bois,” p. 413. 
29 Varden, Helga. “A Kantian Conception of Global Justice,” Review of International Studies 37.5 (2011): 2043–57. 
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b. Du Bois’s Marxism? 
Finally, in the monograph version of my dissertation, I intend to include a discussion of 
Du Bois’s Marxism. Because I aim to present his Marxism as part of a philosophy of modern 
freedom, I am interested in the ethical dimension of his critique of labor and alienation in the racial 
capitalisms of 19th- and 20th-America. Drawing on the work of Manning Marable, Laurie Balfour, 
and Adolph Reed Jr., I will consider economic enfranchisement through the lens of the political 
and social meaning of racial embodiment.30 Without collapsing the terms of evaluative assessment 
to productive capabilities, Du Bois engaged Marxist thought in his critique of American 
democracy. He tied the degradation of citizens of color to the public perception—and 
depreciation—of the value of their labor in civil society, as well as the kinds of employment made 
available to them. I also aim to connect the issue of productive labor in civil society with that of 
reproductive labor in the family, for labor is not a monolithic concept, but assumes distinct 
expressions in the family and in civil society.31 But this is all work for another time and another 
day, one that in my estimation, will come soon. 
                                                      
30 Marable, Manning. W.E.B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat. Boston: Twayne. 1986; Balfour, Lawrie. 
Democracy’s Reconstruction: Thinking Politically with W.E.B. Du Bois. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Reed, Adolph L. Jr. W.E.B. Du Bois and American Political Thought: Fabianism and the Color Line. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997. 
31 Schwarzenbach, Sibyl A. On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009. chp. 4.   
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